

A HISTORY OF THE MILITIA AND DEFENCES OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA 1871-1914

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

History

We accept this thesis as conforming to the
standard required from candidates for the
degree of MASTER OF ARTS

Members of the Department of

History

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

April, 1956

ABSTRACT

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITIA AND DEFENCES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA - 1871-1914

This thesis deals with the development of the militia of British Columbia during the period 1871-1914 and takes into account the various economic, political, and social factors within British Columbia which affected its growth. This includes an examination of the causes, both internal and external, which induced certain individuals or groups of people in the province to agitate for the establishment of militia units, and the Dominion policy towards this agitation. In this latter respect it takes into account the strength and weaknesses of the militia system both in the Dominion as a whole and within the province of British Columbia. It deals briefly with Imperial defence policy in general, and Canadian-Imperial relations concerning the defence of British Columbia, in particular Esquimalt. The various British proposals for the joint defence of the naval station, the Dominion policy concerning such proposals and the negotiations which led to joint defence agreements are considered. The author concludes that policy concerning the defence of British Columbia originated not with the Dominion Government, but with the Imperial authorities. Some examination is made of the effect of a permanent regular garrison upon

a volunteer militia in the way of instruction, example, etc., and of Canadian policy towards the establishment of a permanent garrison at Esquimalt.

The historical significance of the work lies in the fact that, with the exception of Mr. R.H. Roy's article, The Early Militia and Defence of British Columbia, 1871-1885, there has been no examination of the early military history of this province. Canadian military history, including that of the various provinces, has as yet been but slightly examined by historians. It offers a wide field for research.

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IMPERIAL POLICY AND THE DEFENCE OF
CANADA AND BRITISH COLUMBIA

To understand the development and growth of the militia of British Columbia, the student must recall that this province is a maritime province, with a seaboard that stretches from the American border to the tip of the Alaskan Panhandle. With such a lengthy sea frontier to defend in the event of war, and with a scanty population from which to draw her military force, most of which was concentrated in the region of the lower mainland and southern Vancouver Island, she had, through necessity, to rely upon the Imperial garrison and the ships of the Royal Navy's Pacific squadron stationed at Esquimalt. This was the only British base in the eastern Pacific from the Cape to Alaska and it owed its strategic importance to the coal supplies of Vancouver Island, the only such coal resources on British soil in the eastern North Pacific. Therefore, the general attitude of the Imperial Government in matters of colonial defence plays an important part in the military history of British Columbia. In the succeeding chapters the more detailed results of Imperial policy in relation to British Columbia will be explained. This chapter will attempt to cover the general phases of Imperial policy in regard to the defence of Canada and her western coast.

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One of the factors which influenced the United Kingdom Government to support the federation of her North American colonies was the hope that such a move would enable her to withdraw her garrisons and relieve her of the financial burden of providing for the defence of that area. This was a partial manifestation of the then prevalent "little England" concept, which advocated a reduction of the expense of maintaining overseas garrisons in colonies which were considered liabilities. A further British problem was the possibility of hostilities developing with the United States over the Alabama claims as a result of the American Civil War, and the probable annihilation of her troops in the province of Canada if such a conflict should break out. With this attitude becoming the official policy of the British Government, it was not long until the Imperial garrison was being reduced in numbers, much to the consternation of the Canadians who protested that they were being left defenceless in the face of a belligerent American public. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Benjamin Disraeli, answered Canadian arguments with;

It can never be our pretense or our policy to defend the Canadian frontier against the United States. If the colonists cannot, as a general rule...defend themselves...they can do nothing. 1

Further Canadian representations against this Imperial policy were to no avail.² It was firmly pointed out to the

1. Quoted in C.P. Stacey, Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871, Toronto, Longman's Green, 1936.

2. The Marquis of Lorne, arriving in Ottawa, was refused an Imperial regiment, the British being more anxious to withdraw regiments from Canada than to station one in Ottawa. W.S. MacNutt, Days of Lorne, Fredericton, University of New Brunswick Press, 1955, p. 15.

Canadian Government that responsible government in internal affairs carried with it the responsibility of self-defence and that the presence of British troops was an anomaly in a free colony. The Dominion Government repeatedly stated that Canada had the right to some protection in view of the threat of the United States, her precarious financial condition and her efforts to maintain the Imperial ties. To this reasoning the Imperial Government pointed out the difference between the duty of the Empire to protect Canada from foreign aggression and the ability of the colony to provide a defensive force in time of peace.³ The British Government was in no mood to argue. The rise of Prussia after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 had upset the balance of power in Europe and had also given the Russians the opportunity of establishing naval bases on the Black Sea, contrary to the treaty of 1876. In contrast to the problems thus presented, the Canadian pleas carried little weight, and Britain maintained her policy of withdrawing her garrisons from the colony. Canada managed to provide for the defence of her borders from the assaults of the Fenians in the East, and to preserve her internal sovereignty by utilizing the militia to police the newly acquired territory of Manitoba. While neither of these actions could be construed as a full-scale engagement, they did demonstrate that the militia could suffice in times of

3. Canada, Sessional Papers No. 63, 1867-68, also Canada, Sessional Papers No. 46, 1871, also C.P. Stacey "Britains Withdrawal from North America, 1864-1871" CHR, Vol. 36 (Sept. 1955) pp 185-198, also C.P. Stacey, "British Military Policy in the Era of Federation" Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1934, pp 20-29, also R.L. Schugler, The Recall of the Legions, a phase of the Decentralization of the British Empire "American Historical Review, Vol. 26, (Oct. 1920) pp 18-36

external and internal difficulties. The exception to this was British Columbia, where the only defence available against a threatened Fenian invasion were the ships of the Royal Navy at Esquimalt.⁴ The Imperial Government, however, offered assistance in the province of Manitoba, to the satisfaction of the Canadian Prime-minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, who wrote to Sir John Rose that;

I received yesterday your cable to the effect that Her Majesty's Government will co-operate in the expedition...even if the force does not go, the agreement of England to co-operate with us will be immensely satisfactory to us, and show the United States that England has no intention of abandoning her colonies. ⁵

That this agreement was actually little more than a token offer is indicated in a comment by the British Secretary of War, the Earl of Granville. "Troops should not", he said, "be employed in enforcing the sovereignty of Canada on the population should they refuse to admit it."⁶

This British policy remained constant and the last of the Imperial troops, with the exception of the permanent garrison at Halifax, sailed from Quebec City 11 November, 1871. At Esquimalt the defence rested upon the ships of the British North Pacific squadron alone. An era of British Imperial defence policy was at an end.

4. See Chapter III, pp. 55-58.

5. Joseph Pope, Correspondence of Sir John A. Macdonald, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1921, p. 124.

6. Quoted in N.F. Black, History of Saskatchewan and the Old North West, Regina, North-West Historical Company, 1913, p. 146.

Meanwhile, a change in the shape of naval architecture was necessitating an alteration in naval policy. This change began as early as 1850, and by the late 1870s the armaments for war ships had become more deadly by the use of shot and shell; ships, now powered by steam, became larger, and could mount heavier weapons. A naval race began which was to embrace the whole of Europe as well as Russia.⁷ This increased the burden upon the Royal Navy as it faced more formidable potential foes and, as the Empire expanded, was forced to disperse its fleet over the whole of the globe.⁸ It then became necessary for the Royal Navy to conserve and redistribute her energies. This strain increased as the Manchester School of "laissez faire" gave way to a resurgent imperialism on the part of the United Kingdom. The acquisition of colonies by force if necessary, was not regarded as distasteful an occupation as formerly.⁹ This change in Imperial policy came after the election of a Liberal government under Gladstone, who initiated a period of reform in England, which alleviated many of the abuses of the electoral system created as a result of the Industrial Revolution. Relieved of the complete preoccupation in the struggle for domestic improvement, the majority of the British people now had time to look abroad

7. A.J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, New York, Knopf, 1940, pp. 8-9.

8. G.S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic, Toronto, University of Toronto, 1950, pp. 278-282.

9. For an excellent account of the causes of the new European imperialism see W. Langer The Diplomacy of Imperialism New York, Knopf, 1935, Vol. 1, pp. 67-96.

from their Island. This renewed interest and pride in affairs beyond the seas brought a new concept of the importance of the Empire to the Mother Country. Unfortunately, Mr. Gladstone, being a Liberal, still adhered to the philosophy of the Manchester School. His political antagonist, Disraeli, himself a former Manchester advocate, now realized that there was a general reaction to these "laissez faire" theories. Seeing the political expedient, he guided his Conservative party into the Imperialist camp, and, with this issue, imperialism versus "laissez faire", as one of the significant issues of the election, brought his government into power in 1874. The Liberals, once defeated, had the flexibility to alter their policy, and Gladstone was soon telling audiences that;

There is no more idle conception amongst all the vain imaginings that fill the atmosphere of politics, than the conception that now and then finds vent, that there are in this country a party of men who are insensible to the great dignity and the great duty connected with the maintenance of the Colonial Empire of England. There may have been superstitions gather around the idea of that Colonial Empire that have dominated in various ways, but there is no man worthy of the name of a statesman, no man known to me in the sphere of political life, who is not sensible that the business of founding and cherishing these colonies is one that has been so distinctly entrusted by providence to the care of the people of this country, that we should almost as soon think of renouncing the very name of Englishmen as of renouncing the great duties which, pressing beyond these, are imposed upon us in regard to the more distant but not less dear portions of this great British Empire. 10

10. Quoted in H.O. Arnold-Forster, "The Liberal Idea and the Colonies", Nineteenth Century and After, vol. XIV, (September, 1883), p. 400.

Though political opinion now swung towards the imperialist idea, there was little offered in the way of concrete suggestions as to how the Empire could be defended from foreign powers, or how the military establishments of the various colonies could be integrated into one force to protect the Empire as a whole. There was little cause for concern in a world at peace, but the Russian scare of 1877-1878, as a result of British intervention in the Russo-Turkish War, made it imperative that some steps be taken for the defence of Imperial interests. In the Pacific, immediate action was taken by the Royal Navy which stationed three ships at Esquimalt to counter the presence of a Russian squadron then visiting San Francisco.¹¹ The Dominion Government, alarmed by the arrival of the Russian merchant raider, Cibbria, off the coast of Maine, could take no measures to defend her two coasts against rumoured possible attacks on British shipping in North American waters.¹² As the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, wrote;

We have as much interest in British Columbia as in Australia, and no more. The railroad once finished, we become one great united country... Were the railway (the Canadian Pacific) in existence now, the Imperial Government would have no anxiety about the military protection of Vancouver Island and its harbours from Russian attacks, and the coal supply so necessary for the North Pacific

11. Victoria Daily Colonist, 30 April, 1877, p. 2.

12. See Chapter III, page 72.

squadron would also be secure from attack. At present Canada has no means of sending a militia force or munitions of war to British Columbia, and the burden must therefore be thrown on England. 13

With the responsibility thus forced upon the Royal Navy, the defence of British Columbia became increasingly an Imperial matter, and the people of the province, realizing their isolation from the Dominion, accepted the idea of Imperial defence;

Naturally Englishmen, in whatever part of the British Empire they may be placed, feel they are as fully entitled to the protectingegis of the mother country as if being in their native land... military defence must be Imperial and not national. 14

This rise of interest in Imperial defence by British Columbia was an expression of the second fear of threatened Fenian invasion in 1880-1881. The troubled situation in Ireland and the poverty and misery of the Irish peasantry had caused an almost fanatic nationalism amongst the Irish-Americans who were bent upon striking a blow against the hated British crown. The possibility of such an invasion was strong enough to have induced Macdonald to ask for the despatch of Royal Navy ships to Esquimalt. The willingness

13. Macdonald to Sir Stafford Northcote, 1 May, 1878, in Pope, Correspondence of Sir John A. Macdonald, pp. 242-243 This was a rather hypocritical statement, as, even when the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed, Macdonald exhibited little interest in the protection of British Columbia from attack. His government took, and continued to take, little action to improve the militia forces of the province. Its isolation did force its defence upon the Royal Navy, but the Canadian Government did almost nothing to assist.

14. Victoria Daily Colonist, 20 February, 1877.

of the Imperial Government to shoulder the defence of British Columbia was not entirely altruistic. The new aggressive railway policy of Macdonald made the British Government suddenly aware of the immense importance of Esquimalt other than as a naval and coaling station maintained primarily as a defensive precaution against possible Russian encroachment in the North Pacific. The eventual completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway would mean the realization of an uninterrupted global highway on British-controlled territory.¹⁵ British trade and commerce could proceed from Portsmouth to Halifax, via the Canadian Pacific Railway to Esquimalt, from there to the Far East, and from the Far East through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean back to Portsmouth. Esquimalt would thus "become the bastion from which the familiar instrument of sea-power could smother American impertinences and make Britain the greatest power on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic."¹⁶

The Conservative Prime Minister, Disraeli, decided to reinstitute the old Colonial Defence Committee as a Royal Commission to "enquire into the defence of British possessions and commerce abroad." This Commission sat from 1879 to 1882 and issued three reports. The first summarized the amount of trade within the British Empire and British trade with foreign nations; the second dealt with the coal supplies and the

15. See Chapter II and IV, pages 102-103.

16. MacNutt, Days of Lorne, p. 107.

protection of colonial and commercial interests by the Royal Navy; the third and final report concerned the great Imperial trade routes, the value and nature of such trade and the terminal ports requiring military defence. These reports brought out the important commercial value of the Empire as well as the absolute necessity for United Kingdom control of the sea lanes and secure bases from which the Royal Navy could protect the ocean routes of the Empire. Although allowing the Royal Navy the freedom to seek out, engage and destroy any enemy on the high seas, the Commission did not decide on any scheme for the defence of the Empire as a whole, or the extent of the responsibility of each colony to contribute towards the military and naval force of the Empire.¹⁷ Its report is important in that it outlined the type of defence and militia required in British Columbia, and it was to guide the Imperial and Canadian Governments when they sought to improve or expand the militia of the province.¹⁸ It was also to be one of the steps which led to the calling of the first Colonial Conference in 1887.

During the time that the Commission was holding its investigations, England was beginning to experience, not only industrial competition from the United States, Germany,

17. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic, fn. p. 279, also Imperial Defence, The Edinburgh Review, vol. 169, (April, 1889), pp. 554-555, 557, 567, also Colonel E.T.H. Hutton, "A Co-operative System for the Defence of the Empire," Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings, vol. 29, (April, 1898) pp. 224-225.

18. See pages Chapter I ¶ pp 72-74 ¶ IV, pp 111.

and France, but also discrimination against her goods in the forms of duties and tariffs on the European continent. Her textile, steel and iron industries were struggling against a drop in prices and the effects of a world depression and it soon became apparent to the industrial leaders of Britain that the Empire, once thought of as an expensive luxury, was actually their salvation.¹⁹ The prediction of the Manchester School that Canada, once federated, would gradually leave the Empire, was proven wrong, and the fear of an Anglo-American war over the Dominion had passed. The investigations of the Royal Commission revealed that the United Kingdom's advantage, even in the colonial markets, was diminishing.²⁰

In Canada there was also an interest in Imperial federation, with the aim of strengthening and preserving the Imperial tie. In Canada the Imperial federation league was opposed to the trend towards economic union with the United States and was ably headed by Colonel G. Dennison of Toronto. The employment of a Canadian voyageur contingent in the Sudan campaign of 1884 was regarded by many as an expression of Canada's loyalty to the Empire, even though the force was a civilian group recruited and paid by the Imperial Government. The Canadian Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, had no desire to enter into any agreement with the British Government

19. C.A. Bodelson, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, London, 1924, p. 83.

20. R. Jebb, The Imperial Conference, London, Longmans Green, 1911, vol. II, pp. 114-115.

that would involve Canada in Imperial wars.²¹ He did not wish to lessen the Imperial tie, but declared;

I am very desirous that the connection between the colonies and the mother country should be drawn closer, and that the large groups of colonies should assume, by degrees, a position less of dependence and more of an alliance...and I am a total disbeliever in the practice of colonial representation in the Imperial Parliament. 22

The desire for an Imperial defence scheme gained impetus with the Denjailah incident on the Northwest frontier of India, which seemed to imply that Russia aspired to undermine Britain's position in India. The United Kingdom became extremely interested in the defence of the coast of British Columbia as the Canadian Pacific Railway neared completion, providing a link by which the United Kingdom could strengthen her position in the Far East. Shortly after, relations between Canada and the United States became strained over the fisheries question, especially when Canada began seizing American ships for supposed violations of the treaty of 1818. The American president, Grover Cleveland, was authorized by the House of Representatives to retaliate against Canada by debarring Canadian ships and their goods from American ports, and it was stated in the United States Senate;

...at Victoria on Vancouver Island she (Great Britain) keeps consistently from two to three war-ships convenient to the commercial centres along the Sound and upon the Columbia River, and within forty-eight hours of the wealthy and populous city of San Francisco. She had recently ordered...twenty

21. C.P. Stacey "Canada and the Nile Expectation 1884-1885" C.H.R. Vol. 33 (Dec. 1952) pp. 319-340.

22. Macdonald to the Rev. C.H. Mackin, 4 April, 1890, Pope, Correspondence of Sir John A. Macdonald, p. 468.

Armstrong 30 ton guns for her fortifications at Vancouver Island, to frown on our defenceless coast just across the Strits of Juan de Fuca, and she notified the Canadian Pacific Railway to be ready to bring them other war material across the continent in April next. 23

The Republican representatives from New England, aware of the Irish vote, became more bellicose as the situation deteriorated. The Imperial Conference of April, 1887, occurred one month after the president signed this retaliatory bill. The moment had arrived, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, to work out some arrangement for the military protection of the Empire. When, at the Conference, the question of Canadian defence came up for discussion, the Canadian delegate, Sir Alexander Campbell, stated that Canada's general defence, as well as the defence of her Pacific coast, was improved immeasurably by the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1886, and that this railway was in itself a great asset to Imperial defence. It was pointed out to the other delegates that this provided a continuous link through British soil from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and was made possible without the assistance of the Imperial Government. In concluding, Sir Campbell said;

You all know also that we have made what we consider may be used as other preparations. We have constructed at enormous expense the Canadian Pacific Railway. By means of that railway, and by means of the Intercolonial Railway, which was constructed some years ago under the management of my friend Mr. Fleming, we have extended the possible communication from London to the extreme northwest on the

23. Quoted in G.N. Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1952, vol. I, p. 82.

Pacific Ocean, and reduced the time occupied in traversing that distance to a period of a fortnight. So that Her Majesty's Government could send reinforcements of men and material to Esquimalt in 12 or 14 days from this place. 24

The Canadian delegates also brought to the attention of the Imperial Government the financial difficulties encountered by Canada in building this railway, and the great expense incurred in suppressing the second Riel Rebellion in 1885; she wished to refrain from further military expenditures. This remained the position of the Canadian Government and there was little the Imperial authorities could do to alter it, even though, without the presence of even a skeleton permanent garrison, the defenceless condition of the Canadian Pacific Coast was an obvious fact. The only available defensive force was the Royal Navy, and the Volunteer Militia at Victoria.²⁵

The Canadian delegation returned home to find the American presidential election of 1888 centering in a rather bitter Anglophobia. President Cleveland was accused by those court-ting the Irish vote of being pre-British, and, as the election campaign progressed, Anglo-American relations became even more strained. These relations more tense with the Bering Sea controversy of 1889. The American protestation of Canadian seal-fishing in the Bering Sea and public announcement of American intentions to police these waters, amounted to a denial of freedom of the seas. A small squadron of Royal Navy ships ominously took up station at Esquimalt and there

24. M. Ollivier, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1937, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1954, vol. 1, p. 42.

25. See Chapter IV, pp. 91-97.

was the possibility of war between the United Kingdom and the United States. Eventually, after a lengthy diplomatic correspondence, the issue was submitted to arbitration by treaties signed at Washington on the 29th of February, 1892.²⁶

Any attempts on the part of the Imperial Government to persuade Canada to make donations to her external defences met with little success. The position taken by the Dominion Government was that she was already spending more than the million dollars annually required for defence by the Canadian-Imperial agreement of 1865.²⁷ This attitude was ill-received by the Imperial authorities who had spent more monies on Canadian defence than on the defence of any other colonies, and it was not until after the Bering Sea controversy and much negotiation that an agreement was reached with the Canadian Government in 1893 on the joint defence of Esquimalt.²⁸

During the next two years Imperial defence policy remained unchanged, and little was accomplished in the efforts to provide for an Imperial defence plan. Unfortunately, the

26. See "Great Britain" in Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 1889-1892, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1890-1893. also Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald, the Old Chieftan, Toronto, Macmillan, 1955, p. 554, also T.A. Bailey, A. Diplomatic History of the American People, New York, Crofts, 1947, pp. 445-449.

27. See Chapter II, p. 39.

28. See Chapter IV, p. 119.

international situation again became troublesome, and the United Kingdom shortly found herself at strained relations with two nations, almost simultaneously. The first was the United States who resented Britain's meddling in South American affairs, contrary to the provisions of the Munroe Doctrine as interpreted by the American Government of that period. The strained situation evolved out of the United Kingdom's efforts to extend the boundaries of British Guiana to include a goodly segment of Venezuela. When the British Government seemed loath to arbitrate, President Cleveland sent to Congress a message which amounted to an almost direct challenge to England.²⁹ There was a fever of activity in Canada; the militia was greatly improved. In England the idea of war with the United States was largely deplored and was, in fact, to be avoided at all costs. A primary factor which made the Imperial Government ready to settle her differences with the United States was the situation in South Africa. On 3 January, 1896, an Englishman, Dr. Jameson, engineered a foolhardy attempt to undermine the authority of the Boer Republic in South Africa. This was followed by a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany to President Kruger of the Boer Republic, giving him at least the moral support of Germany in his struggles with the British.³⁰ The United Kingdom now found that she was alienated and isolated internationally, and confronted with the possibility of facing

29. See F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, New York, Holt, 1938, pp. 415-421.

30. R.L. Lovell, The Struggle for South Africa, 1875-1899, New York, Macmillan, 1934, fn. p. 360, p. 377.

an alliance of hostile European powers. It was now imperative that she settle her differences with the United States. This was accomplished in November, 1896, and with it came a lessening of Anglo-German ill-feeling. But the German incident had served to warn England of the difficulties which lay ahead.

In the last month of 1896 a degree of peace and amity had come to international relations after a year of crisis during which Britain had seen her world prestige plummet. In addition to the difficulties with the United States and South Africa, Russian encroachments in the Far East and more especially Manchuria, had given that power, by treaty with China, important railway and commercial rights and a naval base at Port Arthur. As a result of these incidents, H.W. Wilson, one of the foremost 'navalists' of England, could write;

...our national reputation has distinctly fallen, because we are not strong enough to give effect to our veiled threats. On top of this all comes the steady and continuous growth of foreign navies which have no great commerce, no transmarine empire like ours to protect, and which it would seem, must be destined for offensive action against ourselves. 31

The British Army was totally unfit for active operations; the Royal Navy, formerly faced with France and Russian as potential foes, now faced the possibility of defending the Empire from Germany, France, Russian, and the United States, while the United Kingdom stood alone, without any ally upon whom she could rely. The Imperial Government realized that a new, more aggressive naval policy had to be formulated. On

31. Quoted in Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, p. 241.

the 3rd December, 1896, the Duke of Devonshire, president of the Defense Committee of the British Cabinet, stated, "Maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial defence against attack by sea. That is the determining factor in shaping the whole defensive policy of the Empire."³² The naval race was now on in earnest.

At the Colonial Conference of 1897, the British Secretary of State for Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, expressed his desire to see the Empire united for trade and defence and he alluded to the Defence Committee, established in 1885, which had become a permanent part of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The First Lord of the Admiralty, in addressing the delegates, summarized the new concept in naval defence, and in so doing pointed to the flaw in War Office-Admiralty co-operation in arriving at methods to defend colonial stations, and Esquimaux in particular;

I know that an erroneous impression has existed that, not only in the Colonies, but at home, we should station ships to defend particular ports. Take Liverpool for instance. We, the Navy, are under no guarantee to defend Liverpool. The defences of Liverpool are in the hands of the Army who practically manage the torpedoes and the mines, the shore defences in fact...The principle point in that speech (by the Duke of Devonshire) was a protest against the idea of what I call hugging the shore, against the idea that protection by the Navy superseded the necessity for shore defences. It laid down the principle that our policy must be aggressive, seeking out the enemy...Hence the

32. Hutton, Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings, p.224.

duty of the Colonies as well as the Mother country to look after their shore defences. 33

For, as Marder points out; in reference to the lack of co-operation in the defence of the coaling stations;

The divorce between the Admiralty and the War Office, and the absence of any co-ordinating power regulating the functions of the two services, was responsible for the impossibility of framing any really adequate system of national and imperial defence. The needs of the army and the navy, and the probable functions of both in war, had never been considered by some high organizations in which both services were represented. Co-operation between the War Office and the Admiralty was irregular, uncertain, impeded by formality... (they) were on little better than speaking terms. 34

The Conference ended without any agreement having been reached on Imperial defence. The new Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier, was not to deviate from the policy of his late political opponent, Macdonald, which precluded Canada from becoming too involved in Imperial affairs and Imperial wars.

In 1898 the Imperial Government was faced with a very real possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance in the Mediterranean. This would place in the Mediterranean a combined force greater than that of the British force stationed there. In England there was talk of placing the fleet on a war footing and of increasing the Mediterranean squadron of the Royal Navy. But while England was preoccupied with the Mediterranean situation, she ignored, for the moment, the fact that the

33. Ollivier, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1937, vol. 1, p. 142. For further comment on the confusion and difficulties involved in manoeuvring between the Admiralty and the Army and Colonial Defence Committee, see Chapter III, pages 71-73, Chapter IV, pages 96-97.

34. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, p. 79.

the First German Fleet Bill of 1898 had been passed by the German Government. The Bill was not a direct challenge to England, for, as Professor Langer states;

It did not provide Germany with a fleet comparable to those of France or England. It was of an unambitious character, and the British paid little attention to it in its own right...it was the alliance value of the German fleet that concerned the English more than anything else. 35

In the simplest terms there was a possibility that if Germany decided to cast her fortunes with England's two rivals, her fleet could provide the balance that could seriously threaten British naval supremacy. Regardless of the fact that the Admiralty believed Germany more prudent than to allow the rise of Russia in Europe,³⁶ there was some concern over Germany's increasing influence in the Far East.³⁷ This concern increased with the discovery that British naval construction had been seriously curtailed by an engineering dispute and a dockyards strike.³⁸ The situation was further complicated by the threat of the rising Japan. The First Lord of Admiralty, in introducing the naval estimates to Parliament, observed that;

Every day new factors enter into our strategic considerations. The balance of power varies; navies vary in the rate of increase; new fleets are created. For instance, the Japanese fleet is a new factor in strategic considerations, and there are naval develop-

35. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, vol. II, pp. 441-442.

36. Marder, The Anatomy of Sea Power, p. 299.

37. T.A. Brossey, ed., The Naval Annual, Portsmouth, Griffin, 1898, p. 56.

38. A.S. Hurd, "The Navy and the Engineering Dispute," Nineteenth Century and After, vol. X~~4~~III, (March, 1898) pp. 366-371.

ments by Germany and other nations. All these matters must continually modify our plans. 39

The entry of Japan into British naval concepts raised the question of whether an alliance with that nation could be promoted to thwart Russia's ambitions in the Far East. The Japanese had embarked on a naval programme which was to span the years 1897-1906, and was aimed at making her the supreme naval power in the China Seas. The Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons, commented that such an alliance would be;

...one of the most economical things that this country could possibly undertake, because it would save at once one, at all events, of the Great Powers from entering into a combination against us, and we should then be satisfied that the preparations we have made against all eventualities were absolutely sufficient. 40

This seeking of an alliance with a third power to prevent a combination occurring against England was not generally accepted. There were many who felt that the only policy was to increase her armaments and to disregard the courting of allies.⁴¹

With the Great Powers now wholeheartedly committed to a naval race, the Russian Tzar promoted a conference to consider the problem of international disarmament. The Conference, held in 1898, was a complete failure, for, as Lieutenant-

39. United Kingdom, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 4 series, vol. LIV, 10 March, 1898, pp. 1258-1259.

40. Ibid., vol. LVIII, 10 June, 1898, p. 1435.

41. Looker-on, "The Imperative Policy of Armament," Blackwoods Magazine, vol. 163, (June, 1895), pp. 861-864.

Colonel à Court wrote in a memo as the conference ended;

...although anxious to meet us half-way, Russia cannot come to a separate understanding with England to limit naval armaments so long as there is no check upon the navies of Germany and Japan...but the German naval delegate...has made it quite clear that Germany will not hear of limiting naval armaments while Japan, according to her naval representative, will only listen when she has reached the standard of the great naval powers, that is to say, never. The crux of the problem lies in the fact that no power can cry a halt while the one next below him on the scale continues to arm, and that the latter will not cease to arm until he has reached an equality with the rival above him. Moreover, the new policy of America and the rapid growth of her fleet are bringing a new set of considerations to the front....⁴²

Even had these difficulties been surmounted, public opinion in England demanded that her only salvation was to keep constructing new ships of war and that conferences on disarmament were little but a waste of time.⁴³ The Imperial Government, wishing to secure her bases in the colonies, began negotiations with Canada concerning the renewal of the joint agreement of 1893.⁴⁴ While these negotiations were being carried on, the long-smouldering antagonism between Briton and Boer broke out into open conflict in March, 1899.

⁴². Quoted in G.P. Gooch, H. Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, London, Majesties' Stationery Office, 1928, vol. 1, pp. 229-231.

⁴³. T.A. Brassey, "Can We Handle Our Own at Sea," Fornightly Review, vol. 64, (July, 1898), pp. 141-147, also S.Low, "The Hypocrisies of the Peace Conference, Nineteenth Century and After", vol. 45 (May, 1899), pp. 689-699, also Sir H. Howarth, "Some Plain words About the Tzar's New Gospel of Peace," Ibid., (January, 1899), pp. 202-216.

⁴⁴. See Chapter IV, pages 134-135.

The British Government immediately began a campaign to enlist the support of the colonies and in Canada it was ably assisted by the actions of Major-General Hutton, Commanding Officer of the Canadian Militia, Lord Minto, the recently appointed Governor-General, and the loyalist element of Canada's English-speaking population. As the campaign to enlist Canadian support gained momentum, the negotiations for the defence of Esquimalt came to a successful conclusion, for, as Lord Minto wrote to Chamberlain;

...though he (Prime Minister Laurier) thoroughly approves the action of the Imperial Government on South Africa, and admits the undoubted necessity of war, he has not been inclined to admit the policy of this colony accepting pecuniary liabilities for the old country. He says it is contrary to the traditions of Canadian history, and he thinks Canada would render Imperial service in a better shape by contributing to such works as the Canadian Pacific Railway and the defence of Esquimalt...45

As the war progressed and British blunder was followed by British defeat, the issue of Canadian participation became intense. Within Canada it became an emotional 'casé célèbre' with English Canadian desiring participation and French Canadian almost unanimously opposing it. Laurier, harrassed by the Conservative opposition and the loyalist elements of his own party, approved by Order in Council the despatch of Canadian troops for service in South Africa at Imperial expense. In defending his action before Parliament, he carefully enunciated his policy concerning Anglo-Canadian relations;

45. Lord Minto to Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, quoted in John Buchan, Lord Minto, a Memoir, London, Thomas Nelson, 1924. p. 141.

If England, at any time, were engaged in a struggle of life or death, the moment the bugle was sounded or the fire lit on the hills, the colonies would rush to the aid of the mother country. 46

But he continued;

I claim for Canada this: that in future Canada shall be at liberty to act or not to act, to interfere or not to interfere, to do just as she pleases, and that she shall reserve to herself the right to judge whether or not there is cause for her to act. 47

This policy, which was termed the "Laurier policy,"⁴⁸ was to be the criterion by which Canada was to maintain her relations with the Imperial Government, especially in matters of defence. It was to last until the ascendancy of the Conservatives under the leadership of Sir Robert Laird Borden in 1911, when Canadian policy became more closely tied with that of the United Kingdom.

During the time that the Empire was engaged in the Boer War, the German Government passed a second fleet bill, which was to be a direct challenge to the sea superiority of the Royal Navy and thus to the British Empire. This bill, passed in the year 1900, was based on the assumption that;

If Germany could put a sufficient number of ships into the line of battle, England could not risk an attack, even with her superior fleet, because she would lose so many ships in destroying the German

46. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 5 February, 1900, p. 38.

47. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, ibid.

48. A.C. Dewey, The Dominions and Diplomacy, London, Oxford University Press, 1921, p. 235.

navy that the British navy would then be at the mercy of other powers. 49

The preamble of the bill itself stated that "Germany must have a fleet of such strength that a war, even against the mightiest naval power would involve risks threatening the superiority of that power."⁵⁰ With the British becoming aware during the years 1901-1902 of the growth of German seapower, which was contrary to her general European policy of the balance of power, she saw, at the same time, the "open door" policy in China being threatened by both Russia and Japan. Unable to promote an alliance with the United States to maintain the status quo in the Far East,⁵¹ though, as Gelber wrote:

English-speaking friendship, the increased navy of the United States and the popular reassertion of the Munroe Doctrine were, in fact, all constituents of that informal defensive reinsurance on which Great Britain would henceforth rely, as she turned away to face whatever might rise across the North Sea. 52

However, this Anglo-American friendship was not sufficient, and England still needed allies, especially as she had decided on a definite policy of concentrating the fleet in home waters. When the Commander-in-Chief of the North Pacific squadron asked for more ships, he was curtly refused by the Admiralty, who informed him that the Royal Navy could not station ships

49. This bill gained support in Germany as it was pointed out that even if Germany wanted to help the Boers she did not have the money to do so. See E.L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy, Oxford, Clarendon, 1935, pp. 24, 28.

50. Quoted in H.F. Watt, L.G.H. Horton-Smith, The Passing of the Great Fleet, London, Sampson Low, Marston, 1909, p. XXXVII.

51. "An Eastern Navy," Contemporary Review, vol. 80 (October, 1901), pp. 538-546.

52. E.C. Gelber, The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, 1898-1906, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 130.

at every port of the Empire. As the Royal Navy was taking her ships out of the waters of the North Pacific, it became an absolute necessity for England to protect that flank, as well as her interests in the Far East. On the 30th January, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded and with it came the end of England's "splendid isolation."⁵³ The alliance was more to the advantage of Japan, but;

Briefly stated, there was a real clash of interests between England and Russia. But not so much in Manchuria as in China generally, in Tibet, in Persia, in Turkey...the English made the agreement with Japan in order to prevent an understanding between Russia and Japan which would have rendered the British position in the Far East almost hopeless. If one looks at the alliance from this viewpoint there will be less difficulty in seeing why the British gave the Japanese the free hand in Korea and avoided pressing too far their demand for an extension of the alliance to India. The important thing for England was not in the alliance, but that there was an alliance. ⁵⁴

Within the alliance was a secret understanding that the British would keep a fleet in the Pacific equal to the third largest naval power there. But the United Kingdom, at the insistence of Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, inserted a clause stating that this would be done "as far as possible."⁵⁵ This provided England with a loophole which enabled her to reduce her fleet in Pacific waters, even against the wishes of the Japanese, who feared a war with Russia. The British Director of Naval Intelligence wrote that the

53. Israel Torkow-Namani,, "Abandonment of 'Splendid Isolation' by Great Britain," C.H.R., vol. 27, (1946), pp. 163-188.

54. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, vol.II, pp. 782-783.

55. Gooch, Temperly, eds. British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vol. II, pp. 103-105, 110.

third power agreement had not been fulfilled to the letter, as it imposed strategically unsound obligations.⁵⁶

The Colonial Conference of 1902 found the Imperial Government becoming more concerned about the rise of German naval power, and there was a determined effort on the part of the British authorities to work some scheme by which the Empire would contribute towards the maintenance of the Royal Navy. To this, Laurier was unequivocally opposed, as he was opposed to a New Zealand resolution to have an Empire military force established for service anywhere in the world. To have consented to any of these proposals would have deepened the already wide split between French and English in Canada, over Canadian participation in Imperial wars. The Prime Minister did offer to relieve the Imperial Government of the burden of manning the fortification at Esquimalt and Halifax.⁵⁷ This offer was favourably received by the United Kingdom Government, which was, perhaps, gratified to have at last obtained some hope of assistance from the Dominion.

The advent of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904 brought with it the possibility of intervention by Russia's allies, France and Germany. British participation seemed unavoidable. The Imperial Government, probably more than anxious to curtail the number of ships needed in colonial ports, undertook negotiations with Canada to have the Dominion assume control

56. Quoted in Marder, The Anatomy of Sea Power, p. 434.

57. See Chapter IV, pages 143-147.

of Halifax and Esquimalt naval stations. The agreement was eventually concluded in March of 1905,⁵⁸ not long before the Japanese eliminated the Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima, 27-28 May, 1905. This nullified any threat from Russia, and with the constantly growing Anglo-American friendship, it became even more feasible for the British to bring her fleet home to the North Sea. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed in the same year, in the form of compromise, largely out of British insistence. The compromise consisted in maintaining the status quo against aggression by any third power.

July, 1906, found the last of the Imperial garrison relieved of its duties at Esquimalt, amidst mixed reactions amongst the press and public opinion of British Columbia.⁵⁹ Questions by groups in the province as to the provisions being made by the Admiralty for the defence of Esquimalt brought forth the following statement of policy by the Admiralty Board;

It is the opinion of the Board of the Admiralty... that the changes which they have made in the system under which His Majesty's Navy has been distributed hitherto, will afford a much higher degree of security to the Empire as a whole, and the defences of the coast of British Columbia and Vancouver Island will be strengthened...in the event of the outbreak of war with a naval power under the revised scheme of distribution of the fleet, Esquimalt would share in the protection which would be extended to all British

58. See Chapter IV, pages 146-147.

59. Editorial, The Daily News Advertiser, 30 March, 1905, also Vancouver Province, 20 February, 1905, Hopkins, op.cit., pp. 465-

possessions in the Pacific and Indian Oceans by the powerful Eastern Fleet. 60

In reality there was only the insignificant Canadian garrison at Esquimalt, undermanned and almost forgotten by Ottawa,⁶¹ for the Canadian Government fully realized that the Royal Navy had no intention of keeping Esquimalt as a major Imperial Naval station. The attitude of the Dominion Government was best expressed by the Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir Frederick Borden;

I may add this much, that it has transpired since the government took over Halifax and Esquimalt, that the British Admiralty, before we made the offer, had deliberately adopted the policy, though we were not aware of the fact, of practically abandoning Esquimalt as a naval station and therefore the government had not asked the Royal Navy to keep units at Esquimalt. 62

Protest as British Columbia might that section nine of the Terms of Union, that the Dominion Government would use its influence to keep the Royal Navy at Esquimalt, had been violated, the Canadian Government refused to take any action and it is not likely that they even desired to do so. It was far more likely that Laurier was content to see Imperial influence in Canadian military affairs diminish to non-existence. His recent experience with Imperial officers appointed to command the Canadian militia, Major-General E.T. H. Hutton and Major-General Lord Dundonald. In the case of the former, Laurier obtained his resignation for the general's

60. Quoted in J.C. Hopkins, ed., Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1905, p. 465.

61. See Chapter IV, pages 150-152.

62. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 9 March, 1909, p. 2299.

overstepping the line on military affairs, and becoming too politically involved in government military policy. The case of Lord Dundonald was similar, but it received a greater degree of publicity. From these two incidents evolved the Militia Council and Canadian military command over forces in the Dominion.⁶³

The Imperial Conference of 1907 found the Imperial Government, having learned from past experience that the colonies could not be induced to contribute to or participate in an Imperial defence scheme, attempting a new approach. A resolution was passed stating that the Imperial Government was a leader amongst equals, and not the omnipotent ruler as formerly. There was also debate on a motion put forth by the Honourable Alfred Deakin, Prime Minister of Australia, which stated that, not only should the dominions have the right to consult the Imperial Defence Committee, but that they should also have the prerogative of representation at the meetings of the Committee to explain Dominion views and opinions on Imperial defence. This motion was accepted by the delegates and, from 1907 to the end of the First Great War, Canada had a delegate present at all meetings of the Imperial Defence Committee.⁶⁴

63. See Chapter IV, pages 143-152, also A.P.Gundy, "Sir Wilfred Laurier and Lord Minto," Canadian Historical Association, Annual Report, 1952, pp. 28-38. also G.R.Parkes, "The Evaluation of the Control of His Majesty's Canadian Forces," Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol.V, (July, 1933), pp.465-480; also N. Penlington, "General Hutton and the Problem of Military Imperialism in Canada," C.H.R., vol.24, (June, 1943), pp.156-171.

64. A.B. Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, Oxford, Clarendon, 1928, vol. II, pp. 1182-1183.

In military matters the delegates to the Imperial Conference of 1909 decided on two principles: the first was to standardize the military forces of the Dominions on the pattern of the British Army, in equipment, training, and arms; the second was to work out a plan whereby the Dominion forces could rapidly combine into one homogeneous army. This was a change in Imperial policy from the former attempts to dominate or cajole the colonies into agreeing to some Imperial defence scheme. The British now settled upon the more subtle, yet more successful plan of binding the colonies together under her leadership by making their military forces dependent upon British supplies, British training, and British methods.⁶⁵ This policy was continued successfully, until the present time, when the factor of continental defence has forced Canada to adopt American arms and supplies.

The Imperial Conference of 1911 showed what progress had been made in the Imperial General Staff which had, by then, been in operation for two years. The progress that was most apparent was in the arrangements effected for loans, attachments and interchanges of and between officers of the British Army and officers of the Dominion services. A system had also been arranged for the exchange of advice and assistance by allowing correspondence to take place between the General

65. Imperial Conference of 1909, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 29 A, 1909, pp. 33-45, This dependency on the United Kingdom was evident when guns, etc. were obtained for the British Columbia Militia and the fortifications at Esquimalt, Chapter XX, pp III, pp 60.

Staff Officers of the Dominion and the United Kingdom General Staff, on condition that their correspondence was open to inspection by the Minister of Militia and Defence. The formation of a Dominion's section of the General Staff was agreed to. Considerable progress had been made in the standardization of military education with the Empire. Another matter that was arranged was the regulation of visits to the Dominions by the Imperial Inspector General and regulations were drawn up under which that officer's services would be available to the Dominion requesting them.⁶⁶

A year later the Dominion's section was created, consisting, at the outset, of one officer each from Canada and Australia, and designed to keep the militia of the Dominions abreast of United Kingdom military education, training, and staff duties, as well as innovations in the field of strategy and tactics. At the same time the Dominion officers could advise the Imperial General Staff on local matters within their respective countries.

Generally, the course taken by Imperial policy in providing for the defence of her colonies, and more especially, the defence of Canada, hinged directly on England's economic and political relations with other countries over which Canada had no direct control. When it was found expedient the British Government willingly left the defence of Canada in the hands of Canadians, except for the naval stations of Halifax and

⁶⁶. The Imperial Conference, 1911, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1911.

Esquimalt which were bastions of the Royal Navy defending the Eastern and Western approaches to Canada. The first years after British Columbia entered Confederation were years of apathy on the part of the Imperial Government towards the defence of her overseas colonies. This period, lasting to 1878, found the Imperial Government lacking interest in even the defence of Esquimalt, possibly because it was considered less important than Halifax. However, with the first critical international situation, rising out of the Russian scare of 1877, Canada and the United Kingdom became alarmed over the defenceless position of the Canadian coastlines. The Canadian Government displayed more concern over the defence of her East Coast, allowing the Royal Navy and the population of British Columbia to provide protection on the Western seaboard. From 1877 until 1902 several more crises threatened to involve Canada in Imperial wars which might conceivably have imperilled the West Coast. The Dominion's form of action was to depend upon the protection offered by the Royal Navy, without contributing to the expense. The Imperial Government, on the other hand, was impatient to arrange a definite scheme for the defence of the Empire and the defence of the colonies themselves as separate segments of the Empire. In attempting to accomplish this, she spent more money on Canadian defence than on the defence of any other colony up to the year 1891, and, while there are no figures available, it is safe to assume that this expense continued up to 1902. Canada, however, adopted a rigid policy of not contributing towards Imperial defence, choosing, instead, to develop her railway

communications and to use this as an excuse as to why she could not donate the funds to Imperial defence. The only accomplishments were the agreements of 1893 and 1899 on the joint Anglo-Canadian defence of Esquimalt. Except for the Venezuela incident in 1896 there was never any concern in Canada that there was a possibility of a war's being fought on her soil. In 1902 Imperial policy changed to a definite attempt to organize a defence scheme for the Empire, concentrated on naval power. The rise of Germany forced the British to concentrate her fleet in home waters, leaving the colonies defenceless a second time, with the major difference that the danger lay in Europe and the Dominion had the utmost confidence that the Royal Navy could prevent any war being carried to the shores of North America. The Dominion's policy remained static: non-participation and no contribution.

CHAPTER II

THE CANADIAN MILITIA SYSTEM 1868-1914.

In any study of the history and development of the militia of the province of British Columbia, it is necessary to realize that after 1871 this former British colony became a part of the Dominion of Canada, and had, through necessity, to adopt the militia system of the Dominion as a whole. It is therefore important to understand the military organization of Canada, and to note briefly the various weaknesses and strengths of that system.

The basis of the Canadian Militia system was laid in 1868, by "An Act Respecting the Militia and Defence of the Dominion of Canada,"¹ and was introduced to the House by George E. Cartier, Minister of Militia and Defence in the Conservative Government of Sir John A. Macdonald. This Bill formally acknowledged that the concept of compulsory military training in Canada had ended. The Tories remembered that the French-Canadian element of their party had deserted on the issue of conscription when it was introduced as part of a Militia Bill in 1862. The new method now adopted was to have the Militia built upon voluntary enlistments into various militia units, and to discontinue the old method of having compulsory military service for a period of six months or more. No provision was made for a professional army as we

1. 31 Vict. c 40.

know it today. The actual provisions for a Canadian Militia under the Act were as follows: the Militia was to be divided into different elements, the primary being the Active Militia and the Volunteer Militia, the secondary the Reserve Militia.

The Active Militia was to train for a period of eight to sixteen days a year for two years, the numbers of men trained being regulated by the money voted by Parliament. Men could be balloted for service, or provide a substitute, or, if failing in these alternatives, pay to the Department of Militia and Defence a sum of thirty dollars and thus be declared exempt from obligation to serve. The Volunteer Militia was to be composed of men who offered their services free of compulsion for a period of three years. These were men who might have escaped serving any time in the military at all, but who for various reasons, joined a militia unit in much the same way that men offer their services to the Reserve Militia in the present day. The Reserve was to be formed from all men who had previous military training and who were exempt from further military service, unless a national emergency required a levée en masse. As men of the Active and Volunteer Militia completed their tour of duty, they automatically became members of the Reserve Militia, theoretically making it possible to have a large pool of trained soldiers. Prior to 1868, these men of the Reserve were mustered on the sovereign's birthday, when they showed their presence to their commanding officers, and were retained on the militia reserve list. Unfortunately these parades became somewhat unruly and the government felt it necessary in the

public good to discontinue them. Since there was a lack of departmental staff in Ottawa to keep records up to date on the men in the Reserve, it became a paper force of dubious military value.

Under the Act, the male population of Canada, including all men between the ages of eighteen and sixty who were British subjects or naturalized British subjects, was placed into different groupings as they became liable for service. Differentiations within a broad category were made on the basis of marital status and age. In the first class were all men between the ages of eighteen and thirty who were unmarried; next were single men aged thirty to forty-five; thirdly, men in the same age group, married but without children; and, lastly, all men, regardless of marital status, childless or not, between the ages of forty-five and sixty. In the event of war, the male population would be called upon to serve in the order of the above classes, and in the case of an impending attack on Canadian soil, the whole male population, from eighteen to sixty, physically able, would be called out.

It was believed that, under this Act, Canada could sustain a force of 40,000 men, fully trained and equipped, ready for instant service, and trained for a period of eight and sixteen days a year. Actually, the maximum number available in various degrees of fitness and training, some ill equipped, was 37,000.²

2. Capt. E. J. Chambers, The Canadian Militia, Montreal, Fresco, 1907, p. 89.

The Act of 1868 sufficed for a period, especially as it allowed the Dominion to keep her military expenditures at a minimum. The Government could easily limit expenses by cutting the number of days' training allowed to the absolute minimum of eight days, and also limit the number of troops to be trained. Rather than cut the numbers of men to be trained, the Government usually limited the days of training. While Canada was able to keep her military costs down in this way, she could always count upon the British Imperial Garrison to provide the hard core professional corps around which the civilian militia units could rally. She could also obtain officers and senior non-commissioned officers for purposes of instruction when required. Thus, in the event of war, Canada could count upon the Imperials absorbing the initial shock while the Dominion's militia was being mobilized. At the same time she could acquire British equipment and, as shown by the First Riel Rebellion in Manitoba, British advice and officers. The Fenian troubles of 1870 and the North West rebellion in the same year did show that the Canadian militia was not completely shoddy, and that, given the proper leadership and training, it could respond to the threat of invasion extremely well. The lesson that training is necessary to form an efficient fighting force was learned during the trouble in 1866, when the Canadian Militia broke in confusion on their first contact with the Irish American invaders, and the situation was saved in part by the presence of British regulars.

Immediately after the withdrawal of the British Army in 1871, the Macdonald Government, to offset the loss of such a good part of the establishment, undertook a very modest course of action. The Government authorized the formation of two batteries of garrison artillery, one at Kingston and the other at Quebec, whose chief function would be to provide an instructor force for the militia.³ These batteries were the humble start of the Canadian Army Active Force, and are in existence today as "A" and "B" Batteries of the First Royal Canadian Horse Artillery.⁴

Whatever plans the Macdonald administration may have entertained for the expansion of a regular Canadian Army, they were thwarted by the election in 1873 of the Liberals under Alexander MacKenzie, on the eve of a world depression. By 1877 the depression in Canada had forced a curtailing of the expenditure of \$1,000,000 which Canada had promised the Imperial Government she would spend annually on her military establishment.⁵ The whole of the militia fell into disrepair. There was shortage of rifles; uniforms, important to a volunteer unit, were old and worn; men were not being trained,

3. C.P. Stacey, "The Development of the Canadian Army," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 6, no. 2, 1952, p. 6.

4. Ibid., p. 7.

5. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 1689, E. Cardwell to Governor General, Lord Monck, 17 June, 1865, also P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. VI, no. 165, Copy Order in Council dated 20 January, 1892.

and what money was available was being concentrated on the city corps to the neglect of the rural units. Many units went from two to four years without their allocated period of training, and in 1882 the General Officer Commanding the Militia reported that the militia was averaging six days' training a year.⁶ The MacKenzie Government seemed loath to cut the numbers of men to be trained, preferring to have a large number of militia PARTIALLY drilled. This became known as the "dead period" in Canadian military development, and it was not until 1885 that militia funds exceeded \$1,000,000⁷ and the increase then was primarily the result of the outbreak of the Second Riel Rebellion in the same year.

The only optimistic note in the entire period of Liberal regime was the establishment in 1872 of a cartridge factory at Quebec and the creation of the Royal Military College in 1876.

The military situation became grave in 1878 with the Anglo-Russian crisis of that year.⁸ This crisis made a profound impression upon Macdonald. Having nurtured the be-

6. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1882, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 9, 1883, p. viii.

7. See Appendix. 1.

8. See Chapter 1, pp. 7-8.

ginnings of the Canadian regular army, he saw in this crisis a means by which Canadian public opinion would sanction the increase of the meagre permanent force. Macdonald wrote to Sir Stanford Northcote:

In a time of profound peace such a proposition would be unpopular...would be objected to by the opposition of the day and could not be carried by any ministry and yet I am satisfied that the time has come for the formation of a regular force closely connected with the Imperial Army and worked up to the same standard of training and discipline. Without this Canada will never add to the strength of the Empire but must remain a source of anxiety and weakness. 9

After 1879 his attitude towards the militia changed. While he was in London in 1880 to procure funds for the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, he appeared before the Colonial Defence Committee.¹⁰ He was cautious and non-committal in referring to Canadian defence expenditures. With the Russian crisis now passed, and faced with the prospect of the vast undertaking of building a trans-continental railway, he had to abandon temporarily his plans for the expansion of the Canadian permanent force.¹¹ However, his Government did introduce some important innovations. These innovations were due to a very noticeable decline in the ability of the regular militia. The original scheme for the setting up of two batteries of artillery was to provide train-

9. Pope, Correspondence of Sir John A. Macdonald, p. 329-342.

10. See Chapter 1, pp. 7-8.

11. A.R. Stewart, "Sir John A. Macdonald and the Imperial Defence Commission of 1879," Canadian Historical Review, vol. 35, (June, 1954) pp. 119-139.

ing for militiamen who would, in turn, train their respective units. This was to be accomplished by drafting officers and non-commissioned officers from the militia and attaching them to the active army for a year, whence they would proceed back to their original units to pass on their acquired training. However the plan broke down and the burden of instruction fell upon the few active troops, and the resulting fall in the efficiency of the militia led many to believe that a larger body of regular troops was necessary for the health of the citizen militia. They pointed to the progress of the militia artillery under the stimulus of the active "A" and "B" Batteries, led by Colonel Strange and Colonel French, both of the Imperial Army.

In view of these conditions, it was decided to form an instructional cadre of cavalry and infantry. This was accomplished through the Militia Act of 1883 which read in part:

It being necessary in consequence of the withdrawal of Imperial regular troops, to provide for the care and protection of forts, magazines, armaments, war-like stores and such like service, also to secure the establishment of Schools of Military Instruction in connection with corps enlisted for continuous service, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty to raise: one troop of cavalry, three batteries of artillery (of which three shall be "A", "B", and "C" Batteries now embodied), and not more than three companies of infantry - the whole strength shall not exceed seven hundred and fifty men. 12

The cavalry school, which later became the Royal Canadian

Dragoons, was established in 1884 at Quebec and the first infantry schools, which ultimately became the Royal Canadian Regiment, were opened in the same year at Fredericton, St. John's and Toronto.¹³

The deficiencies of the militia were amply illustrated by the North West Rebellion of 1885. The entire military organization broke down, leaving the troops to fight with poor equipment, insufficient supply and extremely scanty staff. Transport was organized along the way, and the basic fighting arm of the prairie, the cavalry, did not even get into action. Only the ineptitude of the rebel leaders prevented complete disaster.

The campaign cost the Canadian Government \$5,000,000, but the cost was insignificant compared to the revelations of the shortcomings of the military aspects of the expedition. Every principle of war was disregarded, and the need was apparent for drastic reorganization in every quarter.

The Canadian Government, however, let matters slide gracefully back to normalcy. Thus until the commencement of the Boer War, the militia was characterized by unmilitary bearing and organization.

In reviewing the years 1871-1899 several conclusions may be drawn. The first is that two very significant features of the military policy of Canada had their origins during

13. Quoted in Stacey, Canadian Army Journal, p. 8.

this time - the volunteer system which left it to the few to keep the militia in some form of efficiency, and made it impossible to have a solidified trained military force, and the apathy of the Canadian Government and people which placed an even greater burden on those men who strove to increase the efficiency of the militia. There is a good deal of truth in Lt./Col. Jarvis' statement in 1880:

A review of the management of the militia by successive administrations during the past twenty years almost warrants the conclusions that our rulers disbelieved in the necessity of a force at all, but retained one out of deference, perchance, to the old world prejudice of the British Government. 14

Confederation removed from Canada the regular establishments upon which the pre-confederation regiments had depended, and it brought to Canadian statesmen no concept of a Canadian Army created out of the unrelated corps of the militia scattered throughout the Dominion from Atlantic to Pacific. No really decentralized control was maintained or any scheme of mobilization readied for emergencies. Of necessity there was continual reliance upon the Imperial Army. Since Canada had no munitions factories, military stores were purchased in the United Kingdom and high Imperial officers were used to inspect, report, and assist the Dominion in the establishment of her militia. Non-fighting support departments were unknown in Canada. The Administration was over-centralized in Ottawa and what there was of it was left in civilian hands.

14. Lt./Col. S.M. Jarvis, "Imperial Federation and Canadian Defence," Canadian Monthly, vol. 4, (May, 1880) p. 457.

In 1878 Major-General Hutton, the Imperial Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, stated that:

The militia force of Canada is not, under the existing system, an army in its true sense; it is but a collection of military units without cohesion, without staff, and without those military departments by which an army is moved, fed, or ministered to in sickness. 15

The establishment of the Canadian militia was another source of weakness itself. There was a large surplus of men engaged in non-combatant roles as compared to those who were in the position of having to bear the brunt of any fighting that might have to be done. A similar disproportion existed in the ratio of officers and non-commissioned officers to men, which was found to be 1:2.24.¹⁶ This meant that for every 2.24 privates there was one officer or non-commissioned officer, a situation which made the militia top heavy in command on the battalion level.

The only sign of progress appeared as a result of the Venezuela incident of 1896. The militia was rearmed with a more modern rifle and the regular permanent force was increased. But the expenditure entailed in rearming the militia necessitated a curtailment of the usual period of summer training.

It was not until after the South African war that the extreme weaknesses of the militia were forcefully brought to

15. Stacey, Canadian Army Journal, p. 9.

16. See Annual Report of the State of the Militia, Establishment Lists, 1894-1904, Canada, Sessional Papers, 1895-1905.

the attention of the Government and it finally decided that something should be done. The Imperial Government also felt that her own forces needed reforming, and, upon hearing that Canada was planning to reorganize her militia force, invited the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir Frederick Borden, to the United Kingdom to discuss mutual problems of defence with the Colonial Defence Committee. As a result, certain militia reforms in Canada were undertaken, to the benefit of both nations. But, the Government's general attitude had not greatly altered. The Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, expressed his views in 1902, on the militia to Lord Dundonald, then commanding the Canadian Militia, when he said:

You must not take the militia seriously; for, although it is useful for suppressing internal disturbances, it will not be required for the defence of the country as the Munroe Doctrine protects us from enemy aggression. 17

✓ As ~~did~~^{had} the Riel Rebellion ~~had~~, the Boer War imparted to Canadians a false sense of security. The prevailing feeling was that the Canadian soldier was naturally superior as a fighting man. The idea of a professional army in Canada met with derision as a result of the poor showing of the British regulars which contrasted sharply with the excellence of the non-professional Canadians.¹⁸ This view gained support from

17. Quoted in A.R.M. Lower, Canada and the Far East - 1940, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 96.

18. Buchanan, Lord Minto, A Memoir, p. 144.

certain ranking professional soldiers in the United Kingdom. They had learned from the war that the Canadian soldier was tougher, possessed of more individuality, and more adaptable to the rigours of warfare than his English counterpart. "Canadians seem to possess," wrote Hamilton, "a natural aptitude for military discipline and to assume its bonds with eagerness...as shown in South Africa they were the best of the Colonial infantry."¹⁹

Although this faith in the characteristics of the individual Canadian soldier was well-founded, his personal qualities could not make up for the lack in the militia system as a whole. He was the product of a society which believed, not that a militia should be trained for war, but that its only purpose was to serve in aid of the Civil Power. A newspaper comment of 1902 demonstrates the typical attitude of the time:

Dundonald apparently shares a delusion dear to Hutton. He seems to think the people of Canada are concerned about being in readiness for war, or that if they are not they are to blame and should be stirred up. Any man who thinks that way - and all European soldiers do - fails to grasp the essential distinction between Europe and North America. With Europe war is a condition. With us it is a theory. 20

Canadians ignored the fact that in the organization of the force for South Africa, the militia showed, with the exception of the active force, complete breakdown. No provision

19. C.F. Hamilton, "The Canadian Militia," Queen's Quarterly, vol.10, (October, 1902) p. 199, also see Lt/Gen. J.F. Owen, "The Military Forces of Our Colonies," Fortnightly Review, vol. 297, (March, 1900) p. 479.

20. Quoted in Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1902, p. 193.

was made for the orderly training of troops or for the replacement of casualties. The majority of the force ^{WRS} were paid, fed, and clothed by the Imperial Government.²¹

The shortage of trained officers and non-commissioned officers was critical in 1902. It was reported that only five per cent of all the militia officers could read a map.²² Those qualified or even partially qualified men who were available were offered no tangible inducements to volunteer their services. Pay for officers, like that of the men, was low. The burden placed on the officers was made more severe by the fact that they had to provide themselves with their own uniforms at a cost far greater than the remuneration they received for military duties.²³ The higher ranking officers were expected to provide funds from private sources to help maintain their units.²⁴

While the officers came from that stratum of society which could afford such donations, the rank and file were largely from the lower middle class and could not afford these expenses. The rations and uniforms provided by the Government were of poor quality. The same could be said of the pay.²⁵ These were generally men who could afford neither

21. C.F. Hamilton, "Defence 1812-1912," A. Shortt, A.G. Doughty, eds. Canada and its Provinces, Toronto, Brock, 1914, vol. VII, pp. 436-442.

22. Lt./Col A.B. Cunningham, "The Canadian Militia," Queen's Quarterly, vol. 19, (April, 1912) p. 380.

23. Hamilton, Queen's Quarterly, p. 198.

24. Miles, "Our Militia," Canadian Monthly, vol. 5, (March, 1874) p. 187.

25. Lt/Col. O'Brien, "Our Militia," Canadian Magazine, VOL. 2, (December, 1894) p. 104.

the time nor the expense involved in going into summer camp for annual drill, and whose training, therefore, was limited to the occasional three hours of evening drill.²⁶ Those few who were able to go into camp found themselves without sufficient equipment for training purposes. For the whole Canadian Militia Field Artillery there were in 1902 but one hundred eight guns.²⁷

Eventually the Government decided to initiate reform and on 17th March, 1904, Sir Frederick Borden, Minister of Militia and Defence in the Liberal Government, introduced a new Militia Act. In presenting the bill, he stated that:

Let me say, in the first place, that the existing militia law is practically the same law which has been on the statute books since confederation, and indeed was on the statute books of Old Canada long before that date. Times have changed since that existing law was enacted...and it has been found impossible to carry on our militia system advantageously under the existing law...

Now I will mention some alterations which have been made in different provisions of the law. First it is proposed to increase the permanent force of the militia to 2,000. The present law provides for only 1,000.

The next change is in the rate of pay of the Active Militia. I am happy to be able to say that this bill provides that while the pay shall begin as it does now at fifty cents a day...there shall be a provision... allowing for an increase year by year, until at the end of three years, one dollar a day may be paid to men who have shown by their good conduct and their proficiency in rifle shooting that they have earned it.

One other alteration proposes to extend the period for annual drill from sixteen days to thirty days. It is not compulsory, but it will be possible, if occasion requires, to make that extension of time. The present law provides for sixteen days, but it

26. Owen, Fortnightly Review, p. 480.

27. Hamilton, ibid., p. 205.

has been the custom to make the period twelve days. It is not probable that that will be extended, but it was thought desirable that power should be given to the government, if at any time it felt necessary for the drill to be extended in certain cases to thirty days. 28

This Act represented the last major change in the provisions of the Militia Act until World War One. It did away with none of the major defects. Laws are easily passed, but their proper administration is another matter, and Canada has always shown a lack of reality where military matters are concerned.

The Canadian militia was, at best, imperfectly trained. The senior officers had little or no experience in handling their battalions, and staff officers, at once the most difficult to train and the most essential to the smooth functioning of all parts of the army, were scarce indeed. Records of the qualifications of junior and non-commissioned officers were ill kept and no one knew who was qualified for his rank and who was not. The rank and file was not required to engage in any definite period of training, and the fluctuating numbers being discharged or enrolled made advance preparations for their twelve days' training next to impossible. The arrangements for mobilizing the militia were hopelessly inadequate. No local mobilization storehouses existed, and there was a deficiency of stores. The equipping of the militia on a Dominion-wide scale would have been impossible;

28. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 17 March, 1904, pp. 206-211.

there was a scarcity of clothing of all descriptions, transport, and other necessary material. Sir John French, the Imperial Inspector General in Canada, stated in 1910, "... at the present it would not be possible to put the Canadian Militia in the field in a fit condition to undertake active operations, until after the lapse of a considerable period of time."²⁹

French reported that the peace-time organization of the militia was defective in that the various arms of the service were disproportioned and poorly integrated. This was true not only of the whole system but of any individual military district, and was particularly true of British Columbia. He recommended that some scheme be formulated for the mobilization of the militia in the event of war. He also advised the further training of officers in higher command and the enforcement of the requirements for qualifications of officers.³⁰ Major-General Lake, senior member of the Militia Council, reported that the chief deterrent to the carrying-out of these recommendations was not that they embodied a new concept but that:

...the extent to which progress in carrying out his recommendations can be made and the period which must elapse before they can become effective depends entirely upon how far Parliament is prepared to provide for the expenditure necessary. 31

29. B. Sulte, "The Canadian Militia Before the Great War," C.H.R., vol. 4, (June, 1923) p. 103.

30. Report by General Sir John French, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 35a, 1911.

31. Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 35b, 1911.

The Government was not prepared to place funds at the disposal of the militia. There existed in Canada in 1914 almost 1,000,000 men of military age and the militia had been increased to 57,000 men of all ranks. However, those who had trained in the militia were not kept track of after their discharge. The war establishment of the militia was 150,000 of this total; of the remaining 1,000,000 men, no record existed.³²

The Government attitude during this period towards the militia was one of apathy. To the different Governments, both Liberal and Conservative, defence was a minor concern for Canada. The departure of the Imperial garrisons made a deep impression on some Canadians. They were sorely missed in the social and economic circles. But the fact that Canada replaced the Imperial garrisons with the inadequate permanent force worried a very small minority. The Northwest was opening up and all surplus capital and energy were needed for westward expansion and consolidation. The various federal administrations were uninterested in expanding or supporting the volunteer militia beyond the barest necessity.

This was the state of the militia on a Dominion-wide scale, and its weaknesses were also manifested in the individual provinces. Any change in the Government's policy naturally affected each of the provinces. While British Columbia had her own particular problems with regard to the

32. Sulte, C.H.R., p. 103, also W. Wood, "In Case of War," The Canadian Magazine, vol. 11, (June, 1898) pp. 95-96.

militia, she had as well to accept the general policy issued from Ottawa. In the detailed study of the militia of British Columbia, the fact that the province was a part of the whole, and not a distinct segment, will aid in understanding the difficulties she faced during the development of the active militia on the Pacific Coast.

CHAPTER III

THE EARLY YEARS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VOLUNTEER MILITIA AND THE DEFENCES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

At the time of Confederation the province of British Columbia had at its disposal for means of defence three rather ill-organized and ill-equipped militia units, which had been formed prior to 1871.¹ These were: the Victoria Volunteer Rifle Corps (1864), the New Westminster Volunteer Rifles (1863), composed chiefly of former Royal Engineers who had taken their discharge in British Columbia, and the Seymour Battery (1866) which had been formed when the colony had experienced the first Fenian scare of 1866-1867.² The men in these units provided their own clothing and accoutrements and were not a regular volunteer militia establishment, but a collection of patriotic men who had organized into military formations due to the threat of internal or external disturbances. With Confederation these became part of the militia force of the Dominion. But, because of the isolation of the west coast and of governmental indifference, the necessary equipment, military supplies and instruction which would have enabled these units to become functional organizations, were not to be provided for some time to come. Even

1. For a full account of the Colonial Militia of British Columbia, see W.E. Ireland, "Pre-Confederation Defence Problems of the Pacific Coast", Annual Report of the Canadian Historical Association, 1941, pp. 41-54.

2. Provincial Archives of British Columbia, No. 3138, R. H. Roy "The Early Militia and Defence of British Columbia", p. 1.

without a militia force, there were not enough weapons to arm the male population that would be available for military service. For the arming of the 900 men of military age in the province,³ there were but 735 old assorted rifles.⁴ This was the condition of the defences of British Columbia at the time of the second Fenian scare.

On 31 December, 1871, the Lieutenant-Governor of the province, J.W. Trutch, received an anonymous letter dated 29 December, 1871. It read:

Sir:- There are now in town a Company of Fenians who hold regular meetings and they are well-drilled. Take a warning - they boast that they are now in part of the Dominion and will have revenge yet from the Canadians. Several of the Government rifles and bayonets are in their hands, also some of the ammunition for Long Enfield rifles. This, sir, is a warning. You may treat it as you think best, but it is true, nevertheless.

(Signed) From a Loyal Subject in
Victoria. 5

Having received this warning, Trutch hastily called his Executive Council in order to organize an effective curtailment of any possible Fenian aggression. On New Years Day he informed Captain R.P. Cator, R.N., the senior officer at Esquimalt, that he had received the above note, adding that;

I do not very seriously apprehend any such an attack as my anonymous correspondent implies to be impending, yet in view of the events which happened

3. P.A.C., M.R. Defences of Canada, Vol. VI, p. 437.

4. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 1494 Deputy Adjutant General C.F. Houghton to Adjutant General Col. P. Robertson Ross, 30 March, 1875, also Robertson-Ross to Houghton, 8 Feb., 1878.

5. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file 6278, Letter to the Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia, Hon. J.W.Trutch, 29 Dec., 1871.

in the province of "Manitoba" and the known character and aims of the Fenian organization, I think it incumbent to take such steps as are in our power to prevent the perpetration of robbery and outrage in our neighbourhood. 6

The Lieutenant-Governor also inquired if H.M.S. Boxer could be despatched from Esquimalt to Victoria to protect the city from any marauders, and requested that the Royal Navy take any other steps necessary for the protection of life and property in that city. The following day, 2 January, 1872, Trutch sent a hurried despatch to the Secretary of State for the Provinces, Joseph Howe, in which he outlined the events that had just occurred and the steps taken to resist any attack. The Royal Navy had stationed H.M.S. Boxer off the mouth of Victoria harbour with orders to challenge any suspicious craft, and, with the navy alerted, the Lieutenant-Governor felt that the advantage which surprise might have given the Fenians in the event of an attack had been largely eliminated.⁷

A hasty scheme of defence was devised by the senior naval officer. His flagship, H.M.S. Sparrowhawk was to be anchored off Victoria harbour to prevent the entry or exit of vessels or boats until it was definitely ascertained that they were on lawful business. The Captain of the Sparrowhawk was instructed to watch for the firing of rockets in succession from the Government Buildings. This would inform him that

6. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.E., file 6278, Trutch to Senior Naval Officer Esquimalt, Captain R.P. Gator, 1 January, 1872.

7. Ibid., Trutch to Secretary of State for Provinces, Joseph Howe, 2 January, 1872.

the expected attack on the town was underway and assistance was required. As soon as he observed this signal, the commanding officer of the Sparrowhawk was to communicate with the senior officer on H.M.S. Scout by firing three guns in succession, and this was also to be an answer to the signal from the town of Victoria. As soon as this was done, H.M.S. Boxer was to get up steam immediately and call alongside H.M.S. Scout and Sparrowhawk to put a party of 50 marines aboard. These troops were to be landed nearby the Government Buildings at the same time as H.M.S. Boxer was proceeding up harbour to act as needed. H.M.S. Sparrowhawk was then to block the harbour against any ship which seemed even remotely suspicious, whether she be English or American. The Lieutenant-Governor was asked to instruct the police to make arrangements for the firing of the signals to the ships.⁸

Even with ships of the Royal Navy present, the defence of Victoria was not too secure. The city's police force of ten men was poorly organized, and the Victoria Volunteer Rifles was in no condition to act. The Victoria Colonist stated that

It is problematical as to what extent it would be safe to rely upon this force as a means of repelling a Fenian invasion. If we are correctly informed that it has lapsed into a torpid state, it would perhaps be wisest not to count upon it at all as a means of defence. 9

The situation appeared to be so serious that the Executive Council asked Trutch to transmit to the Dominion Government a

8. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file 6278 Cator to Trutch, 3 January, 1872.

9. Victoria Colonist, 4 January, 1872.

request to use its influence to persuade the Imperial authorities to have Esquimalt made the permanent headquarters of the Royal Navy's North Pacific Squadron, and to have one heavy frigate and one gunboat located in British Columbia waters at all times. The Council also expressed the desire to have the militia system of the Dominion extended to British Columbia, and a force of 100 permanent force militia stationed at Victoria.¹⁰

Before the Fenian scare was over, the Lieutenant-Governor was prompted to write the Dominion Government again concerning the defencelessness of British Columbia, and, more specifically, the city of Victoria. Defence, he explained, would be inadequate since H.M.S. Scout was to leave for the Sandwich Islands in March, leaving only two warships to provide protection for Vancouver Island and the British Columbia coastline. The departure of this ship would reduce the Imperial garrison to fifteen Royal Marines. It was therefore imperative that the Dominion should immediately organize the militia in British Columbia and station 100 permanent force militia at Victoria.¹¹

The Dominion, however, did not see fit to comply with the request for either a permanent Canadian garrison or the organization of the British Columbia Militia, and the province was forced to continue to rely upon the Royal Navy. The

10. P.A.C. M.R. D.M.P. file 6278, Minutes of an Executive Council Meeting of the Province of British Columbia, 2 January, 1872.

11. Ibid, Trutch to Howe, 9 January, 1872.

senior naval officer soon became anxious to remove H.M.S. Sparrowhawk from the mouth of Victoria harbour. On 6 February, the Executive Council of British Columbia decided that H.M.S. Sparrowhawk would no longer be required since as long as either Boxer or Sparrowhawk stayed at Victoria, the situation would be under control.¹²

The senior naval officer declared, however, that he could not extend the stay of either ship at Victoria, and he would not sanction a division of his command as his first responsibility was to provide for the defence of the naval base at Esquimalt. He also stated:

...without some more efficient force than now exists in Victoria it is evident that such outrages as are alleged to have been intended, may be organized with impunity in your midst, and I cannot but suggest that this force (Victoria Volunteer Rifles and the police force) should be so increased and reorganized as to furnish a real protection to life and property, and so prevent the reoccurrence of such alarms as we have been subject to lately. I would also bring before your notice the very exposed position of British Columbia, with scattered towns which would be unable to afford each other assistance in consequence of their distance apart, and the whole apparently to be entirely dependent for protection in cases of outbreak or raid on what little assistance that can be effected by ships of war present at Esquimalt. This I attribute to the entire absence of any military force in the province and would again suggest that Victoria should be made the depot of a well organized militia or police, not only for the protection of that town, but such as to be able to render assistance in case of emergency to other parts of the colony.¹³

The Fenian scare abated and was soon forgotten. The

12. P.A.C. M.R. D.M.P. file 6278, Minute of the Executive Council of British Columbia, 6 February, 1872.

13. Ibid, Cator to Trutch, 7 February, 1872.

Annual Report of the State of the Militia pointed out that, although British Columbia had become Military District Number 11 on 16 October, 1871, no steps had been taken to appoint a staff or enroll men for the volunteer militia.¹⁴ This report was followed by more detailed suggestions from the Adjutant-General, Colonel P. Robertson-Ross, concerning the organization of a militia force in British Columbia. Of primary importance, he felt, was a supply of military arms, clothing, and stores sufficient to equip 1,000 men and costing approximately \$50,000, to be shipped direct from the United Kingdom to British Columbia. He also recommended that the total number of men to be trained in the Volunteer Militia in British Columbia should be limited to 500 non-commissioned officers and men.¹⁵ This report was approved by the federal cabinet on 22 February, 1872, and orders for the specified material were placed in the United Kingdom.¹⁶ Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain the necessary Martini-Henry Rifles and in place of these Canada was forced to accept the Snider. The result was to be that British Columbia possessed small arms of a type different from those of the Dominion Militia.¹⁷ Later there was difficulty in obtaining a supply of ammunition for the Snider Rifle.

Meanwhile the appointment of a Deputy Adjutant-General

14. Annual Report of the State of the Militia 1871, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 8, 1872, p. 45.

15. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O. File 6279, Adjutant-General, Col. P. Robertson-Ross to the Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir George E. Cartier, 21 February, 1872.

16. Loc cit

17. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O. File 6281 War Office to Colonial Office 6 May, 1872.



Provincial Archives, Victoria, B.C.

Lieut.-Colonel Charles F. Houghton.

for British Columbia was under consideration by the Macdonald Government. The selection eventually fell on Charles F. Houghton. Irish by birth, he had served as an officer in the Imperial Army 57th and 20th Regiments of Foot. He had sold his commission in 1863 and come to British Columbia where he became a gentleman farmer in the Okanagan Valley. In 1871 he was elected a member to the House of Commons and while serving there he heard that the appointment of a commanding officer of Military District Number 11 was to be made.¹⁸ Houghton's application for the position was vigourously supported by his fellow Members of Parliament from British Columbia. After talking to Sir George E. Cartier, Minister of Militia and Defence, Houghton returned to British Columbia in June, 1872, expecting that his appointment would be effective immediately.

His expectations were allayed by the proposed visit of Robertson-Ross to British Columbia to report on the military situation there. The Adjutant-General arrived in Victoria for a two week visit on 28 October, 1872, and at the end of this time submitted a report which formed the basis of the organization of the British Columbia Militia. In this report he recommended the formation of two rifle companies at Victoria, and one each at Nanaimo, New Westminster and Burrard Inlet. The Seymour Battery of Garrison Artillery at New Westminster was to be reorganized. A company of mounted riflemen was to be organized in the Kootenay district, since the isolation

18. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O. File 6521, C.F. Houghton to Cartier, 22 April 1872.

of this area made it necessary that white settlers there be afforded some protection. The annual drill of the different corps was to be carried out at the discretion of the commanding officers under the same regulations and at the same rates of pay as prevailed in the Canadian Militia.¹⁹

This report was supplemented by a memorandum from the Acting Adjutant-General, Colonel Walker Powell, who informed the Minister of Militia and Defence, Hugh Macdonald, that the total strength of the Volunteer Militia in British Columbia should number 220 officers and men, to be located in the following places: at Victoria, two companies of rifles, 100 men all ranks; at Nanaimo one company of rifles, forty men all ranks; at New Westminster one company of rifles, forty men all ranks; and at Burrard Inlet one company of rifles, forty men all ranks. This memorandum, with the exception of the reference to the company at Burrard Inlet, was approved by the Government on 18 October, 1873.²⁰

Houghton's appointment was once more delayed by the death of Cartier, and the result was that the suggestions of the Adjutant-General were delayed in being implemented. It was not until 21 March, 1873, that Houghton was given the

19. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1872, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 9, 1873, p. cxxvi, for a full account of Col. P. Robertson-Ross' tour see R.H. Roy, "The Colonel Goes West" Canadian Army Journal, Vol. 8, (April, 1954), pp. 76-81.

20. City Archives of Vancouver, M.R. Military District No. 11 Acting Adjutant-General Col. Walker Powell to Cartier, 23 September, 1873, also Ibid Copy of An Order In Council, 18 October, 1873.

rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and was designated the Deputy Adjutant-General of British Columbia.²¹

In October Houghton received authority to proceed with the enrollment of five companies of militia, but he was limited by the specifications in the supplementary memorandum to Colonel Robertson-Ross' report.

The enrollment of the rifle companies at Victoria and New Westminster was accomplished with little difficulty. They were officially authorized on 13 February, 1874, and were to be known as Nos. 1 and 2 Company of Victoria Volunteer Rifles and No. 1 Company of New Westminster Volunteer Rifles.²² The Nanaimo Rifle Company was not organized until some time later. Houghton's recruiting efforts were organized along the lines most generally used in that period. Proceeding to Nanaimo on 14 April, he reported,

On arrival (at Nanaimo)...I immediately posted notices and convened a public meeting at the court house on the evening of the 16th (of April). On which occasion, having explained the Militia Act and Regulations to them, I succeeded in enrolling seventeen volunteers. At a subsequent meeting held at the same place I enrolled nineteen more names, making a total in all of thirty-six, from which number I selected a Captain, Lieutenant and Ensign, in whose hands I placed the roll for completion. 23

The company at Nanaimo, however, lacked a drill instructor and could not guarantee a full complement of volunteers.

21. Militia General Order, (M.G.O.) No.6, 28 March, 1873.

22. M.G.O., No.3, 13 February, No.8, 11 April, 1874.

23. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 9937, Deputy Adjutant-General, Colonel C.F. Houghton to Powell, 4 May, 1874.

Application to the Royal Navy for a drill instructor met with no response, since, as the senior officer pointed out, a high desertion rate left his ships so undermanned that he could not spare a single personnel.²⁴ This company also lacked a drillshed and was forced to accept the use of a small "mechanics' hall" as a poor substitute.

The Seymour Battery of Garrison Artillery, authorized on 10 July at New Westminster,²⁵ also experienced difficulties. New uniforms and rifles which had been to the battery failed to compensate for the lack of modern weapons. Two obsolete 24-pounder Howitzers were mounted on dilapidated travelling carriages equipped with harness which was crumbling from long neglect.

The Annual Report of the State of the Militia for 1873 outlined the various factors that hindered the development of the volunteer militia in British Columbia. As contrasted with the high civilian wage scales and standards of living in the province the fifty-cents-a-day remuneration of the volunteer militia served as little inducement to men to sacrifice twelve days' work to perform the annual drill. In addition, the labour force was largely transient and engaged in staple industries, such as fishing, mining, and logging which were carried on in the rural areas. It was therefore difficult to hold a unit together. An even more serious deterrent to maintaining a unit was the lack of trained officers, upon

24. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 4874, Cator to Houghton, 12 June, 1874.

25. M.G.O., No. 19, 10 July, 1874.

whom rested the burden of maintaining a volunteer unit.²⁶

With the new militia in British Columbia in existence, there was agitation on the part of Members of the Legislative Assembly from the interior of the province for the establishment of a militia unit in the vicinity of Kamloops, as well as in the Kootenay district. A succession of resolutions asked Lieutenant-Governor Trutch to convey to the Dominion Government the desire on the part of the Government of British Columbia to have such units established.²⁷ The Liberal Government of Alexander Mackenzie, while considering the matter, could not be induced to carry out these requests, and the interior remained for the time being without any form of military protection.

The deficiency of military protection for the interior was also noticed by the General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, Major-General E. Selby Smyth. He reported after a western inspection tour in 1875 that some sort of a protective force should be established at Kootenay Village and Josheph's Prairie. He pointed out that Kootenay, geographically isolated, consisted of a population of about 150 white people, surrounded by almost six times that number of Indians. A small police force, he recommended, of about 50 men, should be established in the area. He further advised that a small force of twenty to thirty mounted riflemen be established

26. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1873, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 7, 1874, pp. ix-xv.

27. Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia, 5 January, 1874, p. 11, 7 January, 1874, p. 13.

in the Okanagan Valley, and at Clinton and Cache Creek, to meet once a year at Kamloops. Such a troop of men could furnish their own horses, and would need only uniforms, arms and camp equipment. The group would be more a yeoman force than a regular militia unit. Such a group was sorely needed for the protection of 200 to 300 white settlers scattered throughout a twenty mile radius in the Okanagan district, whose isolation made imperative an organized means of self-defence, since outside help could not arrive in time in an emergency. In this report the idea of forming a battery of garrison artillery in British Columbia was mentioned for the first time. According to Smyth, such a battery could be formed at Victoria where there were sufficient willing and efficient men and where there was a former officer of the Royal Navy who could command such a unit. He further noted that at the naval dockyard at Esquimalt, about to be sent back to England, were two 7-inch and four 40-pounder muzzle-loading rifled guns. He proposed that they be transferred to the Dominion Government to be used for the protection of Victoria and Esquimalt Harbours.²⁸

Meanwhile, the War Office, becoming concerned about the defences of British Columbia, as of other colonies, had despatched Colonel G.F. Blair, formerly of the Royal Artillery, to that province to survey the sights for possible defensive works at Victoria and Esquimalt. While Colonel Blair was

28. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1875, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 7, 1876, p. vii.

conducting his survey, the Dominion Government was asked by the War Office to submit a detailed report on the defences of Canada. Colonel Blair was requested by the Federal authorities to report on the state of the defences of British Columbia. The defence of the British Columbia seaboard, he wrote, was beyond the resources of the Dominion and should be left in the hands of the Royal Navy's North Pacific Squadron. He felt that the most immediate danger was the unprotected southern frontier of the province. He stated that:

The states are ever ready to swallow this tidbit of English possessions. Its geographical position in reference to the States cannot be better expressed than by the simile of a frog with one hind leg down a serpent's throat. The extended jaws of the serpent are the territories of Alaska and Washington and the hind leg of the frog already well down the serpent's throat is the Island of San Juan de Fuca, the rest of poor froggy is irrevocably destined to follow his digested heel unless some external force is brought to bear on the serpent's head. 29

Colonel Blair recommended that the Indians, who had been converted to Roman Catholicism, be organized into a fighting force to protect the Canadian Border from the United States. With the poor roads in the interior, defence, he contended, would be relatively simple. The defence of the lower mainland, on the other hand, was conversely more difficult. Communications with Washington Territory were in better condition than were those in the interior. The establishment of a corps along the American border, composed of former British military personnel who had settled in the province, he deemed essential, together with a military

29. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file 02638, Colonel G.F. Blair, Memorandum on the defences of British Columbia, 1875.

survey of the frontier. He further suggested that the Dominion make every effort to purchase Alaska and to obtain for Esquimalt an Imperial garrison such as existed at Halifax. Because of the potential importance of the Canadian Pacific Railway as an aid in the defence of the western province, he urged its immediate completion.

His final recommendation was that the accumulations of military stores be initiated, since there were no such depots available outside the Royal Navy dockyard at Esquimalt. This lack, Colonel Blair pointed out, would hamper, if not make impossible, the instant equipping of the male population in the event of war.³⁰

In view of the stability of Canadian-American relations, Colonel Blair's apprehensions about a threatened invasion were incongruous, as were his suggestions for the purchase of Alaska. The recommendation of a military survey, however, were practical, such manoeuvres being, in fact, the first requirement of the projected defensive occupation of any area by a military force. The proposed storehouses were, similarly, a valuable conception, but, like all previous recommendations, destined to remain unheeded until much later.

Both Colonel Blair and General Smyth asserted that some form of land defences should be provided for the protection of Esquimalt. No action was taken by the Dominion Government

30. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A02638, Memorandum of the defences of British Columbia, Col. G.F. Blair to General Officer Commanding, Maj/Gen. E. Selby-Smyth, 10 November, 1876.

to implement the repeated suggestions by General Smyth that this be done.³¹ In fact, the Mackenzie Government, faced with the depression of the seventies, was curtailing military expenditures. Funds voted by Parliament for the support of the militia were cut in half and the number of trained men by a third. The result in British Columbia, as elsewhere, was that the efficiency of the militia was reduced. Practice ammunition was scarce, uniforms became shoddy and ill-fitting, and the units were forced to pay for goods and services which should have been provided by the Department of Militia and Defence. Under these conditions, men were resigning from the militia, and even the Seymour Battery had become "Thoroughly disorganized."³² Nevertheless, companies still managed to function. The burden of holding together and maintaining the various units fell more and more upon the shoulders of the commanding officers, who gave freely of their time and money. An inefficient commanding officer resulted in the complete demoralization of a unit and in its eventual disintegration. An excellent example of this was the New Westminster Rifles, of whom Colonel Houghton wrote after their dissolution in 1876; "I have every confidence that the men will again enroll if a new company be formed, the officers of which shall be selected if not by themselves, at least with their full approval."³³

31. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1875, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 7, 1876, pp. vii-viii.

32. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1877, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 8, 1878, app.#1, p. 213.

33. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1876, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 7, 1877, app.#1, p. 260.

The total deterioration^{FR} of the volunteer militia was prevented by a second threat of possible attack on British Columbia. During the years 1877 and 1878, the province experienced the first of the Russian scares.³⁴ The possibility of British involvement in a war with Russia arose as a result of British policy during the Russo-Turkish War. In February, 1878, the presence of a Russian squadron of eleven ships in San Francisco harbour brought to the people of British Columbia uncomfortable realization of the defencelessness of their position. As the Victoria Colonist observed in an editorial;

In the event of Great Britain declaring war against Russia, we wish again to direct attention of the authorities to the fact that the sea coast of this province will be defenceless. The Russian war vessels now at San Francisco might batter down Victoria, shell the dockyard and seize or destroy the great collieries on the east coast of the Island. Property of the value of many millions of dollars lies absolutely at the mercy of an invader. The local government have time and again drawn attention to our defenceless situation; we are not aware that any steps have been taken to materially increase the naval forces on this "Station."³⁵

As nervousness about insecurity increased Colonel Houghton called a meeting of prominent Victoria citizens, senior naval officers, and senior officers of the volunteer militia, to discuss the possibility of raising a volunteer militia battery of garrison artillery at Victoria.³⁶ The senior Royal Navy officer, Captain F. C. B. Robinson, agreed that, if such a battery were raised, he could manage to

34. See chapter 1, pp.7-8.

35. Victoria Colonist, 1 May, 1877.

36. Ibid., 17 February, and 20 February, 1878.

supply it with two converted Palliser 64-pounders and also a drill instructor.³⁷ Under the auspices of Captain C. P. Dupont the battery was formed and started holding regular drill parades.³⁸ The battery being formed, it now became necessary to equip it with guns. The weapons so hastily promised by Captain Robinson failed to appear, and General Smyth once more applied to the Minister of Militia and Defence to obtain the required armaments.³⁹ The request was forwarded through the Governor-General, Lord Dufferin, to the Admiralty. The Navy refused to provide the guns.⁴⁰ In a later despatch to Dufferin, the Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, advised that further representation by the Minister, through the Governor-General, should be made, and that such a move might meet with some success.⁴¹

The possibility of war with Russia led the British Government to continue the existence of the old Royal Commission, which had been inquiring into the defences of British possessions abroad, as the Colonial Defence Committee.⁴² In one of its reports it stated that Esquimalt was devoid of

37. Colonel F.A. Robertson, "The 5th British Columbia Regiment, Garrison Artillery," The Kahki Call, vol. 10, (November, 1926), p. 1.

38. Loc. cit.

39. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 02390, Smyth to Minister of Militia and Defence, A.G. Jones, 5 March, 1878.

40. Ibid Admiralty to Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, 4 March, 1878.

41. Ibid Hicks-Beach to the Governor-General Lord Dufferin 18 March, 1878.

42. See Chapter 1, pp. 9-10

local defences against sudden attack, and could not be expected to rely upon the Royal Navy to provide all the protective force necessary. Some plan of local defence was needed, including suitable protection of Vancouver Island. The defence works necessary to protect these areas were to be of a temporary nature, adequate to meeting a sudden emergency, rather than an expensive, long-term undertaking.⁴³

The Dominion was made even more aware of her vulnerability to Russian attack when the Russian armed merchant vessel Cimbria arrived in northeastern American waters in March of 1878. This vessel was rumoured to carry sixty officers and 600 seamen who were to man fast raiders which the Russian Government intended purchasing from the United States. These ships were to be armed from stores on board the Cimbria, and then employed to prey on British shipping off North America.⁴⁴ The danger of a similar situation on the West Coast was brought to the attention of the Government by General Smyth, who stated, in a letter to the Minister of Militia and Defence, that;

I have so frequently brought to notice the totally unprotected state of the harbour of Victoria and the entrance of Esquimalt in Vancouver Island as well as the immensely important coal mines of Nanaimo, that I need only once more very earnestly urge that guns now lying in Esquimalt dockyard... may at length be handed over and mounted on Macaulay's Point to command the entrance to both harbours. ⁴⁵

43. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O. File 04375 Quoted in Hicks-Beach to Dufferin, 20 March, 1878.

44. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O. File 04441 Smyth to Jones, 2 May, 1878

45. Loc cit

While General Smyth was writing concerning the guns, the Colonial Defence Committee was already noting the fact that Esquimalt was "the only refitting station in British territory on the western coast of America."⁴⁶ For this reason, it had instructed the Admiralty to turn over the guns to the Victoria Artillery Corps.⁴⁷ The Admiralty's position in refusing to transfer the guns, based on the premise that they were reserves for warships, was reversed by the Committee which recommended that the guns be loaned until additional weapons could be shipped from England.⁴⁸ Immediate action was required, in the opinion of the Defence Committee, as the time required for weapons and reinforcements to arrive in British Columbia from either the United Kingdom or India made imperative some interim action. The Committee also stated that it was confident that the loyalty of the citizens in Victoria would assure the raising of sufficient numbers of militia to man the armaments.⁴⁹ A letter in May from Hicks-Beach to Lorne stated that the Admiralty had agreed to transfer the guns to the Dominion and that "the whole armament in store at Victoria and Esquimalt, wether belonging to the War Office or the Admiralty, will be at the disposal of the Dominion Government for the defence of these points."⁵⁰


46. P.A.C. G.G.P. Vol.3, No.165, Hicks-Beach to Dufferin, 11 May, 1878. Enclosed was a "Report of a Colonial Defence Committee on the Temporary Defences of the Naval Station of Esquimalt and the Important Commercial Town and Harbour of Victoria," April, 1878. (Hereafter known as Report)

47. Ibid, Report.

48. Loc cit

49. Loc cit

50. Ibid, Hicks-Beach to Dufferin, 11 May, 1878.



Sketch-map of the Victoria-Esquamalt district showing the approximate areas covered by artillery batteries, 1878.

The Dominion Government now gave "orders for the erection of a battery on Macaulay's Point,"⁵¹ and General Smyth now despatched Colonel D. T. Irwin, Inspector of Artillery, to supervise the construction of these proposed defence works. He arrived in Victoria on 27 May, and, after inspecting the Victoria Volunteer Artillery Company, which, after several months of drill, had finally been given official sanction to organize,⁵² he met with Rear-Admiral A.F.R. de Horsey, who was to assist Colonel Irwin in his duties. Though they disagreed on the location of the battery, the two officers finally formulated plans for the mounting of the guns, and the work was started in June.⁵³ Three months later the four batteries were completed. The two most formidable were situated on Brothers' Island and Macaulay's Point. The former held one 8-inch and two 64-pounder rifled muzzle-loading guns, the latter three 7-inch rifled muzzle-loading guns. The two emplacements at the base of Beacon Hill were equipped each with two 64-pounder rifled muzzle-loading guns.⁵⁴

The works now constructed represented a compromise between the views of Rear-Admiral de Horsey and of Colonel Irwin. The Admiral had envisioned much stronger fortifications and a greater number of guns. In drawing up his previous recommendations he had stated his reasons for

51. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1879, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 8, 1880, p. 306.

52. M.G.O., No. 19, 20 July, 1878.

53. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 04474, Smyth to Minister of Militia and Defence, R.W.Scott, 29 June, 1878.

54. Annual Report of the State of the Militia 1878, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 8, 1879, pp. 306-312.

demanding increased fortifications: "I realize," Admiral de Horsey wrote, "this port has for urgent reasons been left without any of Her Majesty's ships and that it is dependent on resources of the place for defence against sudden attack."⁵⁵

The problem of raising a sufficient force of volunteer militia to man the fortifications was to emerge again and again, as "owing to the isolated position of Victoria," Colonel Irwin pointed out, "the very limited number of its population, and the high rate of wages paid for labour, special, and almost insurmountable difficulties are placed in the way of the establishment of anything like an efficient force."⁵⁶ Initially, it had been a relatively simple matter to enroll men in the volunteer artillery, when it was first formed, and it had soon had its full complement of fifty men all ranks. Colonel Houghton had reported that the artillery drill was more to the liking of the young men of Victoria and the new, colourful tunics had more appeal than the shoddy uniform of the rifle companies.⁵⁷ While the volunteer artillery could gain recruits, the rifle companies were losing members to the militia battery.

Admiral de Horsey again expressed doubts that, even with the existing popularity of the artillery, enough men could be raised to man the fortifications at Esquimalt. In a

55. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 4715, Senior Naval Officer Esquimalt, Rear Admiral A.F.R. de Horsey, to Dufferin, 26 June, 1878.

56. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1878, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 5, 1879, p. 311.

57. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1878, *op cit.*, p. 214.

letter to the Admiralty, he wrote:

...Esquimalt should be defended by Imperial resources and under naval control. The Dockyard is Imperial property and bears the same relative position to our Squadron in the Pacific as Halifax does to the Squadron in the North Atlantic, but with three-fold force as there is no Bermuda or Jamaica in these waters, no British possession within possible reach for supplies and repairs. In viewing the trifling number of Volunteer Militia, any fairly organized enemy's expedition should suffice to destroy the dockyard and be master of the position until again ejected by hard fighting. 58

Both General Smyth and Admiral de Horsey were agreed that a permanent force should be stationed at Esquimalt. Unfortunately, their recommendation came at an inopportune time. Tensions had subsided in Europe and the worry over a possible attack had passed. The only improvement in military affairs in British Columbia was the increase in strength of the Victoria Battery of Garrison Artillery to five officers and 85 other ranks. 59

During the latter part of 1878 the Imperial Government endeavoured to draw Canada into some form of agreement for the defence of Esquimalt, and the sharing of the expense of additional fortifications. The Federal Government informed the War Office that it could not under existing fiscal conditions take upon itself any further military expenditure. However, the Dominion Government did agree to co-operate in a military survey of the Pacific Coast. The War Office appointed Colonel J.W. Lovell, Royal Engineers, as British

58. P.A.C., M.R. Defences of Canada, Vol.IV, File 13A6 de Horsey to Secretary of the Admiralty, 28 July, 1878.

59. M.G.O. No. 3, 1 August, 1878.

representative, while Colonel T.B. Strange, Dominion Inspector of Artillery, represented Canada.

Colonel Lovell made a detailed tour of inspection of the defences of British Columbia in 1879. He recommended that the temporary batteries, recently constructed, since they could not be turned into permanent fortifications, should be left in the hands of the Dominion Government. He suggested that the number of gun emplacements be increased to ward off any attack by sea. To protect Esquimalt against an attack by land, twelve field guns should be recommended, be placed at the disposal of the permanent garrison. He also advised that the garrison number 1138 Imperial troops, and, in addition, these troops should be assisted by a volunteer militia force of 854 men. For Nanaimo he proposed another Imperial garrison to man the guns which he felt were necessary.

In concluding his report Colonel Lovell asserted that the province could not be protected from an American invasion. He added that the greatest need for the defence of the province was the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway and an all-Canadian telegraph route.⁶⁰ This was also the opinion of General Smyth, who wrote;

The people of British Columbia are very loyal and desire to remain closely united with England, from which they derive their origin, but they feel that their interests have been sometimes neglected, and there is no knowing how they might act if

60. P.A.C., M.R., Correspondence of the Committee on the Defences of Canada, vol. VI, Col. J.W. Lovell, "Report of the Defences of Esquimalt and Victoria, December, 1879.

they felt themselves free to act according to their interests. 61

Colonel Strange's report was similar to that of Colonel Lovell. He also recommended the establishment of a permanent garrison. Although, he felt, the American might prove to be a threat, such a threat was relatively minor. The presence of the Russian fleet at San Francisco during the late seventies, on the other hand, made it evident that such a danger was not to be ignored. Due to the lack of communication, he said, British Columbia would have to rely upon British reinforcements coming from India until the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed. His plan, by which the province could be defended from an attack either over land from the south or over sea, was, in the case of the former, to station a battery at New Westminster, aided by Indian auxiliaries as sharpshooters, to cut off the road south of New Westminster leading to the United States. The rugged terrain and densely wooded area between the Forty-ninth Parallel and the south bank of the Fraser River would make this feasible. In the event of attack from the sea it would be necessary, he felt, to destroy the bridges between Esquimalt and Victoria and, with the volunteer militia supported by a permanent force, hold the naval station. He pointed out that protection was required for Nanaimo and the proposed western terminus for the Canadian Pacific Railway at Burrard Inlet. One of the methods by which a

61. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1879, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 8, 1880, p. XLIV.

sufficient force could be maintained on the mainland was to form a defensive force for the terminus for the Canadian Pacific Railway and would also be able to supply men for repair and construction on the railway.

The total permanent force proposed by Colonel Strange was somewhat smaller than the numbers recommended by Colonel Lovell. Colonel Strange felt that it should number 200 Marine Artillerymen at Esquimalt and 100 men at Victoria. He shared the views of Colonel Houghton and suggested that a four-Battery brigade of garrison artillery be formed from the militia and additional volunteers.⁶² Of all the recommendations in both reports only the last mentioned of Colonel Strange's was acted upon in later years.

The poor state of the British Columbia Militia was also the subject of the Deputy Adjutant-General's report for 1880. He deplored the lack of funds which prevented the rifle companies from getting practical training at camp, and wrote that, if it were not for the funds personally supplied by the officers to pay for the men's rations, and the willingness of the men themselves to attend camp without pay, these companies would be unable to obtain any camp experience.⁶³ At New Westminster the battery of garrison artillery was without suitable guns as the two they possessed were of ancient make and were mounted on rotted carriages.

⁶². Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1879, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 8, 1880, appendix No. 8, pp.203-312.

⁶³. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1880, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 9, 1880-1, pp. 65-69.

He also brought to the attention of the Department of Militia and Defence the fact that all British Columbia units faced the problem of trying to maintain their establishment in a population which was largely transient.⁶⁴ Another difficulty which he noted was the high price of food in British Columbia which made the twenty-five cent ration allowance per man insufficient.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the men in the Victoria Garrison Artillery remained high. Colonel Houghton reported that they;

...established a school of arms in the battery and rented a building for this purpose, where lessons in broad sword, single stick, fencing, and boxing are given one night in each week during the winter season. The necessary material for the school was imported from England, and the expense of the purchase, as well as rent, fuel, and pay of instructors, etc., was provided by members of the Battery by general subscription. ⁶⁶

Again, in the following year, the Deputy Adjutant-General, Colonel J.W. Laurie, made the following recommendation as to the reorganization of the militia at Victoria: that the increase of strength of garrison artillery to eighty-five all ranks was ill-advised and that he recommended instead that two batteries of forty-five ranks each be formed. He disagreed with Captain Dupont's idea that a brigade of garrison artillery be formed out of the rifle corps for the following reasons: first, all of the men who

64. Population available for Military Service, Victoria city, district, and town of Esquimalt and district, 350, Nanaimo city and district, Comox and Cowichan, 350, New Westminster city and district and Burrard Inlet, 350, Indian Auxiliaries, 1,000, see Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1879, op cit. p. 310.

65. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1880, op cit pp. 6-7.

66. Ibid, p. 67.

had wished to transfer to the artillery had already done so when the battery was formed and secondly, if the rifle companies were disbanded the members who were already trained as riflemen would be forced to retire from the militia, as they, due to their previous training and interest, could not be incorporated into the artillery. He felt that the assumption that the strength of the garrison artillery could be increased to 85, based as it was on the present up-swing enrollment due to the influx of railway construction workers, was invalid.⁶⁷ These workers, he pointed out, would soon be leaving Victoria. He also hoped that the Department of Militia and Defence could provide funds for a band, as this was a great aid in recruiting prospective members for the militia. He mentioned that another deficiency of the British Columbia Militia was the lack of an organized reserve system. This was especially serious because of the small numbers of active militia which meant that in case of an emergency it would be necessary to call up former members of the Volunteer Units. To do so would be impossible unless retired members of the militia formations were placed on a roll and account kept of them.⁶⁸ No steps were taken to follow this suggestion and organize an efficient reserve.

In a letter to the General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, R. G. Amherst Luard, Captain Dupont, now

67. Ibid., pp. 66-67.

68. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1881, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 19, 1882, app. # 1, pp. 58-61.

Acting Deputy Adjutant-General pointed out that the chief need was the artillery. He also reiterated the complaint that the pay of fifty cents a drill was too small to compete with wages in British Columbia which were \$2.00 to \$2.50 a day for unskilled men.⁶⁹ It was also becoming difficult to keep the militia units alive as the men were usually absent for long periods of time due to the nature of employment in the dominant industries of mining, logging and fishing. In addition, he suggested that the Victoria Battery of Garrison Artillery be broken up into two batteries, that the No. 2 Victoria Volunteer Rifles and the Nanaimo Rifle Company be converted to artillery, that the Seymour half battery be increased to a full battery, and a battery be formed at Burrard Inlet.⁷⁰ These units should then be formed into a brigade of garrison artillery with No. 1 Battery at New Westminster, Nos. 2, 3 and 4 at Victoria, No. 5 at Nanaimo, and No. 6 at Burrard Inlet. The total strength would be comprised of eighteen officers and 252 other ranks.⁷¹ The units would then be of sufficient size to provide adequate defence for Esquimalt, Victoria, and the Canadian Pacific Railway terminus at Burrard Inlet, and also for the collieries at Nanaimo. Camp pay was to be one dollar per drill with a forty cent ration allowance and schedule of twelve to twenty-four drills a year.⁷²

69. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O. File 01810, Deputy Adjutant General Capt. C. Dupont to General Officer Commanding the Militia Maj/Gen. R. G. Amherst Luard, 15 February, 1883.

70. Ibid

71. Loc cit.

72. Loc cit.

The Adjutant-General, Colonel Walker Powell, in a letter to Honourable Adolph P. C. Caron, the Minister of Militia and Defence, expressed his approval of this report and the validity of the above recommendations, and urged their consideration, as he also believed, that the artillery was the most important military unit for the defence of British Columbia. Further he also agreed that, with the high cost of living in the province, the pay should be increased. The responsibility for the defence of Esquimalt, he felt, should be undertaken by either Canada or the United Kingdom or both, and, after studying various reports on the defences of British Columbia, he would attempt to draw up a scheme for the defence of the naval station. In addition, he suggested that a school of artillery of permanent force men be formed at Victoria on the same basis as that at Kingston, Ontario. This battery should be composed of a few non-commissioned officers and men from the East and be augmented by fifty pensioners who would be less liable to desert and lose their remuneration for long military service.⁷³

The new Deputy Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Holmes, wrote in May, 1883, to Luard, stating that the British Columbia Militia should be formed into a provisional brigade of garrison artillery, as recommended by Captain Dupont and Captain Wolfenden. He concluded by stating that

73. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O., File 01810, Powell to Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir Adolph Caron, 27 February, 1883.

"I hope something will be done soon to get matters straight as things are most unsatisfactory at present..."⁷⁴

In a further despatch during the same month, Luard reported to Caron that a school artillery should be formed in British Columbia, composed of single men from the "A" and "B" Batteries then in existence in the East, and be called "C" Battery. If such a force were formed, barracks would need to be constructed and an extra ration allowance provided to compensate for the cost of living in British Columbia.⁷⁵

Agitation to form a brigade of garrison artillery in the province continued on the part of Colonel Holmes, who added to the many reasons for the organization of such a force. It would, he argued, promote a sense of unity amongst the men and create a feeling of 'esprit', and it would also be a step towards organizing all the militia units in the district into one cohesive formation and overcome the opposition of the rifle corps.⁷⁶

Finally, on 10 October, 1883, the provincial Brigade of Garrison Artillery was authorized. Its organization and the difficulties therein encountered provide an excellent example of the general struggle on the part of the various military officers in British Columbia to advance the progress

74. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O. File 02623, Deputy Adjutant General Col. J.G. Holmes to Luard, 18 May, 1883.

75. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O. File 01810, Luard to Caron, 23 May, 1883.

76. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O. File 02623, Holmes to Luard, 21 May, 1883.

of the volunteer militia.

To further complicate matters, the Royal Navy was in the process of being equipped with a new type of weapon, so that the small supply of rifle ammunition in naval stores would no longer be available to the militia. Therefore, Holmes recommended that the British Columbia Militia be equipped with Martini-Henry rifles. As these new small arms were being used by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, the greatest store of ammunition was held in the naval magazine and was for the Martini-Henry. Victoria's lack of suitable land defence led Colonel Holmes to recommend that the artillery militia be supplied with four field guns.⁷⁷

With the Indians of the interior now being armed with the most modern rifle of its day, the Winchester Repeater, it was deemed necessary that the volunteer militia be similarly armed with more modern weapons and that the mainland garrison artillery be equipped with guns suitable for travelling or for mounting on armoured trains.⁷⁸ Again the discrepancy in prices between British Columbia and the East was noted, with the observation that were it not for the free water, fuel, and financial aid given by the city of Victoria, it would have been impossible to allow the garrison artillery to go to camp in 1884.⁷⁹

77. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1883, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 7, 1884, pp. 51-54.

78. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1884, op cit, 1885, appendix No. 2, pp. 55-56.

79. Loc cit.

The threat of an Indian menace was pointed out by Colonel Holmes in a letter to Luard, in which he stated that the militia had no arms of a type that could be used. The Seymour Battery was still forced to rely upon its two old bronze 24-pounders, when 47-pound, muzzle-loading, rifled guns, with travelling carriages, were actually needed. These weapons, he advised, should be supplied to the Seymour Battery with a quantity of side arms, store, and one to two hundred rounds per gun. Such weapons could be mounted on the decks of the Government schooner Sir James Douglas, and transported readily to any part of the British Columbia Coast.⁸⁰

Colonel Holmes was still striving to increase the strength and efficiency of British Columbia's defences, and concerning himself with the condition of the gun batteries. The mountings and platforms of the heavier weapons, he reported, were becoming more unserviceable with the passage of time. He further reported that the militia depended upon the Royal Navy to supply ammunition for the batteries. "We have less than 100 rounds per gun for the 7-inch and 8-inch guns," Colonel Holmes wrote, "and hardly any for the 64-pounders. At least 400 rounds per gun should be always in reserve for these guns."⁸¹ The Seymour Battery still remained without new armaments, a condition which

80. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O. File 02358, Holmes to Luard, 5 December, 1883; also Victoria Daily Colonist, 5 December, 1883.

81. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1885, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 6, 1886, p. 56.

led Colonel Holmes to state, "I wish to call particular attention to the armament of the battery at New Westminster... How the officers and men managed to maintain interest in their work, with their obsolete weapons mounted on rotten carriages, I can hardly imagine."⁸² His various and repeated warnings fell on deaf ears at Ottawa. Apathy towards the militia of British Columbia was still prevalent. As Colonel Holmes pointed out;

Although great excitement and anxiety for protection was manifested by the inhabitants of this section of the province during the past spring, when war with Russia seemed imminent, very few persons came forward to assist in defending themselves by joining the band of loyal men comprising the already enrolled active militia. 83

In 1884 Captain J. R. East, Royal Navy, wrote to the Minister of Militia and Defence, explaining that, while acting as aide-de-camp to the Marquis of Lorne, he had had the opportunity of visiting the defences of British Columbia in 1872. While there, he concluded that it was an excellent place for the pensioners of the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines to settle, and also be utilized as a military force less likely than local men to absent themselves, because of the resulting loss of pensions. If, he continued, the Canadian Government should supplement these pensions with the usual fifty-cents a day, there would be little difficulty in finding suitable men. He further wrote that, since the Government was planning the establishment of a

82. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1885, Canada, Sessional Papers, No. 6, 1886, p. 56.

83. Ibid., p. 51.

permanent force in British Columbia, his idea should be given serious consideration by the Minister.⁸⁴ Upon consulting Luard as to the feasibility of such a plan, Caron was told that it was well worth consideration if Royal Artillery pensioners were included, as the garrison artillery was the spine of British Columbia defence.⁸⁵ On 6 September, 1884, the Privy Council gave its approval to the idea of obtaining the services of Royal Navy, Royal Marine and Royal Artillery pensioners, and the Canadian High Commissioner, Sir Charles Tupper, was instructed to begin its organization. Soon after, the Colonial Office similarly approved of the scheme, and stated that the Admiralty had also agreed to it.⁸⁶ The Canadian Government expressed its thanks, and requested that the Royal Navy provide transportation for any pensioners recruited in England, as the Canadian Pacific Railway was as yet not completed. Unfortunately, the Admiralty could not see its way clear to allocating a ship for this purpose, and the matter of transporting the men to British Columbia became a problem as great as that of obtaining their services. Any hope of ever raising men in the province was shattered by Colonel Holmes writing to Luard:

84. P.A.C. M.R. D.M.P. File A 7012, Capt. J.R. East R.N. to Caron, 8 July, 1884.

85. P.A.C. M.R. D.M.P. File A 3167, Luard to Caron, 3 July, 1884.

86. Ibid., Caron to The Governor General Marquis of Lansdowne, 28 October, 1884.

...and now I hope that you will believe me when I say that the Department may give up all hopes of raising "C" Battery here, no matter what scale of pay. The men are not in the country and it would be much better to give up the idea altogether than to attempt what will result in total failure. 87

He also stated that if the battery were formed in British Columbia it would have to be consistently reinforced by drafts from the East. He urged that some action be taken as the people of the province were asking when the battery was to arrive.

The subject of "C" Battery also came up in Parliament, when E. B. Baker, (M.P. Victoria) asked what steps were being taken to establish a permanent school of artillery at Victoria, and to form and maintain a permanent battery in that city.⁸⁸ The Government stated that the matter was under consideration and a site for the barracks for such a force was being secured.⁸⁹ Caron later reported:

We have estimated "C" Battery, which is a small battery as far as numbers are concerned, at \$147,000. Out of that I have deducted this year \$27,000, which I do not consider will be required. I may say that the formation of "C" Battery has been creating a good deal of trouble insofar as regards getting the men. Of course, when the railway is completed, there will be no difficulty in the number of men. At present, it would have been easy for us to have got the men required in the older provinces, but we could not send them

87. P.A.C. M.R. A.G.O. File 07004, Holmes to General Officer Commanding the Militia, Maj.-Gen. F.D. Middleton, 28 July, 1884.

88. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 13 February, 1884, p. 285.

89. Loc cit.

over the American railways, armed with guns and all that, and it was considered that the expense of sending them would be so very great that I have so far not undertaken the formation of that squadron for the present. 90

As for the school of artillery at Victoria, Caron did state that some men from "B" Battery at Kingston would be sent to Victoria to help advance such a school and act as instructors. The principal problem was still the poor rate of pay. As Mr. Baker commented;

I am sorry to say that I do not know any men who will undertake to become permanent soldiers in "C" Battery, for the same amount of remuneration that Chinamen and Indians are getting out there. 91

The defences of British Columbia were still in a state of disrepair, and, except for the Royal Navy at Esquimalt, the defence of the province was somewhat insecure when, for the second time, an Anglo-Russian war became a possibility. For a short period the Canadian Government was to be jarred out of its lethargy, to be forced to attend to the defences of the Pacific province. However, even the possibility of war passed and the stimulus turned once again to forgetfulness and neglect. This was to be the history of the Canadian Militia for the years 1885-1896.

90. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, op cit 27 March, 1884, p. 1164.

91. Loc cit

CHAPTER IV

THE "DEAD PERIOD" IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIA
MILITIA - 1885-1896

The year 1885 was to be more than another span of time in the course of Canadian history. The Canadian Pacific Railway had been saved from financial ruin by the slimmest of margins. The Dominion was on the brink of a long depression, and her credit on the international financial markets was becoming progressively worse. The great expenditures on public works, including the railway, had placed upon the Macdonald ministry an unprecedented financial burden that was on the point of draining the as yet unlinked nation of the last of her assets.

Loans to railways could be pushed through Parliament, Macdonald was a legendary figure in the House, but the situation was almost beyond his control. Crisis followed crisis, and in March of this crucial year the Government was faced with organised rebellion. The insurgents, led by the elusive Riel, were not to leave Canada as in 1870 and surrender without a struggle. Twelve dead of the North West Mounted Police attested mutely to this. Hastily the Dominion called out the militia and despatched it to the Northwest over the Canadian Pacific Railway.

Still the protracted negotiations between Canada and the Imperial Government continues on the subject of a

permanent garrison for Esquimalt. Doubtless the Dominion Government would have preferred to let the matter slide into obscurity or to have waited before a decision had to be made and a definite plan formulated. The negotiations had already been prolonged for over two years, and, with all the present troubles perhaps this period might be extended. There was not to be a respite in the urgency of the negotiations as the possibility of war between the United Kingdom and Russia arose in the same month as the start of the Riel rebellion. The West Coast could not be conveniently forgotten, and if the Dominion was ready to forget the defencelessness of her West, the Government of British Columbia was not to let her. The Russian fleet, wrote the Lieutenant-Governor Cornwall, could with impunity create havoc on the coast of British Columbia. All that existed to prevent such an occurrence were one corvette of the Royal Navy and some obsolete guns. He also asked that the Dominion make every effort to induce the Royal Navy to place more ships at Esquimalt, and that the Canadian Pacific Railway be rushed to completion.¹ The last recommendation was ill-advised for it was still doubtful whether or not the Dominion controlled the territory through which the railway was to pass.

The former Governor-General of Canada, the Marquis of Lorne, displaying continued interest in Canadian affairs, pointed out to the English public the defencelessness of

1. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. V, no. 165, Lieutenant-Governor C.F. Cornwall to Secretary of State for Canada, Sir Charles Tupper, 28 March, 1885, also ibid., Cornwall to Tupper, 12 April, 1885.

British Columbia.² In Canada, his views were echoed by the editorial board of the Canadian Military Gazette³ and by the Victoria Daily Colonist:

The Russians have a strong fleet at Vladivostok and in twenty-five days after a declaration of war could be pitching shot and shell ashore here. Were the Canadian Pacific Railway completed troops could reach Victoria from England as quickly as the Russian fleet on the Asiatic coast could rendezvous here. But the Canadian Pacific Railway is not finished and the defence of the only coaling station for British ships in the Pacific coast on the continent of North America rests with the fleet.⁴

This editorial sharply underlined the realities of the military situation in British Columbia. Except for the undermanned and ill-trained militia there was a serious lack of troops to man the fortifications. What was needed was a permanent artillery garrison, equipped with field guns which would be adapted for use in British Columbia's terrain. The value of such a formation lay in its mobility, which would enable it to be used against Indian uprisings in isolated parts of the province. If required, the garrison could be employed to guard the rear approaches to Esquimalt. In time of peace it would be of incalculable benefit to the volunteer militia, providing instruction and setting an example.⁵

The Imperial War Office, more aware than the Dominion Government of military needs in British Columbia, was not


2. Marquis of Lorne, "The Unity of the Empire," Nineteenth Century and After, vol. 17, (March, 1885), p. 399.

3. The Canadian Military Gazette, 26 May, 1885, p. 1819.

4. Victoria Daily Colonist, 6 March, 1885.

5. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., 02673, Inspector of Artillery, Colonel F. Strange, to Powell, 26 May, 1885.

MAP OF
ESQUIMALT & VICTORIA
HARBOURS.



willing to allow the Canadian Minister of Militia and Defence, Adolph Caron, to neglect remedying this situation. With the fortifications constructed in 1878 in decay, and a shortage of ammunition and material, it was time, in the opinion of the War Office, for an agreement to be reached on the joint defence of Esquimalt.⁶ To this Macdonald agreed, but he was not willing to forego the Government's efforts to recruit a permanent garrison which would be under Canadian control.⁷ In declining the Imperial Government's offer to provide the garrison at Canadian expense, he was acting against the wishes of the General Officer Commanding the Militia, who had little faith in any formation the Dominion could raise to man the fortifications.⁸ The Canadian Government would make concessions if the garrison offered by the War Office were maintained at Imperial, rather than Canadian, expense. It was the Dominion's desire that the British authorities should also supply, without remuneration, guns, ammunition, and other necessary stores. Canada's contribution would be the maintenance of the volunteer militia in sufficient numbers to man the fortifications in the event of war. The Dominion wished to bring to the attention of the War Office the difficulty not only of recruiting "C" Battery, but of even keeping the militia force up to strength. High industrial

6. P.A.C., M.R., Defences of Esquimalt, file C1902G Colonial Office Despatch, to Lansdowne, 27 October, 1885.

7. Ibid., Caron to Lansdowne, 27 October, 1885.

8. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. LV, no. 165, Middleton to Caron, 20 November, 1885.

wages in the province provided little inducement for men to sacrifice their time to drill with a militia unit at a regular fifty cents a day. The transitory nature of the population made it almost impossible to bring numbers of men together in order to perform the annual drill. Under these circumstances the strength of the militia in British Columbia was, at this time, as great as could be expected.⁹ The obvious solution, that of raising the pay of both the militia and permanent force, had been suggested often and just as often had been ignored by the Government. It was not Government policy to spend any extra of the Dominion's declining revenue to increase the wage of the militia in British Columbia.

Lord Lansdowne who was anxious to arrive at a compromise between the War Office and the Canadian Government, suggested that the Imperial Government should provide a detachment of Royal Marines to relieve the Dominion of her only serious responsibility in matters of Imperial defence. He further recommended that the cost of ammunition should be borne by the War Office as the Dominion had not the financial resources to supply the necessary amounts required for the defence of Esquimalt. He felt that, with the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, British Columbia would benefit from an increase in population; this in time would allow for an increase in the volunteer militia.¹⁰

9. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. IV, no. 165, Copy of a Minute of the Honourable the Privy Council, 27 November, 1885.

10. Ibid., file A 3167, Stanley to Lansdowne, 4 January, 1886.

The War Office, impatient over the delay, demanded that some action be taken to place a permanent garrison at Esquimalt.¹¹ But the desire to arrive at an agreement for the joint defence of the station was not shared by the Admiralty. It continued in its refusal to provide free transportation for the pensioners being recruited for "C" Battery, despite the fact that the garrison was to be used for the defence of the naval station. The Admiralty had reduced the cost of transportation from three hundred pounds¹² to one hundred¹³, but the Canadian Government persisted in its demand for free passage, stating that the matter concerned the Royal Navy far more than the Dominion. The only concession they were willing to make was to transport the men from Halifax to Esquimalt. Neither side was willing to yield.

Caron was now induced by the cabinet to inform the High Commissioner, Sir Charles Tupper, that a force of one hundred Royal Marine Artillery pensioners was to be recruited for a school of artillery to be established at Victoria. Tupper was requested to make arrangements in the United Kingdom to obtain the necessary men.¹⁴ Having received all the information he required, he began to set up an organization for the

11. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 3167, Stanley to Lansdowne, 4 January, 1886.

12. Ibid., Stanley to Lansdowne, 26 December, 1885.

13. Ibid., Colonial Secretary, Edward Stanhope, to Lansdowne, 12 August, 1886.

14. Ibid., Caron to Tupper, 9 December, 1886, also ibid., Tupper to Caron, 6 June, 1887.

enlistment of the required pensioners. He was, however, unaware that the Admiralty was ignorant of the numbers of men required, the manner of their enlistment, and the arrangements made for their return to the United Kingdom once their terms of service were completed.¹⁵ This lack of information seriously hampered Tupper's efforts, since the pensioners were responsible to Admiralty jurisdiction. When the Admiralty requested information, the Canadian Government replied that the volunteers would be formally enlisted on arrival in Canada, and that the establishment should be 109 men, who would receive their pay through the Canadian Government. As these men were to become permanent settlers in British Columbia, no free passage back to England would be provided.¹⁶

Eventually, matters seemed to be organized sufficiently well to permit the printing and posting of handbills asking for volunteers to go to British Columbia. Transportation was to be paid by Canada, and the men enrolled would be stationed at Victoria. An unfortunate and rather stupid error was made in printing the handbills: they stated that single men were required, and since most of the pensioners were married, the response to the advertisements was not overwhelming.¹⁷ Later, Lieutenant J.S. Vivian, Royal Navy, informed the Canadian High Commissioner that some inducement

15. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 3167, Admiralty to Colonial Secretary, Viscount Knutsford, 25 January, 1887.

16. Ibid., Caron to Lansdowne, 15 March, 1887.

17. Ibid., Admiralty to Tupper, 25 May, 1887.

should be offered the pensioners to persuade them to settle in British Columbia.¹⁸ Even so, Tupper was forced to inform Caron that there had been absolutely no enquiries by pensioners interested in becoming part of a school of artillery and settling at Victoria.¹⁹ The Canadian reply pointed out that the reference to single status had been a mistake.²⁰ But the damage had been done.²¹

Because of the failure of recruiting efforts in both England and British Columbia, the Canadian Government was forced to form "C" Battery from personnel in the eastern "A" and "B" Batteries.²² Caron told Tupper to discontinue enlistment attempts in England as the one hundred men for "C" Battery would be recruited in Canada.²³ Finally, at fifteen minutes past four on the afternoon of 4 November, 1887, "C" Battery left Kingston, Ontario, for Victoria.²⁴ After almost four years of bungling, British Columbia was to have a permanent force.

18. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 3167, Lt. J.S. Vivian (R.N.) to Tupper, 4 August, 1887.

19. Ibid., Tupper to Caron, 29 August, 1887.

20. Ibid., Caron to Tupper, 2 September, 1887.

21. According to a despatch from the High Commissioner to the Colonial Office, the idea of employing pensioners originated with Caron, after a visit to the West Coast in 1885-1886. Ibid., Tupper to Stanhope, 13 December, 1886. This assumption, however, was not correct. The idea originated with Captain East, Royal Navy, former aide-de-camp to the Marquis of Lorne, see Chapter III, pages

22. Ibid., Caron to Lansdowne, 8 September, 1887.

23. Ibid., Caron to Acting Adjutant-General, Colonel C. E. Panet, 23 September, 1887.

24. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 20536, Marching-out State of "C" Battery.

On 7 November, 1885, the Canadian Pacific Railway was completed, and Macdonald saw his dream of a nation linked from sea to sea become a reality. Across Canada there was an awareness of accomplishment, and a hope that a new era of economic growth would arise from the now accessible West. In the United Kingdom news of the event was met with amazement that the colony had been able to stand the strain of building a railway over 3000 miles long. Amazement was followed by a realization of the great benefit this line of communication could be to Empire trade and Imperial defence.²⁵

Previous concern over the dangerous proximity of the railway to the American border²⁶ was dissipated by improved relations with the United States. The concern was now for the protection of the eastern and western termini of the road. The East was assured of defence from the Royal Navy and the Imperial garrison at Halifax. But Esquimalt, the western fortress, had only the newly arrived "C" Battery and an inadequate militia force. The militia was not only small in numbers but was ill-equipped. The Number 1 Battery of Garrison Artillery, part of the force entrusted with the manning of the fortifications at the base, had been equipped with the same two cannon for thirty years.²⁷ The unit's

25. See Chapter I, pages 12-13.

26. General M.B. Hewson, "The Canadian Pacific Railway," The Canadian Monthly, vol. 3, (September, 1879), pp 559-569.

27. The former Governor General, the Marquis of Lorne, had promised to aid the battery in getting newer guns, but had failed. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 09765, Commanding Officer Number 1 Bty., B.C.P.R.G.A., to Middleton, 10 March, 1886.

commanding officer complained that it was becoming an object of ridicule as an "artillery without guns", and that it was supported by its own personnel who had "paid out of their own pockets" for the services of a drill instructor. Now the men had come to the end of their patience, and, unless the Department of Militia and Defence took some action, they would resign.²⁸ In his efforts to obtain modern weapons, he was encouraged by J. A. R. Homer, Member of Parliament for New Westminster.²⁹ Their endeavours were to no avail; Caron simply replied that the matter was "under consideration."³⁰

Early in the summer of 1886, the War Office ordered two officers, Colonel C.H. Fairfax-Ellis of the Royal Artillery, and Lieutenant-Colonel G. Barker, Royal Engineers, to proceed to Esquimalt to report on the defences of that station, and to submit suggestions as to what they felt would be required to bolster these defences. The officers outlined a scheme for the placing of new forts, and the improvement of those already in existence. They were of the opinion that "C" Battery was too small to man the proposed forts and that its numbers must be increased since the militia forces at Victoria were too far away from the naval station to render immediate support in the event of an attack.³¹ These opinions

28. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 09765, Commanding Officer Number 1 Bty, B.C.P.R.G.A., to Middleton, 10 March, 1886.

29. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 3167, J.A.R. Homer to Caron, 24 March, 1886.

30. Ibid., D.M.M.D., Panet, to Homer, 2 April, 1886.

31. P.A.C., M.R., Report on the Defences of British Columbia, file A 3167, 14 August, 1886.

were supported by the Canadian Military Gazette which stated that the militia was poorly equipped and that the garrison artillery was not even of sufficient strength to man the forts in existence.³² Similar statements from the Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia, H. Nelson, and the Executive Council of British Columbia lent weight to these arguments. Nelson demanded that the militia of the province be increased and the fortifications on Vancouver Island be repaired.³³ The entire militia of the province came under the criticism of the Executive Council, which entreated the Dominion Government to increase and reorganize this force, pointing out the urgency of such a move in consideration of the nervous state of European affairs. It also suggested that units be formed at Vancouver, Yale, Kootenay, and Nanaimo.³⁴ Offers by citizens to raise a militia force at Vancouver, which would include a large number of former Imperial Army veterans and men who had served in the recent North West rebellion, were refused. The Macdonald Government would take no action to reorganize, equip, or expand the Militia. Although the militia lacked sufficient ammunition for their obsolete rifles, were short of uniforms and other equipment,³⁵ the Government refused to give assistance. "It was a large wonder," stated

32. The Canadian Military Gazette, 3 March, 1887, p. 677

33. P.A.C., M.R. D.M.P., file A 6667, Lt/Gov. H. Nelson, to Secretary of State for Canada, J.A. Chapleau, 11 April, 1887.

34. Ibid., Nelson to Chapleau, 2 May, 1887.

35. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1887, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 9, 1888, p. 51.

the Canadian Military Gazette, "that any active militia existed at all in British Columbia, as nothing is done to encourage military tastes."³⁶

The Dominion Government remained unmoved. It had built a railway at tremendous cost which was of great benefit to Imperial defence, and which Canada had placed at the disposal of the Imperial Government should it be required for Empire protection. If the Royal Navy was going to establish an arsenal at Esquimalt as suggested in the United Kingdom,³⁷ it would probably provide for the defence of that station without Dominion assistance. The Government's attitude was made amply clear by Sir Alexander Campbell at the Colonial Conference of 1887:

To construct a railway which can put such a power in the hands of Her Majesty's Government is undoubtedly a great contribution to the defence of the country. Few things can be more valuable to the defence of a country than the power of ready communication. That has all been done without calling on the Crown for any money whatever...It might have been very justly said to Her Majesty's Government, "Her is a great work which will be of great use to the Empire; you ought to contribute to it." But nothing of that kind was said. ³⁸

Further, the rebellion of 1885 proved that the militia was sufficient to defend the country, and, since it could be readily transported by rail 2000 miles to the North West to

36. The Canadian Military Gazette, 17 November, 1887, p.159

37. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic, p.284, also George Baden-Powell, "Imperial Defence in Our Time," Royal Colonial Institute, vol.13, (June, 1882), p.355., also Jarvis, The Canadian Monthly, p. 458, also Captain J.C.R. Colomb (R.N.) "Imperial Defence," Royal Colonial Institute, vol.17, (June 1886), p. 405.

38. Quoted in Ollivier, The Colonial and Imperial Conference, from 1887-1937, p. 42.

put down a rebellion, it could be also transported to British Columbia to defend that area in time of war.³⁹

As for the immediate defence of Esquimalt, "That coast is defended for the present," Campbell said, "by Her Majesty's North Pacific Squadron, which goes to Esquimalt once a year, and is more or less there all the time, as the North American Squadron is more or less at Halifax all the time."⁴⁰ The Dominion Government did not want the War Office to feel that its responsibility for the protection of this station had diminished even though Canada provided the garrison and formed her own militia. In addition to the steps already taken to develop the British Columbia Militia, the Dominion had authorized the formation of an additional battery and had co-operated with the Imperial Government in fortifying the base.⁴¹ No mention was made to the fact that the battery referred to had been authorized in 1878.

The Canadian Government received support for these arguments from the lack of co-operation between the War Office and the Admiralty.⁴² While the latter was trying to arrange a joint defence scheme in which Canada would contribute, the Admiralty, in a report of 22 June, 1885, said that Canada could not spend any more money on her militia than she was already spending, and that the cost of the

39. See Chapter II, pages 13-14.

40. Quoted in Illivier, op. cit., p. 43.

41. See ibid., p. 84.

42. See Chapter I, pp. 18-19.

Canadian Pacific Railway, the small population, and lack of revenue, prevented the Dominion from assuming further military expenditures.⁴³ Lansdowne also explained to the Colonial Office that;

...but little has as yet been done concerning the fortifications of British Columbia as the financial resources of the country and the heavy demands thereon for other works of necessity would not warrant any considerable outlay for this service. ⁴⁴

The Canadian Government conceded that the fortifications at Esquimalt had not been improved since 1878. These armaments consisted of ten old guns then obtained on loan from the Admiralty.⁴⁵

The ineffective state of the defences of British Columbia was also pointed in the House of Commons in May, 1888 by Mr. E. G. Prior, M.P., Victoria and Mr. V.E. Casey, M.P. West Elgin (Ontario). It was noted that the militia had not been granted enough money even to go into summer camp for the previous four years. Caron still refused to make any increased grants for the British Columbia militia,⁴⁶ and also declined to reorganize the force in order to increase the numbers of garrison artillery which were required. This increase would have demanded very little expenditure, and, as the Canadian Military Gazette argued, "it seems a mistake

43. P.A.C., G.C.P., vol. IV, no. 165, Quoted in Memorandum of the Honourable the Privy Council, 19 December, 1887.

44. Ibid., Quoted in Minute of the Honourable the Privy Council, 23 January, 1888.

45. See Chapter III, pp. 72-73.

46. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 2 May, 1888, pp. 1215, 1219.

to keep up a solitary company of rifles (the Victoria Volunteer Rifle Corps) in a town where garrison artillery is required, as it is in Victoria, for coast defence."⁴⁷

The War Office still persisted in its attempts to reach an agreement with Canada for the defence of Esquimalt. In 1888 a Colonial Office despatch stated that, since 1885, the whole question of the defences of key ports of the Empire had been under consideration, and that Her Majesty's Government had accepted the recommendation of the Colonial Defence Committee as the basis by which arrangements could be made with the Dominion for the defences of Esquimalt. The recommendations were that the Imperial Government should provide armaments consisting of a total of eighteen guns of different calibers, make accommodation for a permanent garrison at a cost of £31,000, donate submarine stores and boats at a cost of £12,000, erect buildings to store equipment £10,000, and supply all designs and skilled men to aid in the construction of the above works. The Dominion would be required to supplement the Imperial contributions by providing, without cost, all sites for the batteries, buildings and submarine stores, paying for new works and the improvements of old fortifications, at a cost of £30,000 and maintaining the works in an efficient condition once they were completed. It would also be expected to provide a regular garrison of 75 all ranks, expand the militia to 290 all ranks, and provide suitable instructors for the

47. Canadian Military Gazette, 16 May, 1888, p. 517.

militia force. Imperial Royal Engineers would be supplied during the time of works construction to assist the Dominion. The Colonial Office suggested that cheap Chinese labour be used to cut the cost of construction. It could not guarantee fulfillment of Canada's wish to have the garrison provided by the War Office, but could only go so far as to help the Dominion Government obtain the services of pensioners, if such were desired. The militia force was to consist solely of artillery. Infantry would not be required for they could be transported from Eastern Canada. The initial shock of any attack could best be taken by artillery men who would man the heavy guns, since the infantry could not be employed unless the enemy made a landing.⁴⁸

In British Columbia, meanwhile, there was, at last, a public awareness of the inadequacy of militia for purposes of defence. In a resolution sponsored by W. N. Bole (M.L.A. New Westminster), the Legislative Assembly expressed apprehension concerning the defenceless of the province. The Assembly also expressed a desire that new militia corps be formed at Vancouver, Yale, New Westminster, and Kootenay, at the earliest possible date.⁴⁹ J. A. Mara, M.L.A. for Yale, informed Caron that the citizens in the Okanagan desired to form a mounted troop of rifles, and that the men would, on the formation of such a unit, provide their own horses and

⁴⁸. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. V, no. 165, Colonial Office Despatch, to the Governor General, Lord Stanley, 13 June, 1888.

⁴⁹. Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia, vol. 17, 10 April, 1888, p. 80.

saddles. The cost of drill instruction, he continued, could be surmounted; the corps could be instructed by a local provincial land agent without remuneration.⁵⁰

The Dominion's attitude had not changed perceptibly. The requests were simply acknowledged, then ignored. The Government not only displayed no interest in strengthening the militia in the province, but it was little concerned over the plight of "C" Battery. The low pay of the men of the unit was not sufficient compensation for the high cost of living in Victoria, which was twenty-five to thirty three per cent higher than in Eastern Canada. It was becoming almost impossible for the personnel to maintain themselves satisfactorily under these circumstances. The only compensation the Department of Militia and Defence would make was an increase in the rate of pay of the men of an insignificant amount of ten cents a day,⁵¹ which was totally inadequate. Low pay caused numbers of the rank and file of the unit to desert and enter more lucrative civilian employment. Those men who tolerated poor pay, would not accept the deplorable barracks accommodation.⁵² The equipment of the unit was shoddy. The drop in strength of the battery was a matter of concern to the General Officer Commanding the militia, Major

50. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 8017, J. A. Mara to Caron, 26 June, 1888.

51. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, op cit, 4 May, 1888, pp. 1220-1221.

52. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1888, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 13, 1889, pp. 62-63.

General Middleton, who asked that reinforcements from "A" and "B" Batteries be despatched to Victoria to take the place of the men who had left the service.⁵³ This solution, a short term one at best, was not carried out by the Dominion. "C" Battery was left to carry on as best it could under existing circumstances.

Complacency towards the lot of "C" Battery was matched by continuing disregard of the state of the volunteer militia. Recommendations that artillery units should be established at Nanaimo, to protect the coal supplies, and at Vancouver, to defend the terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway, were shelved by the Dominion authorities. The need of stores and new clothing for the militia and the necessity of providing up to date weapons for the battery at New Westminster, were overlooked.⁵⁴ It is small wonder that the Deputy Adjutant-General, Colonel J. G. Holmes wrote that the Victoria Volunteer Rifles was "completely and hopelessly inefficient," and "it has been getting worse every year."⁵⁵ The only suggestion Holmes could offer that would meet with some approval, was the disbanding of the Corps, and reforming it in Vancouver.⁵⁶

53. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1888, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 13, 1889, p. 181.

54. Ibid., pp. 62-63.

55. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 26557, Commanding Officer Victoria Volunteer Rifle Company, Lt. P. Woolcott, to Holmes, 20 February, 1889.

56. Ibid., Holmes to Powell, 28 February, 1889.

In 1889, Middleton, realizing that Macdonald and Carson would not take the corrective steps necessary to place both the militia and "C" Battery on a firm basis, proposed to Lord Stanley, the Governor-General, that the Dominion Government accept the Imperial proposals for the defence of Esquimalt and pay the cost of the proffered British garrison of seventy-five all ranks. He reviewed the Imperial offer,⁵⁷ and strongly recommended that it be accepted as it stood, and that the militia be reorganized to be completely garrison artillery, as the Colonial Defence Committee had recommended.⁵⁸

Stanley forwarded this advice to Macdonald. The Government, at a meeting of the Cabinet 10 August, 1889, reviewed its position regarding Imperial terms for the joint defence for Esquimalt. In keeping faith with the pledge given to the Imperial Government in 1885, it was spending £17,000 annually to maintain "C" Battery.⁵⁹ The militia force had been expanded to include British Columbia, and a permanent force had been stationed at Victoria. Defensive works had been constructed at an expense of £20,000 without Imperial aid. The Government was of the opinion that the development of the local militia and the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway should be considered the Dominion's full share.⁶⁰

57. See pp. 105-106.

58. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. V, no. 165, Middleton to Stanley, 2 May, 1889.

59. Ibid., Report of the Privy Council, 10 August, 1889.

60. Loc. cit.

Stanley gave support to the views of the Cabinet, and, in a despatch to the Colonial Secretary, Viscount Knutsford, explained that Canada would not accept the idea of paying for an Imperial garrison over which the Government had no control. If it was to be an Imperial garrison, then the War Office would have to realize that it would be maintained by Imperial funds. There was no other recourse, for the Dominion, Stanley wrote, had done its part by maintaining the militia and "C" Battery.⁶¹

The War Office was not to concede defeat so readily. Knutsford presented its arguments for Canada's contributing to an Imperial garrison to the Governor General. Imperial troops would be invaluable as instructors for the militia. It was obvious that "C" Battery was not carrying out its duties properly. The War Office advised Canada that the Dominion Government had eighteen months in which to make a decision between employing a detachment of Royal Marine Artillery or continuing to use the services of "C" Battery.⁶² Caron, in reply to this despatch, reiterated the stand of his government. Since the Royal Navy needed the coal supplies on Vancouver Island as well as the naval base at Esquimalt, the defence of that station was an Imperial matter, the expense of which to be borne by the British Government. He concluded;

61. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. V, no. 165, Stanley to Knutsford, 13 August, 1889.

62. Ibid., Knutsford to Stanley, 7 November, 1889.

Finally the Undersecretary would observe that, as regards attacks upon land of Canadian territory, the United States of America are the only power contiguous to Canada upon this continent; and with that nation it is hoped that present friendly relations of Her Majesty's Government may be maintained. 63

The Canadian Government discounted the possibility of any attack over land upon British Columbia. If an attack were to be made, it would obviously be by sea. The defence of British Columbia would then, automatically, be the responsibility of the Royal Navy. If troops were required, they could be conveyed from the East over the Canadian Pacific Railway. There was no need to expand the British Columbia militia.

In reply to a circular Colonial Office despatch of 21 August, 1888, asking for information concerning the defences of Halifax and Esquimalt, an Order in Council was drawn up 2 February, 1891 which quoted the views of a military committee formed to study the defences of these two stations. The committee consisted of the General Officer Commanding, Major-General Ivor Carado Herbert, the Adjutant-General, Colonel W. Powell, the Commandant of the Royal Military College, and the Inspector of Artillery. It reported that the permanent garrison at Esquimalt was sufficient to provide an adequate defence, with the provision that sixty men from "A" and "B" Batteries would be transported to

63. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 8322, Caron to Stanley, 7 December, 1889.

reinforce "C" Battery as accommodation became available. Employing this report, the Order in Council went on to state that there was no need to provide funds for the offered Imperial garrison. The Government would maintain the volunteer militia at a strength recommended by a Colonial Defence Committee of 13 June, 1888, with the reservation that it would not be in excess of this number. It would not, however, expand the militia in British Columbia until satisfied that the population of the province was great enough to support additions to the existing total of twelve officers and 202 other ranks.⁶⁴

This provided the Dominion with yet another excuse for refusing to expand the militia. Requests that a highland unit be formed at New Westminster⁶⁵ and that the Nanaimo Rifle Company be reorganized,⁶⁶ were denied on the grounds that the Colonial Defence Committee wanted only garrison artillery established. Representations for the organizations of a battery of garrison artillery at Vancouver were rejected on the pretext that the population was too meagre to accommodate such a unit.⁶⁷

The Department of Militia and Defence exhibited some

64. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 25032, Copy of an Order in Council, 2 February, 1891, also P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 11121, Caron to Stanley, 2 February, 1891.

65. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 09944, G.G. Bonson to D. Christolm (M.P. New Westminster), 9 May, 1889.

66. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 37503, Holmes to Powell, 5 August, 1891.

67. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 9688, City Cler, Vancouver, to Caron, 19 December, 1889, also Ibid., 19 March, 1891, 4 April, 1891.

interest in March, 1890, in an outlined project to utilize Royal Navy reservists who had settled in British Columbia as a defence force. Unfortunately, the matter was allowed to languish and was never brought to successful realization.⁶⁸

The War Office was quick to note in October of 1891 that Esquimalt was an important base for the fleet whose purpose was the Dominion's protection, pointedly remarking that Canada did not, as Australia did, contribute to the Admiralty for the Royal Navy's maintenance. The War Office expressed deep concern over the inadequate defences of Canada's West Coast, and insisted that the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway increased, rather than diminished, the demands upon the Royal Navy for the defence of the Western seaboard of the Dominion. The Imperial Government was, moreover, exasperated over the fact that from 1878 to 1885, Canada had refused all Imperial requests to increase the fortifications of Esquimalt. The British Government, by offering to contribute £53,000 to the construction costs, as recommended by the Colonial Defence Committee, had offered more to Canada than to any other colony. The Dominion was asked to contribute £20,000 and to maintain a permanent force and a volunteer militia force, but Canada, while agreeing to this sum, had not settled the vexing question of the garrison for Esquimalt.⁶⁹ On 13 November of the same year

68. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 9907, A. Begg, Chief Commissioner of Immigration, Victoria, to Caron, 5 March, 1890. also ibid., Panet to Begg, 8 May, 1890.

69. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. VI, no. 165, Knutsford to Stanley, 21 October, 1891.

the Imperial Government renewed the offer to provide arms, stores, submarine stores, designs and skilled workers to aid in construction of works, and buildings required.⁷⁰ Canada, as before, was to provide the sites necessary, pay for changes relating to the building of new works, provide a garrison of 75 all ranks, and a volunteer militia force of 240 all ranks, fifty volunteer militia submarine miners, and necessary instructors to drill the volunteer militia.⁷¹ If, however, "C" Battery could provide men for the submarine unit, then the force needed would be reduced to 75 Royal Artillerymen. If "C" Battery was not of sufficient strength to do this, then the original plan was to be carried through within ten months.⁷² The Imperial Government also noted that Canada had, by an Order in Council of 27 November, 1885, agreed to establish a permanent force of one hundred men at Esquimalt and increase the strength of the local volunteer militia. This volunteer militia now numbered a total of twelve officers and 202 other ranks, but the increase in population actually required a force of thirty officers and 525 other ranks, which had not been enlisted. The General Officer Commanding had reported that the existing volunteer militia was not sufficient for the defence of the naval station.⁷³ The Dominion replied in January, 1892,

70. See pp. 105-106.

71. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 11121, Knutsford to Stanley, 13 November, 1891.

72. Ibid., Knutsford to Stanley, 18 November, 1891.

73. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 1121, Herbert, quoted in Knutsford to Stanley, 18 November, 1891.

that since Confederation she had expended \$1,000,000 yearly on defence,⁷⁴ and, since 1885 when it was agreed that the Imperial Government should furnish at a cost of £25,000 the arms and equipment necessary for a submarine corps, had the additional expense of maintaining the permanent garrison at Esquimalt. Canada was to provide the permanent force ("C" Battery), pay for the cost of works, the mounting of the guns, and provide a sufficient volunteer militia force. The Dominion had promised to increase the volunteer militia to a strength of 30 officers and 525 men only when the population of British Columbia could support such an increase, and it did not feel that the province could, at this time, sustain this number.⁷⁵ The Dominion also accepted the burden of constructing earthworks as outlined by the Colonial Defence Committee at the cost of £20,000 estimated in 1885, and to maintain such works in an efficient state. But the Dominion still declined to pay for an Imperial garrison, or to provide barracks for such a unit. The matter of instructors for the volunteer militia and submarine miners was not definitely agreed upon in 1885. As decreed by the Colonial Defence Committee, the volunteer militia should be predominantly garrison artillery, but at a strength no larger than that formerly promised (i.e. 30 officers, 525

74. This figure was not quite accurate. See appendix I.

75. Italics the author's. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. VI, no. 165, Copy of an Order in Council, 20 January, 1892.

men) by Canada by Order in Council, 27 November, 1885. Canada would supply the sites, but the cost of construction was to be no greater than the amount approved by this Order in Council - £20,000 opposed to the Imperial estimate of £30,000. The Dominion also firmly stated that there was no threat from the United States and that the sea defence of the West Coast was the problem of the Royal Navy and not of the Canadian Government.⁷⁶

Stanley, in forwarding the Order in Council to the Colonial Office, added that;

...Garon (the Minister of Militia and Defence) is to be replaced, and the new minister will do his utmost to get Esquimalt up to agreement. Mr. Abbott agrees with me that there is no use in prolonging the controversy with the present Minister of Militia and I have told the Prime Minister that I will forward the minute of Council without comment on the express understanding that a change in office is made forthwith...and the question (of Esquimalt) solved by him. 77

The War Office, in commenting upon this Order in Council, stated that the defence of Esquimalt had fallen upon the Royal Navy and at Imperial expense. The Colonial Office noted that the Royal Navy was providing for the defence of the whole of the Canadian West Coast, and was in need of the base at Esquimalt, and it had to be properly defended. After three and a half years, the Colonial Office observed, the Dominion and Imperial Governments had still not arrived at any definite agreement and no defence works had as yet

76. Ibid., Copy of Order in Council, 20 January, 1892, also Tucker, Canadian Magazine, pp. 307-309.

77. Ibid., Stanley to Knutsford, 22 January, 1892.

been constructed for the defence of the naval station. The colony of Australia, Knutsford pointed out, had accepted less liberal terms for her defence. The War Office said "C" Battery was not competent. A force of two officers and 150 other ranks should be sent to Esquimalt to train the volunteer for a two year period, and to help form a volunteer militia submarine detachment of two officers and 48 other ranks. A permanent force detachment of submarine miners of two officers and fifteen other ranks should be attached to the Royal Marines for training, as opposed to the Dominion's offer of a detachment of thirty-five all ranks to be raised from "C" Battery.⁷⁸

The War Office declaration that "C" Battery was incompetent was more than correct. Desertion was common. Twenty-five per cent of the men had purchased their discharge to find more lucrative occupations in the province, and recruits to fill the gaps in the ranks were unavailable.⁷⁹ Major-General Ivor Herbert, Commanding Officer of the Canadian Militia, pointed out that the assumption by Canada that "C" Battery, at a strength of three officers and 135 men, was sufficient, for the Esquimalt garrison, was false. The strength had fallen to fifty-three all ranks, and the battery was inefficient and staffed with poor officers and men.⁸⁰ Herbert wrote;

78. Ibid., Knutsford to Stanley, 30 March, 1892.

79. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, op cit, 21 April, 1892, pp.14-17. also Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, vol. I, p. 81.

80. Loc. cit. also Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1891, Canada, Sessional Papers, no.19, 1892, appendix 1, p.3.

I saw various squads (of "C" Battery) to through gun drill with 9 inch R.M.L. and 64 pounder guns, one and all were bad. The gun numbers did not know their duties, got in each other's way and were for all practical purposes little better than untrained men. 81

The average stay of recruits in the battery was one and one half years out of the three year period of enlistment. A further difficulty was the independent attitude of the population of the West Coast which recoiled from any form of regimentation.

Progress towards the solution of the perplexing problem of "C" Battery and the joint defence of Esquimalt was advanced by a visit to the naval station by a party of Conservative cabinet ministers in 1892. This included Sir John Abbott, the Prime Minister, and G. E. Forester, the Minister of Finance.⁸² As the cabinet became aware of the defencelessness of Esquimalt and expressed some willingness to participate in a joint defence scheme, the General Officer Commanding in Canada, Sir John Ross, was writing Stanley that the Imperial offer of seventy-five men for the garrison was not sufficient. He claimed that at least 150 all ranks were needed to man the fortifications. He also expressed doubts that desertion could be prevented unless pay and allowances for the garrison were increased.

81. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. VI, no. 165, Herbert to War Office, 9 November, 1892.

82. Ibid., Stanley to Colonial Secretary, Marquis of Ripon, 26 November, 1892.

83. Ibid., Sir John Ross to Stanley, 29 November, 1892, also Colonel A. Hill to Stanley, 23 November, 1892.

The Admiralty informed the Colonial Office that unless Canada came to an immediate agreement for the defence of Esquimalt, the offer to provide a permanent garrison would have to be withdrawn. Stanley presented this ultimatum to the Federal Cabinet. In December, 1892, it agreed to contribute to the maintenance of the Imperial detachment and to provide for a militia force of 400 rank and file in addition to "C" Battery.⁸⁴ The Cabinet also desired that buildings and fortifications already constructed by the Canadian Government be regarded as partial payment towards the cost of proposed new construction amounting to £30,000. Stanley supported his Cabinet and informed the War Office that the financial resources of the Canadian Government would not allow them to pay the full cost of construction.⁸⁵ He quoted Herbert as saying that the defence should rest solely with the Royal Artillerymen who were more competent to man the modern guns than were the men of "C" Battery.⁸⁶

The Imperial Government accepted in April, 1893, the Canadian proposals that Canada contribute £30,000 towards the construction of works and buildings, and that the former Dominion expenditure of £10,000 on barracks be accepted by the Imperial Government as partial payment for the cost of construction. The Canadian Government was to maintain a volunteer militia and pay some of the cost of a detachment

⁸⁴. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. VI, no. 165, Stanley to Ripon, 27 December, 1892.

⁸⁵. Ibid., Stanley to Ripon, 24 December, 1892.

⁸⁶. Ibid., Stanley to Ripon, 27 December, 1892.

of seventy-five Royal Marine Artillery. The expense of the first two years would be borne by the Imperial Government until the works were completed. The Imperial Government reserved the right, at the end of five years from the arrival of the Royal Marine Artillery at Esquimalt, to reduce or withdraw the garrison.⁸⁷ The War Office stated that construction could begin as soon as Canada could provide the sites.⁸⁸

Formal acceptance of these terms was incorporated in a report of the Cabinet of 1 August, 1893, stating that money had been voted by the Dominion Parliament to be expended for the construction of fortification at Esquimalt in 1878, and that the Dominion would present these to the Imperial Government for \$50,000 (£10,000), to meet preliminary expenses of construction. Canada would pay for Royal Marine Artillery for the year 1893-1894. The Cabinet also agreed, as previously promised, to transfer all barracks to the Imperial Government.⁸⁹

A last complication arose in connection with the barracks which constituted part of Canada's contribution. The Marquis of Ripon pointed out that, although the original cost had been merely £7,000 the present Canadian evaluation

87. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. VI, no. 165, Ripon to Stanley, 27 April, 1893.

88. Ibid., Ripon to Stanley, 27 April, 1893.

89. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 39098, Order in Council, 1 August, 1893.

was £10,000 and that this figure would not be accepted by the War Office, for

I am to add that in the present situation of affairs in Canada His Lordship (the Governor General) is certain that any effort to obtain a further contribution from the Dominion would be useless, as owing to a heavy deficit of revenue, expenditure is being drastically cut down, and more especially the Department of Defence. 90

The Imperial Government's acceptance of this estimate settled the last major problem.

The militia in British Columbia was not to derive much benefit from the joint agreement. There was a determined effort to get a militia unit established in Vancouver, as the Legislative Assembly wished.⁹¹ Preference was for a rifle corps, and G.E.G. Corbould, M.P. Vancouver, wrote to the Minister of Militia and Defence, MacKenzie Bowell in March, 1892, asking that such a unit be established in the city.⁹² The Department of Militia and Defence claimed, however, that there was no money available to carry out such a scheme.⁹³ A public meeting was held in Vancouver and it was found that men would volunteer if a militia unit were authorized.⁹⁴ It was also reported to Bowell that thirteen

90. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 39098, Ripon to Secretary of State for War, 26 June, 1894.

91. Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia, vol. 21, 23 February, 1892.

92. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 10730, G.E.G. Corbould to the Minister of Militia and Defence, MacKenzie Bowell, 20 March, 1892.

93. Ibid., Panet to Corbould, 26 March, 1892.

94. Ibid., City Council Vancouver to Bowell, 25 February, 1892.

hundred citizens of Vancouver had expressed themselves as desiring that an infantry battalion be established in their city, and that the city had already expended \$40,000 on a parade square.⁹⁵ The citizens' desires were thwarted. Herbert stated that there was not the money to establish a force in Vancouver, as the existing militia was not even receiving its twelve days drill a year, and there were too many officers and non-commissioned officers in proportion to men and that these faults had to be rectified before the establishment of any new units in British Columbia. The development of the militia in the province, furthermore, was to carry on in the manner decreed by the Colonial Defence Committee. Militia garrison artillery was to be organized first as it was now only one half of what was needed for the defence of Esquimalt.⁹⁶ The Dominion Government restated the views of Herbert and added that "the development of the militia in that province has to be in accordance with the lines laid down by the Colonial Defence Committee appointed by the Imperial Government, and that the whole militia system is under study by the Defence Committee and therefore it has to...be developed according to the resources of the country as a whole."⁹⁷

In Parliament, Corbould kept up the agitation for the

95. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 10730, City Clerk Vancouver, to Bowell, 14 April, 1892, also D.W. Meeks to Corbould, 21 April, 1892, also Meeks to Bowell, 6 May, 1892.

96. Ibid., Herbert to Bowell, 24 March, 1892.

97. Ibid., Copy Order in Council, 10 May, 1892.

establishment of a militia unit in Vancouver.⁹⁸ The people of Vancouver were not to be denied; they took matters into their own hands and began to recruit a unit in July, 1893.⁹⁹ Herbert finally conceded that the militia should be increased to support the British Columbia Brigade of Garrison Artillery in order to meet the requirements of the joint agreement for the defence of Esquimalt.¹⁰⁰ It was asked in Parliament by G. Prior whether or not the Canadian Government was keeping faith with the Imperial Government by increasing the numbers of garrison artillery in British Columbia.¹⁰¹ The Government was forced finally, to authorize the establishment of a company of garrison artillery at Vancouver, a company which had been in existence for some months without official sanction.¹⁰² Requests to have the rifle company at Nanaimo reformed or a battery of garrison artillery established in the town did not meet with like success.¹⁰³ The Government's explanation was that, since the Royal Navy was present to provide for the defence of that town, there was little cause for concern.¹⁰⁴ The unit had been reformed

98. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 10 February, 1893, pp. 550-551.

99. Annual Report of the State of the Militia 1894, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 19, pp. 39-40

100. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 32335, Powell to Holmes, 30 March, 1894.

101. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 6 June, 1895, pp. 2216-2217.

102. Ibid., A.G.O., file 32335, Acting Adjutant-General, Aylmer, to Holmes, 2 October, 1895.

103. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A11704, D.W.Gordon (M.P. Vancouver), to Bowell, 6 March, 1892.

104. Canada, Parliament, Senate, Official Report of Debates, 5 March, 1896, p. 246.

unofficially and Holmes had inspected the unit at his own expense. The men of the rifle company had paid from their own incomes for the services of a drill instructor and had contributed \$250 to build a rifle range. They also aspired to construct a drill hall and to make it the property of the corps.¹⁰⁵ Regardless of these efforts, the unit was still not given official recognition.

Between 1885 and 1886 only one additional unit was authorized in British Columbia. This step marked the beginning, small though it was, of the growth of the British Columbia militia. The interior was now beginning to become settled, and with the population increase an expansion of the militia was probable.

105. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 23970, Holmes to Powell, 4 June, 1893, also Major J. S. Matthews, "The Vancouver Militia," The British Columbia Magazine, vol. 7, (June, 1911), p. 553.

CHAPTER V

THE YEARS OF EXPANSION OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIA MILITIA
1896-1914

Two external influences in 1896 played their part in starting the Canadian Government on a period of reform of the Canadian Militia. The first of these was the Venezuela incident which threatened to develop into an Anglo-American war. The second was a general growth of tension in British foreign relations.¹ As a result of the former there was a hurried expansion and improvement in the armament of the militia. The influence of the latter was more subtle. It took the form of Imperial hints and suggestions that Canada increase her militia and maintain it in a more efficient state.² Both had their immediate and prolonged effects on the growth and development of the British Columbia militia during the years 1896-1914.

In the early years of this period the militia of British Columbia made no startling emergence from its lethargic state. Towards the end of 1896, however, the lack of militia units in the interior of the province, coupled with a rapid increase in population, led to renewed efforts on the part of the inhabitants to have an adequate militia established there. In January, 1897, a request to establish a mounted

1. See chapter 1, pp 16-17.

2. Ibid., pp. 18-19, 20, 23.

troop at Vernon was refused at Ottawa, even though it met with the approval of the General Officer Commanding, Major-General W. J. Cascoigne.³ A similar desire to form a company of infantry or mounted infantry in Rossland arose from that city's proximity to the United States border and the increased activity of American labour agitators.⁴ Bad communications did not allow for the formation of a country battalion but the forming of a corps similar to that contemplated for Rossland was under consideration for Trail.⁵ In another request for a Rossland company a militia roll was enclosed with names of a sufficient number of persons to form two companies, and it was hoped that the Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir Frederick Borden, would sanction the formation of a corps.⁶ A further demand ended by stating that;

The corps here will very probably be called on for active work in the near future in connection with strikes and other emergencies and it is necessary that it should be put on a proper footing with as little delay as possible. 7

This request also stated that the men would be unwilling to serve under W. Weeks,⁸ an accountant in Rossland, who

3. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 60553, A.E.Lawes to H.Bostock, 23 September, 1896, also ibid., C.F. Costerton, to Deputy Adjutant-General, Lt/Col J.Peters, (enclosed was a roll of men who would join a mounted troop also ibid., file 64616, General Officer Commanding Major-General W.F.Cascoigne, to the Minister of Militia and Defence, Sir Frederic Borden, 1 January, 1897.

4. Ibid., W.Weeks to Borden, 19 January, 1897, also ibid., unknown to Borden, 25 January, 1897.

5. Loc. cit.

6. Ibid., Weeks to Peters, 3 February, 1897. Labour agitation in Rossland culminated in the Royal Commission of 1903. See chapter VI, pp.177-180, also H.S.Ferns, B. Ostry, The Age of Mackenzie King, London, Heinemann, 1955, pp. 58-64.

7. Ibid., W. H. Cooper to Peters, 5 February, 1897.

8. Loc. cit.

had initiated the movement to form a unit in that city. The Adjutant-General, Colonel M. Aylmer, wrote to Borden that the people were angered when Weeks' received the right to form the unit and that;

A meeting was held of all the qualified officers in Rossland in disgust at the action taken by Mr. Weeks who is really lacking of all that is required for making an officer, and it is most unfortunate that authority was sent to him. 9

In two separate despatches the Deputy Adjutant-General, Lieutenant J. Peters, stated that a company was needed at Rossland, especially with consideration to the possibility of strikes and the lack of police, and the further possibility of American trouble now that a United States Army post had been established at Spokane.¹⁰ He also observed that Weeks was not the man to form this company.¹¹

The War Office now asked if the Governor-General, Lord Aberdeen, would recommend that the Dominion increase the strength of the British Columbia Brigade Garrison Artillery, and form a battalion of infantry in the province, as well as a volunteer unit of fifty submarine miners.¹² Hon. A. Morrison (M.P. New Westminster) wrote to Borden that a school of instruction was needed at New Westminster, and that if one were not provided, the company of garrison artillery

9. Ibid., Adjutant-General, Col. M. Aylmer, to Borden, 5 February, 1897.

10. Ibid., Peters to Aylmer, 9 February, 1897.

11. Ibid., Peters to Cascoigne, 10 February, 1897.

12. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. VII, no. 165, Colonial Secretary, Sir Joseph Chamberlain, to Governor-General Aberdeen, 31 July, 1897.

there would become noneffective.¹³ Peters, commenting on this matter, wrote;

I am sorry to say that there has always been trouble at New Westminster in getting suitable officers for No. 4 Company, especially a man of prominence in the place, with force enough to hold them together. ¹⁴

From 1893-1894 there were five commanding officers of this company and it was eventually disbanded by Peters in 1895. He later asked A. Fornin to reorganize the unit, but, although Fornin was successful in his efforts, the company again fell into disrepair immediately after he left it. It had been placed in the command of a Mr. Smith, whom the men disliked, and, to promote the corps, Peters asked Major Bennett, adjutant of the 2nd Battalion, British Columbia Brigade Artillery, to take command. He succeeded in saving the company from complete disintegration, but when the No. 6 Company was formed at Vancouver, he became its commanding officer, and Smith, once again in charge of the New Westminster corps could not hold it together.

Col. Peters, trying to find some young second lieutenants to help keep the group in existence, commented that until this was done, no school of artillery instruction could be formed.¹⁵ In a later report, the Deputy Adjutant-General (now called the District Officer Commanding) gave a summary

13. P.A.C., M.R., A.C.O., file 16159, Hon. A. Morrison to Borden, 26 August, 1897.

14. Ibid., Peters to Deputy Minister of Militia and Defence, Colonel C.E. Panet, 11 October, 1897.

15. Ibid., Peters to Panet, 11 October, 1897.

of requirements for the defence of British Columbia. He made the obvious observation that the terrain of the province was ideally suited for defence, and that communications being limited to a few known routes and waterways, a small number of well-armed men could hold down a much larger enemy. However, the nearness of the towns and the Canadian Pacific Railway to the United States border meant that the defending force must know exactly where to go, and be ready to move at a moment's notice. If such a force were not made available, then the United States Army detachment at Spokane, moving over connecting roads, could overcome unarmed Nelson, commandeer the Canadian Pacific Railway equipment there, move on to Revelstoke and cut the railway line, thus preventing reinforcements coming from the East. Reinforcements from Vancouver would be useless, even if they could be spared from the defence of Esquimalt and the terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The defence of the interior, therefore, had to rest upon the local population. A company at Rossland could help defend the landing at Arrowhead, which, due to the mountain range, was the most easily defended position in all of Canada, but which had to be manned first. A company of infantry at Rossland could be formed from the Cornish miners in that town. The Canadian Pacific Railway as an important road of defence, had to be kept open, in war or peace. The Canadian Government was entreated to make a determined attempt to convince the American Government that, considering the small population of British Columbia, the Canadian Pacific Railway was not a military railroad.

Col. Peters also advised that companies be formed at Revelstoke, Donald, and Kamloops, and that the Canadian Pacific Railway be asked to detail a caretaker to keep the arms in good order. In all events, such armaments should be available at all times, with enough ammunition ready at hand. If this were done, the men could be found to form these companies. Each community should have a company of forty-two men; the names of these men had already been submitted from Rossland, Kamloops, and Vernon, which needed a mounted troop. Col. Peters concluded by saying that there had been no attempt as yet to organize a militia force of any description in the interior of the province, and that this was a grave omission in the volunteer militia force of the Dominion.¹⁶

This report seems to have had some effect, for, shortly after its submission, Aylmer reported that Borden would try to have a company of infantry authorized at Rossland and a mounted company at Vernon or some other point. Col. Peters was instructed to determine which area could best support another corps.¹⁷

The Quartermaster-General, in a letter to General Cascoigne, stated that, aside from the threat of an American invasion, there was a need for volunteer militia at Vernon and Rossland for use in case of local labour trouble. He

16. Ibid., file 69814, Peters to Quartermaster General, 27 October, 1897.

17. Ibid., file 16159, Peters to Panet, 11 October, 1897.

also observed that there was no volunteer militia in British Columbia other than the British Columbia Brigade Garrison Artillery, which was required to help to defend Esquimalt, leaving the mainland open to invasion.¹⁸

Reporting as to the best locations for forming new companies, Col. Peters suggested that corps be formed at Nelson, Rossland, Vernone and along the Canadian Pacific Railway, at Kamloops, Revelstoke, and Donald. Lists of men willing to serve had already been forwarded from Kamloops (11 January, 1896), Rossland (9 February, 1897), and Vernon (13 April, 1896). He advised that those communities applying first should be given priority in the formation of corps. Rossland was strongly recommended as it was situated in an area which lent itself to easy defence. A mounted troop should, in Col. Peter's opinion, be formed at Vernon, and Kamloops and Nelson should have an infantry company. There had, however, been no offer from Nelson, Donald, or Revelstoke, to raise troops. A regiment, he suggested, should be formed from Companies at Rossland, Nelson, Kamloops, and others, to be called the "Rocky Mountain Rifles" with some prominent person to be its commanding officer. The corps should be armed with two machine guns and two six-pounder Quick-firing (Q.F.) Hotchkiss guns to be mounted on flat cars, and twelve sixteen-pounder Q.F. at the landing at Arrowhead and Revelstoke to be used against paddle steamers.¹⁹

18. *Ibid.*, file 69814, Quartermaster General to Cascoigne, 10 November, 1897.

19. *Ibid.*, file 64616, Peters to Aylmer, 12 November, 1897.

It was soon reported to Col. Peters that authority to form companies at Rossland, Revelstoke, Nelson, Vernon, and Kamloops would be forthcoming, even if in order to meet the added expense reductions were necessary in the volunteer militia at points outside of British Columbia. Organization should be undertaken, pending authority in the establishment lists.²⁰ On 1 July, 1898, the companies at Nelson, Kamloops, Kaslo, Revelstoke, and Rossland were officially authorized. This was the origin of the Rocky Mountain Rangers.²¹ The mounted troop at Vernon, under Judge W. Spinks as elected captain, was also authorized on the same date, but was disbanded 1 August, 1899, for no apparent reason.²² A more fortunate unit was the 2nd Battalion 5th British Columbia Brigade Garrison Artillery, which found a successful method of obtaining funds from the Department of Militia and Defence when all the officers of the battalion threatened to resign unless they were given a drill hall. Three days later the Col. Aylmer wired Col. Peters that \$1000 had been allocated for a drill hall in the supplementary estimates.²³ This threat on the part of the officers had received a faster response than had a resolution of the Legislative Assembly

20. Ibid., file 69814, Aylmer to Peters, 24 January, 1898.

21. Canada Gazette, vol. 32, (2 July, 1898) G.O., 67, p. 67.

22. Even though Peters tried to convince the Government that it should remain, ibid., file 60553, Peters to Aylmer, 8 April, 1899.

23. Ibid., file 73084, Peters to Aylmer, 23 April, 1898, also ibid., Aylmer to Peters, 23 April, 1898.

of British Columbia, requesting that a drill hall be built in Vancouver.²⁴

However, while the volunteer militia of British Columbia was being increased, it was not well armed, and Col. Peters asked that the obsolete Snider rifle, then still in use, be replaced by a more modern weapon.²⁵ He again wrote that if the rifles were replaced, the old weapons could be used as a reserve for settlers at different points in the vicinity of Victoria and along the Esquimalt and Nanaimo railroad route.²⁶ The matter of uniforms became an issue when Col. Peters reported that the richer officers of the Royal Marine Rifles were purchasing their own kit, and the other men were jealous of this self-supplied splendour.²⁷ Col. Aylmer stated that there was to be a standard uniform for all the units, and, in addition, the men were to be equipped with the Enfield rifle, which was the best rifle available at that time.²⁸ On 1 August, 1899, the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment British Columbia Brigade Garrison Artillery was converted into the 6th Rifle Regiment. Later it became known as the 6th Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles. At first the change was greeted with little enthusiasm. Having wanted

24. Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia, vol. XXVII, 2 May, 1898, p. 141.

25. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 76278, Peters to Aylmer, 7 January, 1898.

26. Ibid., 27 August, 1898.

27. Ibid., file 69814, Peters to Aylmer, 9 September, 1898.

28. Ibid., General-Officer-Commanding, Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, to Aylmer, 3 September, 1898.

a separate rifle regiment, the people of Vancouver were displeased now to have a unit clothed. The Vancouver News Advertiser mocked the contrast between the drab dark green and black uniforms of the rifle regiments and the more showy uniforms of the garrisons artillery;

From the radiance of brass and blue,
To the dull dead black of shoddy and glue,
The cheapest cloth of the uniform-makers,
For the 6th Battalion of Undertakers, 29

The 6th Battalion was to become one of the finest volunteer militia regiments in Canada.

While the militia of British Columbia was assuming its final character, the matter of Imperial-Canadian defence of Esquimalt came up once again. The Colonial Office pointed out that the temporary arrangement by which the Admiralty supplied the small regimental garrison for the base was about to expire. The Colonial Defence Committee suggested that a further agreement be concluded between the Dominion and Imperial Governments to cover the next ten years, after which Canada could assume the defence of Esquimalt completely.³⁰ The new terms of the Imperial Government were that Canada was to agree to pay a fixed sum of £21,000 annually for the cost of the Imperial garrison, that the Dominion would pay £12,000 for preliminary charges for all barracks accommodations of the Imperial garrison. The Dominion Government was also asked to pay the maintenance of the local volunteer

29. Vancouver News Advertiser, 6 August, 1899.

30. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 17424, Chamberlain to Lord Minto, 1 February, 1899.

militia of 623 all ranks. The permanent garrison of 322 all ranks was to be supplied by the Imperial Government, and the balance of the cost of their maintenance was to be assured for the next ten years.³¹ The Governor-General, Lord Minto, in reply to a query regarding the extent of Imperial control of the volunteer militia at Victoria, wrote that the British Government would be wise to avoid any attempts to place Canadian troops under Imperial control, as friction would inevitably develop. The Canadian people and the volunteer militia were against this conception of Imperial control.³² Lord Minto informed the Colonial Secretary, Sir Joseph Chamberlain, that the Canadian Government had agreed for the next ten years to pay the cost of a garrison of infantry, one half the annual cost of maintenance, one half the charge for barracks accommodation, and the entire cost of maintaining the volunteer militia.³³ The Dominion Government also would maintain a local militia of 623 all ranks. This arrangement was approved by the Privy Council of Canada on 27 June, 1899.³⁴ The Imperial Government accepted it but expressed its desire that Canada should provide sites for stores free of charge, while the Imperial Government would contribute the arms and stores at no cost.³⁵

31. Ibid., Colonial Office to Aberdeen, 7 February, 1899.

32. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. VII, no. 165, Aberdeen to Chamberlain, 5 April, 1899.

33. Ibid., Lord Minto to Chamberlain, 12 May, 1899.

34. Minute of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council, 27 June, 1899.

35. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 17424, Chamberlain to Aberdeen, 13 September, 1899.



O.M.R. CAMP
OKANAGAN LAKE B.C.

V.P.O.E

First cavalry Training Camp in British Columbia, 1909.

"B" Squadron, Canadian Mounted Rifles went into camp at the north end of Okanagan Lake on 14 June 1909, and were inspected by General Otter, of Boer War fame, on the 15th June. They were unaware until the camp was over they had used an unauthorised name, i.e., Okanagan Mounted Rifles. Camp was from 14 to 26 June. First commission: Major H.A. Perry, "A" Sqd, Kamloops, 15 May 1908; other officers, "B" Sqd, Vernon, 18 May 1908. Camp Commandant: Major Bennett. Officer Commanding: Major H.A. Perry. Squadron officers: - Mr. V. Allen; R. J. Inuitrie; R. O. G. Bennett; E. J. Sutherland; Colin C. MacRae. Medical Officer: Dr. O. Morris, M.D.; veterinary officer: Mr. Isley, V.S. About fifty non-commissioned officers and men. Also horses. No motor equipment. A few months later, the 30th British Columbia Horse was formed, when "B" Squadron, C. In. R. became "B" Squadron, Major Mr. V. Allen, C.O. It was located on Indian Reserve; creek from Vernon in trees; Johnston's Carswell Sawmill, and Okanagan Landing on right. As an officer of 6th Regt, D.C.O.R., Vancouver, I was, one evening, a guest.

J. S. Matthews, 1952

Known since as 2nd C. In. R., B.C. Mounted Rifles; B.C. Dragoons.

This was agreed to, and the first replacement for Esquimalt arrived at the date of termination of the first joint agreement, 30 September, 1899. Col. Aylmer reported, in reference to the defence of Esquimalt, that;

The defence of British Columbia may be considered as dependent in a big measure upon the security of Esquimalt, a Royal Navy base of much importance... new militia units are not necessarily needed as long as the Royal Navy remains superior at sea... 36

The Canadian Volunteer Militia troops were to be mobilized once annually to man the defences of the base under an Imperial officer. Other than this, it was decided that the Canadian troops should be under Canadian officers and free of Imperial control. In addition, the number of militia to be placed at the disposal of the Imperial garrison at Esquimalt, in accordance with the Colonial Defence Conference held 10 November, 1898, were to include the 5th British Columbia Regiment Canadian Artillery, 208 all ranks, and the 6th Rifle Battalion, 15 officers, 500 other ranks.³⁷

The militia, meanwhile, was being given a complete revitalization. In October, 1899, Canada's direct involvement in the South African War resulted in an upsurge in the development of the militia as a whole and of the militia of British Columbia in particular. Official government policy towards the British Columbia militia did not radically change, but the existing militia was improved when South

36. Ibid., file 76278, Aylmer to Peters, 18 October, 1899.

37. Ibid., file 17424, Hutton to Panet, 20 October, 1899. The actual cost of the defence of Esquimalt was to be \$145,000 annually. C.F. Hamilton, "The Canadian Militia, the Beginning of Reform," Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol. VII, (April, 1930), p. 387.

African veterans returned and by the general patriotic feeling amongst the population. More men were willing to joining the militia, but there was still the problem of a lack of units, outside of the already constituted artillery and infantry formation, in which they could serve. This was unfortunate, as the great majority of men from British Columbia who fought in South Africa went as members of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Canadian Mounted Rifles, or as part of the Strathcona Horse, and such men could not be expected to join a rifle corps.

Early in the war, H. Bostock (M.P. Revelstoke), in a letter to Borden, asked if a mounted rifle corps could be formed at New Denver, and also forwarded a list of names of men willing to join.³⁸ The General Officer Commanding, Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, informed the Minister that it was not necessary to form a company of mounted troops at that location to help protect the frontier. Any corps to be formed should, he felt, be placed at Fort Steele, Vernon, and Princeton, to provide, with the help of the independent Rocky Mountain Rangers, sufficient strength to protect the Canadian border.³⁹ Another plea was made by H.P. Hodges for a mounted troop at Vernon. He claimed that men could easily be obtained for such a unit, and that interest in such a corps was considerable as a result of the war then underway in South Africa.⁴⁰ Colonel Peters, in a letter to

38. Ibid., file 17913, H. Bostock to Borden, 24 November, 1899.

39. Ibid., Hutton to Borden, 6 December, 1899.

40. Ibid., file 60553, H.P. Hodges to Peters, 9 December, 1899.

General Hutton, indicated that he was not in favour of authorizing such a unit. He stated that a corps of mounted troops had been disbanded shortly after its establishment at Vernon, and asserted that there was not enough spirit amongst the townspeople to warrant such an authorization.⁴¹ General Hutton accepted these arguments at their face value and stated that he would not recommend the formation of a unit at Vernon in the near future.⁴² General Hutton's concern lay with the coastal defence problem, and he and the Imperial officers at Esquimalt began advocating an expansion in the militia there.

Continued pleas were heard for the formation of mounted corps in the interior of the province. C.M. Edwards wrote to Bostock, saying that a mounted rifle company could be formed as part of the Rocky Mountain Rangers at Cranbrook in the East Kootenay District. The men should be supplied with kahki uniforms, western saddles, and carbines.⁴³ Once again General Hutton turned down the request, with the excuse that there were enough military in the Northwest Territories to provide for the protection of the interior of British Columbia.⁴⁴ Another request to form a rifle company

41. Ibid., Peters to Hutton, 12 December, 1899.

42. Ibid., Hutton to Peters, 20 December, 1899.

43. Ibid., file 17913, C.M. Edwards to Bostock, 27 January, 1900.

44. Ibid., Hutton to Borden, 7 February, 1900. There was also a desire on the part of the city of Vancouver to have the Imperial Government establish a supply depot for material and troops en route to China, ibid., file 19041, J.A.S. McQueen Acting Mayor of Vancouver (on instructions of City Council), to Borden, 24 July, 1900.

1st Battn, 5th Regt. Canadian Garrison Artillery. Victoria
on Park Road, Stanley Park, before or after Review
at Brockton Pt. 1899.-1909, or. 1901. Officers wearing
Sabretache.



at Ladner was vetoed by the Adjutant-General.⁴⁵

While the interior was experiencing a singular lack of success in obtaining the desired militia formations, Esquimalt was faring considerably better. On 1 October, 1899, Canada and the United Kingdom came to an agreement concerning the defence of that base by which the annual cost of the permanent garrison of 320 officers and men would be met. The volunteer militia to be maintained by the Dominion was to consist of: artillery, five officers, 150 other ranks, infantry, fifteen officers, 400 other ranks, engineers, three officers, fifty men.⁴⁶ The problem concerning this force was the raising of the engineers, who were to be a submarine mining company. It was planned that eventually this company of fifty-three all ranks would form part of the 5th Canadian Artillery.

In 1901, General Hutton's report on the annual mobilization of forces at both Esquimalt and Halifax made reference to the condition of the volunteer militia in British Columbia. The report deplored the lack of zeal displayed by the men and the "lack of discipline and soldierlike spirit,"⁴⁷ among the officers and non-commissioned officers. General Hutton suggested that the date of mobilization be fixed by Order in Council and made compulsory as part of the

⁴⁵. Ibid., Aylmer to A.Morrison, M.P., 22 April, 1900.

⁴⁶. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 26 June, 1900, p. 8342.

⁴⁷. P.A.C., M.R., G.G.P., vol. IX, no. 165, O.C. troops Esquimalt to Undersecretary of State for War, 25 October, 1900.

annual drill. The men would be paid for this mobilization.⁴⁸ Writing to Lord Minto, General O'Grady-Haley (Hutton's successor), pointed out that of the volunteer militia garrison artillery force at Esquimalt of sixteen officers and 330 other ranks, only eight officers and 52 men were present, one-sixth of the total force, and that these men were lacking in proper drill and training, and he felt that the men who did not muster should be penalized.⁴⁹

Some months previously, Lieutenant-Colonel C.A. Worsthrop, Commanding Officer of the 6th Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles, had written to Colonel Peters that, in his opinion, the militia infantry force available for the defence of Esquimalt, 355 all ranks, was too small. During the last mobilization this regiment had had to provide outposts and patrols for the entire coastline between headquarters at Victoria and Esquimalt, a distance of ten miles, and keep open communications between the two points. Furthermore, establishment of two companies at New Westminster and four in Vancouver was not sufficient. He advised that the detachment at New Westminster be converted into a rifle unit, and that a new regiment be authorized, with headquarters at New Westminster, with a nucleus of the existing "A" and "B" Companies of the 6th Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles. With the population of the lower Fraser River Valley, growing as it was, he stated, a first class corps could be raised and sustained.

48. Loc. cit.

49. Ibid., General Officer Commanding, Major-General O'Grady-Haley, to Minto, 3 October, 1901.

The 6th Duke of Connaught's Rifles should be concentrated in the city of Vancouver, as the four companies then there could easily be increased to six or eight now that the population stood at 30,000. The new drill hall, then almost completed, would be a great advantage, as it would accommodate a full regiment. "I therefore," the Colonel concluded, "desire to apply for authority to raise two to four additional companies in Vancouver, and will guarantee to keep up the establishment of officers and men."⁵⁰ Colonel Peters, in forwarding this letter to the Adjutant-General, gave his full agreement with the scheme, and also recommended that corps should be raised at Chilliwack, Nanaimo, and Ladner.⁵¹ The eventual result of Colonel Worsthrop's suggestion was the formation of the New Westminster Rifles in 1912.

In the meantime, the 5th British Columbia Reserve Garrison Artillery was having to curtail its training as there was no ammunition available for the newly mounted 6-inch guns at Esquimalt.⁵² Two years later the situation had not been improved. The return of the military resources of the Dominion of Canada in 1903 showed that the volunteer militia in British Columbia for the defence of Esquimalt was short of weapons generally, and of small arms ammunition in particular.⁵³ Another problem faced by the volunteer militia

50. Ibid., file 76-85, Lieutenant-Colonel C.A. Worsthrop to Colonel Peters, 11 January, 1901.

51. Ibid., Peters to Aylmer, 14 January, 1901.

52. Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1899, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 35, 1901, pt. II, p. 27.

53. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. X, no. 165, Chamberlain to Minto, 9 November, 1903, re: Military resources of the Dominion.

garrison artillery was that, while they received instruction on 13-pounder R.M.L. guns, they had to be prepared to man 6-inch guns on mobilization. The distance of three miles from Victoria to the gun mountings presented a difficulty. In November, 1904, General O'Grady-Haley, asked if the Imperial Government would sanction the removal of one 6-inch gun and mounting from the reserve stores at the dockyard to the drill hall at Victoria, so that the volunteer militia could be given instruction on this type of weapon.⁵⁴ Permission was granted by the Imperial War Office, which, however, pointed out the expense of transporting such a weapon and remounting it at Victoria.⁵⁵ It is difficult to ascertain from records available if the gun was ever moved, but it is extremely unlikely that it was.

When he first took office General O'Grady-Haley also concerned himself with the defence of the terminus of the Pacific cable on Vancouver Island. In December, 1902, he advised Borden that a force of volunteer militia all ranks be raised in the neighbourhood of Groppler Creek, the terminus of the cable, to guard against a sudden raid by an enemy force. The building housing the cable, he suggested, should be put in a rough state of fortification and be supervised by the commanding officer of the Royal Engineers at

54. Ibid., O'Grady-Haley to Commanding Officer of Her Majesty's Forces in Canada, 23 November, 1902, O'Grady-Haley reported this lack of suitable weapons for training purposes in the Annual Report of the State of the Militia, 1901, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 35, 1902, pp. 27-28.

55. Ibid., War Office to Colonial Secretary, Alfred Lyttleton, 28 December, 1904.

Esquimalt. The force would be composed of white men employed in the vicinity by the cable company, and could be supplemented, if necessary, by Indians. The commanding officer, he continued, should be the senior person or chief operator at the terminus, and he should be granted a commission in the volunteer militia. This force should be included as a detachment of the 5th Canadian Artillery. This step was necessary to give the unit belligerent rights in case of war. The company should be equipped with thirty rifles, 200 rounds of ammunition and an extra 200 rounds for practices. The men should be issued one uniform each.⁵⁶ The cable terminal, an important link in Imperial defence, was, however, not to be defended, since the suggestions of General O'Grady-Haley which had been prompted by the Colonial Office,⁵⁷ were ignored by the Dominion Government.⁵⁸

At the Imperial Conference of 1902, the First Lord of the Admiralty suggested to the Colonial delegates that their respective countries should contribute to the support of the Imperial Army and Royal Navy.⁵⁹ The Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, stated on behalf of the Dominion Government, that Canada could not see her way clear

56. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 22647, O'Grady-Haley to Borden, 19 December, 1902, question by Borden on 3 November, 1902, concerning the defence of terminus of the Pacific cable.

57. Ibid., Chamberlain to Minto, 2 July, 1902.

58. Ibid., file 22467, Borden to Minto, 13 January, 1903.

59. First Lord of the Admiralty, quoted in: Ollivier, Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1937, pp.161-164.

to contribute directly to the maintenance of British forces.⁶⁰ There was also hesitation on the part of the Prime Minister to contribute funds which would not be controlled by the Canadian Parliament.⁶¹ Sir Wilfrid did offer to relieve the British taxpayer of the burden of Imperial garrisons on Canadian territory, and he proposed that Canada take over control of Esquimalt and Halifax.⁶² An Order in Council, dated 20 January, 1905, stated that;

They (the Canadian ministers), at the same time, (of the Colonial Conference of 1902), acknowledged the propriety of the Dominion, as it advanced in population and wealth, making more liberal provisions for the purpose of self-defence, and they stated the willingness of the Government of Canada to assume the responsibility of garrisoning Halifax and Esquimalt, and to this extent relieving the Imperial Government of the cost of protecting the Dominion. They now deem it expedient to renew this offer in a more formal and precise manner. 63

The Order-in-Council continued to the effect that, if the Imperial Government agreed, Canada would assume responsibility for the whole of the garrison of Esquimalt and Halifax, with troops maintained and paid under the authority of the Canadian Government. In addition, the Dominion would be most grateful for advice in such military matters as might be connected with the principle of local self government.⁶⁴

60. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, quoted in Ollivier,^{op cit,} Vol. I, pp. 165-166

61. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 20 February, 1905, pp. 1403-1404.

62. Loc. cit.

63. Copy of a report of the Honourable the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General in Council 20 January, 1905, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 128, 1905, p. 1.

64. Secretary of State for Colonies, Alfred Lyttleton, to the Governor General, Lord Grey, 8 February, 1905, ibid., pp. 1-2.

This offer was accepted by the Imperial Government, with one reservation. Since the British authorities realized that Canada would find it difficult to raise the Canadian troops to replace the Imperial garrisons at Halifax and Esquimalt, the War Office offered to defray the cost of £200,000 a year, exclusive of the Canadian contribution towards the cost of the garrison at Esquimalt, to maintain the Imperial garrisons until they were replaced by Canadian troops.⁶⁵

The Canadian Government, in replying to this despatch, stated that, while the Dominion gratefully accepted the offer on the part of the Imperial Government to maintain the garrison at Esquimalt and Halifax until replaced by Canadian forces, it felt that;

The cost of maintenance of those troops should be defrayed directly by Canada, and under the responsibility of Your Excellency's Government, rather than that a lump sum should be paid over to the War Office, and that office be made responsible for maintaining the troops - a course which would appear to be constitutionally open to objection. ⁶⁶

Borden concluded by suggestion 1 July, 1905, as the date on which Canada should achieve full control, and that in the interim the British Government might allow a garrison of one company of Royal Gun battery and one and one half companies of Royal Engineers to remain at Esquimalt, with

65. Borden to Grey, 15 February, 1905, ibid., p. 2.

66. Loc. cit.

staff and departmental heads. During this period, Canada would pay, feed, clothe, and equip these troops at the same rates and under the same regulations as were then being maintained by the Imperial Government. The Minister also suggested that Imperial stores then at Esquimalt be sold to Canada at cost in order to equip and supply the remaining Imperial garrison. He concluded by stating that by an amendment to the Militia Act of 1904 the permanent force of Canada was to be increased by 2000 all ranks to allow the Dominion to garrison the two stations.⁶⁷

In a directive to the Undersecretary of State for Colonies, the War Office stated that, while it was prepared to accept 1 July as the date for Canada's assuming control of the garrisons, it could not agree to the scheme proposed by Canada for the cost of maintaining the remaining Imperial garrisons. That was constitutionally and legally impossible. The War Office realized that the payment of a lump sum to the Imperial Government was objectionable to the Dominion Government on constitutional grounds, but felt that this objection could be overcome. Since Canada had been paying one half the annual cost of the Imperial garrison at Esquimalt in past years, it would seem reasonable for Canada to overlook the constitutional drawback and pay the whole of the cost of the two garrisons direct to the War Office.

The sale of Canadian stores, ammunition, etc., also came under criticism from the War Office. Although the Army

67. Loc. cit.

Council had agreed to the eventual sale, it advised that these stores should be used to support British troops remaining under the direction of the Imperial authorities. The supplies would then be sold after the Imperial garrisons had been withdrawn.⁶⁸

The Laurier Government now modified its previous stand by suggesting that Canada would pay the whole, instead of half the cost of the maintenance of Esquimalt's defences. This payment would continue until she had relieved the whole Imperial garrison at a time not later than 1 July, 1906. If these proposals met with the approval of the Imperial Government, Canada would relieve the garrison at Halifax by 1 July, 1905, and that of Esquimalt by 1 July, 1906.⁶⁹

One aspect of Canada's assuming control over Esquimalt from the Imperial Government must be considered as it concerns British Columbia-Dominion relations. The Admiralty, through the Colonial Office, informed the Governor General on 10 December, 1904, that the Admiralty had embarked on a programme of reducing the Naval force at Esquimalt, for the purpose of concentrating the fleet in home waters and for the reason that Dominion protection by fast cruiser squadrons rather than by permanently stationed ships at Colonial ports was made necessary by increased use of steam-

68. F.W.D. Ward to Undersecretary of State for Colonies, 19 April, 1905, *ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

69. Borden to Grey, 13 May, 1905, *ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

ships and telegraphic communications. This, it seems, was not made completely clear to the Laurier Government when it decided to take over Esquimalt. Sir Wilfrid Laurier told the House that the Royal Navy would not abandon the naval station, and therefore the Dominion need not comply with section 9 of the Terms of Union, and that he had no information that would lead him to believe that the Royal Navy intended to abandon that base.⁷⁰ Sir Frederic Borden, in answer to Colonel Sam Hughes, stated in Parliament, in reference to an editorial in the Ottawa Evening Journal, that:

Where it (the editorial) speaks of Canadian defences on Canadian soil, as far as I am personally concerned, I hope the statement is not true. I would be very sorry that Great Britain should so far forget her duties to the Empire as to surrender Halifax and Esquimalt. 71

In another statement, in answer to a question by Robert Laird Borden, the Minister stated that "as I understand (it) there is no intention whatever of abandoning either Halifax or Esquimalt."⁷²

In February, 1906, the Colonial office sent a despatch to the Governor General of Canada, stating it had been informed by the Colonial Defence Committee that it was not necessary to maintain Esquimalt as a fortified port.⁷³ When

70. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 26 January, 1905, p. 188. Section 9 reads - the influence of the Dominion Government will be used to secure the maintenance of the Naval Station at Esquimalt.

71. Ibid., 20 February, 1905, pp. 1403-1404.

72. Ibid., 15 July, 1905, p. 9676.

73. P.A.C., G.G.P., vol. X, no. 165, Colonial Office to Grey, 21 February, 1906, re request by Grey of 4 August, 1905, for information regarding Colonial Defence Committee memorandum that Esquimalt was to be abandoned as a fortified port.

the despatch arrived in the hands of the Canadian Government, Esquimalt had just been taken over, and Canadian troops had proceeded to garrison the two forts at the base. The Canadian Government suggested to the Imperial authorities that it was unwise to issue a public statement of the new British policy, but that if such a publication were to be made, it should come from the Imperial Government. It also pointed out that under a Dominion-British Columbia agreement, the Canadian Government had promised to maintain a militia force to be stationed near Victoria. Such a permanent force could act as a school of instruction for the volunteer militia of the province. The Dominion had decided, in fact, not to withdraw the garrison entirely, but to leave sufficient troops to maintain a school of artillery. This force would consist of a company of the Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery and a detachment of the Canadian Engineers, who would maintain the fortifications and works.⁷⁴

Canada now had to maintain a garrison at a station which, according to the Imperial authorities, no longer required a permanent force. It was a situation that the Dominion could not gracefully avoid, and so the garrison was maintained, as a useful white elephant.

The Militia Council reported in 1906 that the control by Canadian troops of the garrison at Esquimalt was almost

74. Ibid., Grey to the Colonial Office, 30 April, 1906.

complete, but that the old problem of gaining recruits in British Columbia for the garrison was still present. Industrial wages were still high and the labour market good.⁷⁵ It was also reported that the organization of a Royal Canadian School of Artillery, with headquarters at Quebec City, which would include Esquimalt, was underway. The garrison at Esquimalt was short of stores and equipment and the permanent force, unable to be sustained by local recruits, was to be increased by the established procedure of having troops sent from "A" and "B" Batteries in the East. Later, it claimed that maintaining the garrison at Esquimalt was extremely difficult as: "Owing to the very high rate of wages offered for skilled labour the subsequent impossibility of securing local recruits (for the permanent garrison) has presented many difficulties."⁷⁶

The main causes inducing the men to desert were not only the poor army pay as compared with civilian wages, but the overworking of the garrison due to the lack of personnel. The volunteer militia was also suffering as schools of instruction could not be maintained until sufficient men for the permanent force became available.⁷⁷

While the permanent force was dropping below required

75. Annual Report of the Militia Council, 1906, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 35, 1906-1907, pp. 1-2.

76. Ibid., pp. 15-26.

77. Annual Report of the Militia Council for three months ending 31 March, 1907, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 35, 1907-1908, pp. 3-4. also Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 15 January, 1908, p. 1293, also ibid., 3 February, 1909, p. 475.

state of efficiency, the 5th British Columbia Regiment of Garrison Artillery was reported in Parliament as being completely disorganized, as the men were disgusted at not having proper guns for drill. This situation continued until all the officers threatened to invoke tradition by resigning in an effort to persuade the Dominion Government to pay for the transfer of one six-inch and one twelve-inch gun from Esquimalt to the Victoria drill hall. The guns were eventually moved at a cost of \$1200.⁷⁸

The condition of the defences at Esquimalt, now that they had passed into Dominion control, were subjected to criticism from Robert Laird Borden in 1909. He quoted the London Times as stating that;

The forts were abandoned, guns were lying at the foot of a hill, in the open, the navy yard was without a good staff to manage it...the stores had been disposed of locally at ridiculously low prices and the naval base has been virtually abandoned and is rapidly deteriorating. 79

In reply to these charges, Major-General P.H.N. Lake, Inspector General, reported that the defences were not in such a deplorable condition. The armaments, he said, of a permanently mounted nature, ranged in calibre from twelve-inch heavy guns to machine guns. In addition, the fixed armaments used against ships and small vessels, were supported by movable armaments of small weapons which could

78. Ibid., 9 March, 1909, p. 2304.

79. Ibid., 13 January, 1909, pp. 1802-1803.

meet an attack in areas in which the fixed armaments could not be brought to bear. He also stated that a picked company of the 5th British Columbia Regiment Garrison Artillery was to be equipped and trained on the most modern field artillery weapon available, and that the first one had already been sent to Victoria.⁸⁰

With the general expansion of the militia across the Dominion, the volunteer militia in British Columbia had started a period of rapid growth. In 1908, owing to the efforts of E. Copley Thompson, the independent squadron of Canadian Mounted Rifles was once more authorized at Vernon. Thompson was an epileptic remittance man from England who had been trying, for a period of over seven years, to have this unit re-established.⁸¹ In the same year the 72nd Seaforth Highlanders was organized, equipped, and provided with uniforms by the Scottish Society of Vancouver. The regiment had its origin as the result of a series of meetings, the first held on 11 May, 1909, of members of the Scottish Society who felt that a Highland unit was required for Vancouver. After raising \$25,000 for uniforms and equipment, they obtained permission from Ottawa on the 15 July, 1910, to form the regiment under the command of Captain R.J. Leckie.⁸² In the same year, the Earl Grey's

80. Report of Maj/Gen. PHN Lake, quoted in Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 13 January, 1909, pp. 1800-1801.

81. ^{DEF}Kinloch, Report of the Okanagan Historical Society, 1948, pp. 151-159, also H.F. Denison to Major J.S. Matthews, 24 January, 1931, City Archives of Vancouver, M.R., 30th British Columbia Horse.

82. McEvoy, A.H. Finlay, The 72nd Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, Vancouver, Cowan Brookhouse, 1920, pp. 1-3.

Own Rifles was authorized at Prince Rupert,⁸³ and an independent company was established at Armstrong,⁸⁴ and the Canadian Mounted Rifles was increased by two squadrons.⁸⁵ On 1 April, 1909, Military District Number 11 (British Columbia) became a first-class district.⁸⁶ About the same time the 104th New Westminster Fusiliers were authorized to be formed from "A" and "B" Companies of the 6th Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles.⁸⁷

This was also the period in which most of the independent rifle companies and mounted troops in the province were formed

83. M.G.O., no. 38, 1 April, 1910.

84. Ibid., no. 119, 1 June, 1908.

85. Ibid., no. 38, 1 April, 1910, also Lt/Col. C.L. Flick, A Short History of the 31st British Columbia Horse, Victoria, Reliable, 1922, p. 3.

86. Ibid., no. 46, 1 April, 1909.

87. Loc cit., On 16 March, 1908, a military demonstration was staged by the 6th D.C.O.R.s in the form of a mock war between "British" troops and "Boer" troops. One of the "Boer" men, hoping to increase the ammunition available to his comrades, obtained and distributed to his fellow riflemen what he thought was extra ammunition. Amongst the noise and shouting no one noticed that the cries of the "British" "wounded" were remarkably lifelike. The 18th Field Ambulance, who were given the role of recovering the "wounded", were amazed to find that the men were actually bleeding. The officers of the 6th D.C.O.R.s kept the show going and the public was unaware that real shots were being fired about the drill hall. It was later found that a recruit had, by mistake, obtained real bullets. The commanding officer of the 6th D.C.O.R.s called newsmen together and asked them in the interest of the regiment, not to publish an account of this incident. The World, however, published a full description of it. The World, 26 March, 1908, 28 March, 1908, also Major J.S. Matthews, who told the author of the incident and of the commanding officer's plea to newspapermen present.

into regiments. One unit which experienced difficulty was the Rocky Mountain Rangers. The Deputy Adjutant-General refused to authorize pay on the grounds that the regiment was not efficient. The regiment, suffering from the lack of a proper drill hall and clothing, protested and all the officers threatened to resign unless the men received their due remuneration for drills performed, supplies of new clothing and an expanded drill hall. Faced with the possibility of having all the officers leave the regiment, the Department of Militia and Defence was coerced into taking action to remedy the situation.⁸⁸

Aside from this exception, the volunteer militia was gaining in efficiency. The 5th British Columbia Regiment was greatly aided by the establishment of a Coastal Artillery school at Esquimalt and the Militia Council could report in 1910 that the militia had improved greatly with a large number of men taking courses at the school.⁸⁹ Units in the interior also had the benefit of instruction at provisional schools at Kamloops, Armstrong, Revelstoke, Nelson, Rossland, and Kaslo. In addition, the city corps at Vancouver was provided with schools of infantry instruction.⁹⁰ The general improvement of the volunteer militia was not reflected by a similar improvement in the permanent force at Esquimalt, which was still short of personnel and unable

88. Nelson Daily News, 20 April, 1910, also 1 May, 1910.

89. Annual Report of the Militia Council, 1910, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 35, 1911, pp. 109-110.

90. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

to maintain the school of instruction for the volunteer militia in a satisfactory state of efficiency.⁹¹

In 1912, G.H. Barnard (M.P. Victoria) stated in Parliament that the land defences of Canada were in an extremely poor state, and that while the former Imperial garrison numbered 500-600 men, under Dominion control, the Esquimalt garrison had been reduced to 100 men all ranks. Victoria "was defenced enough to be attacked," he stated, "but not enough to resist such an attack."⁹² A book published in England in 1912 stated;

The importance of Esquimalt to British sea power cannot be overestimated, for it protects the coal fields of Vancouver Island, and commands the western terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The importance of holding this Imperial station is far from light if seriously undertaken. The defence of this Canadian station is as vital to England, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa as it is to Canada, and the inhabitants of these far removed parts of the Empire have as much right to demand that these defences are adequate as the Canadians have of insisting upon the proper defence of England and sister colonies.⁹³

The Canadian Government, unable to state publicly that it was not necessary to defend Esquimalt, chose to remain silent when charges of inefficiency of the garrison were levelled against the Government.

The years 1911-1913 saw the establishment of further units in British Columbia, the majority of which were

91. Ibid., 1911, no. 35, 1912-1913, pp. 89-91.

92. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 27 November, 1912, p. 159.

93. P.A. Silburn, The Evolution of Sea Power, London, Longmans Green, 1912, p. 250.

authorized after much agitation and insistence by individuals interested in promoting the volunteer militia in the province. Colonel A.J. Hall, on his own initiative, formed the 88th Victoria Fusiliers.⁹⁴ Dr. F.C. McTavish, originally the medical officer of the 6th Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles, was instrumental in having the 18th Field Ambulance Unit established in Vancouver.⁹⁵ Colonel George McSpadden, using his political influence and friendship with Colonel Sam Hughes, Minister of Militia and Defence in the Conservative Government, established the 11th Irish Fusiliers in east Vancouver to counterbalance the 72nd Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and the 6th Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles which drew men from the wealthier elements of the city. Unfortunately this regiment was never brought up to strength. It was disbanded shortly after the commencement of World War I,⁹⁶ A. Phillips and Donald Cameron, aided by Major R. Fell, formerly of the Royal Engineers, organized the 6th Field Company Canadian Engineers at North Vancouver,⁹⁷ and for a period of almost four years Frederick Stead carried on a campaign which eventually led to the creation of the 19th Canadian Army Service Corps Company.⁹⁸ Political considera-

94. Col. F.A. Robertson, "The 5th British Columbia Regiment, of Garrison Artillery," The Kahki Call, vol. 10, (November, 1929)p. 53

95. C.A.V., 18th Field Ambulance, Dr. F.C. McTavish, History of the 18th Field Ambulance from May 20, 1908-May 19, 1914, (MS), pp. 1-6.

96. Major J.S. Matthews, Personal interview with author, 10 March, 1955.

97. Engineers' Annual, North Vancouver, 6th Field Company, Canadian Engineers, 1914, pp. 6-10.

98. C.A.V., M.R., 19th Canadian Army Service Corps Company, T. Stead to Minister of Militia and Defence, J. Bigger, also Stead to Col. J. Peters, Lt/Col. R.L. Wadmore, Lt/Col. A. Roy.

tions entered into the decisions of the Dominion regarding aid to some militia units, particularly the Earl Grey's Own Rifles, who had not been paid, for, according to the Minister of Militia and Defence, Sam Hughes, the commanding officer was endeavouring to transform it into a liberal political organization. The minister also claimed that the demand for a new regiment at Prince Rupert was due to the efforts of this officer who aspired to command a larger unit than the existing company.⁹⁹

The majority of these units were in existence before they were officially authorized or granted pay by the Dominion Government. It was only through the private efforts of certain individuals and the willingness of the men of these units to train without pay that the different corps were formed and maintained, in some instances by private resources, for periods of over a year.

With the start of the First Great War in August, 1914, the militia of British Columbia was to be put to its greatest test. The value of their training, the leadership of the officers and non-commissioned officers was now to be judged. Judged not on the parade ground but on the battlefield. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the worth of the militia as shown by the war, but it can be said, that, for all its shortcomings and basic weaknesses, the volunteer militia of British Columbia proved itself able to

⁹⁹. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 1 June, 1914, p. 4586.

provide a nucleus around which the great numbers of British Columbia civilians mustered for war.

CHAPTER VI

AID TO THE CIVIL POWER RENDERED BY THE MILITIA OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA - 1871 - 1914


On six occasions the militia of British Columbia was called out to aid the Civil Power in suppressing threatened or actual disturbances of the peace. [On four of these occasions the militia was employed in strike breaking. It is extremely doubtful if, in the majority of instances, their services were actually required, but it was not in the power of the Deputy Adjutant-General to make any decisions concerning the necessity - or the lack of it - to despatch troops to the assistance of the Civil Power. Under the Militia Act, summoning the militia involved a ludicrously simple procedure: three magistrates or justices of the peace at their own discretion signed a requisition for the services of the militia. These magistrates did not have to reside in the area in which the militia was demanded, and it was within their power to call out the troops without any disturbance having occurred.] The threat of trouble was sufficient cause for a requisition. The Deputy Adjutant-General, once the troops were at the scene was forced to abide by the magistrates' instructions, regardless of whether or not he considered them applicable. Even the decision of when to withdraw the troops when the trouble had abated was not in his hands, but rested with the magistrates. Thus the militia could be called out for reasons

other than the simple suppressing of disturbances in areas in which the situation was beyond the control of local authorities.

The first instance of the militia's being called out under the Militia Act in aid of the Civil Power occurred in February, 1877, when a strike among the miners employed by Dunsmuir, Diggle, and Company at Nanaimo resulted from a dispute over pay rates for weight of coal mined. As the strike progressed the miners, incensed at the Chinese who were still working, resorted to violence in order to have all work cease in the mines. Robert Dunsmuir, in order to end the strike, induced the Attorney-General, through the offices of the Lieutenant-Governor, A.A. Richards, to despatch H.M.S. Rocket to the strike zone.¹ When this measure proved to be inadequate, Robert Dunsmuir, by threatening to close the mine entirely if protection were not given to his strike breakers, persuaded the Attorney-General, A. C. Elliot, to arrange for the calling-out of the militia.² The strike lasted several months. At the end of April, the strikers refused to leave company homes and forcibly resisted eviction. This refusal provided sufficient reasons for the signing of the necessary requisition for militia forces by the required three Justices of the Peace. They


1. Correspondence. Orders in Council and other documents relating to the Miners' Strike at Nanaimo and to the despatch of a body of armed volunteers of Militia to the District of Nanaimo in the Spring of 1877, British Columbia, Sessional Papers, 14 March, 1878, pp. 528-532.

2. Ibid., p. 530.



Provincial Archives, Victoria, B.C.

The paddle-steamer "Maude".



Provincial Archives, Victoria, B.C.

The Victoria Volunteer Rifles.

reported to the Deputy Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel C.F. Houghton;³

We therefore request you to call out such portion of the Volunteer Militia as you consider necessary for the purpose of aiding the Civil Power, and of preventing or suppressing any such anticipated riot or disturbance of the peace. ⁴

Colonel Houghton now felt that the time would be propitious to employ the total available militia force of the province.⁵ After gaining assurance from the Attorney-General that the expenses so incurred would be paid by the province in accordance with the provisions relating to Aid to the Civil Power under the Military Act, he called out the No. 1 and No. 2 Companies of the Victoria Volunteer Rifle Corps. The men paraded at Victoria Drill Hall where they were assigned haversacks and ammunition and told for what purpose they were being summoned. At one o'clock on the morning of 1 May they boarded the steamer Maude and proceeded to New Westminster in order to take on board the New Westminster Volunteer Rifles and the Seymour Battery. They were met by Lieutenant F. Scott of Seymour Battery, Captain W. Peel, Commanding Officer of the New Westminster Volunteer Rifles, and a crowd of enthusiastic citizens. The entire Volunteer Militia force of British Columbia, totalling 120

3. It is interesting to note that Houghton later married one of R. Dunsmuir's daughters, Marian Dunsmuir, in 1879, see R. Gosnell, 60 Years of Progress in British Columbia, Victoria, British Columbia Historical Assoc. 1913, p. 121.

4. Quoted in R.H. Roy, "...in aid of civil power, 1877"; Canadian Army Journal, vol. 7 (October, 1953), p. 62.

5. With the exception of the Nanaimo Rifle Corps which, due to lack of support (and, as yet, no drill hall), had been non-effective for some time.

officers and men, were read the appropriate sections of the Militia Act pertaining to aid rendered to the Civil Power by the military, and were reminded to be firm but patient, and not to lose their tempers when carrying out their duty.⁶

At 10:30 p.m. on 2 May, the force left for the strike zone, landing at Departure Bay at 9:30 a.m. the following morning. They were greeted by Robert Dunsmuir and Captain S. Spalding of H.M.S. Rocket, who acquainted them with the situation and the manner in which their services could best be employed.⁷ Proceeding then to Wellington, the force found that travelling by ship instead of by rail, which was intended to give some secrecy to the arrival of the militia, had been a successful ruse; the miners were entirely unprepared for the entry of the military. The only opposition encountered were jeers and catcalls, such as "My God, what's them?"⁸ and "Ain't there a lot of 'em too!"⁹ Others exclaimed that "A dose or two of buckshot would clear 'em out."¹⁰ Colonel Houghton deployed his men in such a manner as to be able to lend support, if required, to the sheriff in his efforts to evict the miners from the company homes. The Seymour Battery and the New Westminster Rifle Company were placed at Departure

6. The Victoria Daily Colonist, 1 May, 1877, p. 3.

7. It is interesting to note that Robert Dunsmuir's partners at this time were Admiral Arthur Farquhar, one time senior naval officer at Esquimalt, Captain F.W. Egerton (R.N.) and Lieutenant W. Nestor Diggle, (R.N.) of H.M.S. Grappier, Esquimalt.

8. The Victoria Daily Colonist, 1 May, 1877, p. 3.

9. Ibid., 3 May, 1877, p. 3.

10. Loc. cit.

Bay, the former to keep the militia from entering the town of Nanaimo, the latter to prevent any of the arrested men from escaping. Thus supported, the sheriff was able to perform his duty without violence. The anticipated arrival of miners from Nanaimo, who were to reinforce the Wellington strikers in resisting eviction, did not materialize, and Colonel Houghton, seeing that the evictions had been completed without further trouble developing, now felt that it would be wise to withdraw the militia from the area. On Wednesday, the force re-embarked on the Maude to return to Victoria and New Westminster.

Colonel Houghton, in concluding his report of this manoeuver, wrote that:

There can be no doubt of the fact that, were it not for the presence of the militia at Wellington, the miners would have continued to set the law at defiance and I am strongly of the opinion that, had I sent up a small force, they would have met with resistance and the affair, unhappily, would have ended in bloodshed.

I think the movement will have a good moral effect on the country and I am satisfied that it has already given a stimulus to the militia of this province which will have a beneficial effect upon the organization in the future. ll

In variance to these views of the Deputy Adjutant-General, a Grand Jury which examined the issues involved, made the following statement to the Chief Justice of British Columbia; Mathew B. Begbie;

...they (the Grand Jury), in common with the people of Nanaimo, regretfully felt that a serious



"C" Battery, Royal Canadian Artillery, at Beacon Hill, Victoria, B.C., as they were leaving for the "Skeena River War" in 1890. They are in front of the old Agricultural Building. (Notice at
the shed in background) on Beacon Hill.
Extreme left: a bugler. Officers:— Capt. Benson. 1st Col. J. G. Holmes. 1st Col. E. G. Poir taken as supply officer and because he could speak Chinook as interpreter; Lieut. Ollivie;
next an unknown officer who afterwards took charge of the ammunition factory at Quebec; Major James Peters with sword drawn through arm, and Dr. Duncan, by himself
on the right; he was afterwards drowned at the sinking of the Can. Pac. Nav. Co. S. "Talamet". This photo was presented and particulars given by Master Gunner J. C. Carnish
who is in the rear, who, in 1890, was the first sergeant-major of the first military unit in Vancouver, No. 5 Co. B. C. B. A. and who, in 1901, lived at White Rock, B. C.
C. Y. Mil. P. G. N. City Archives, 5th

stigma has been cast upon this district by the fact that a military force had been called in to assist the civil authorities...that no act of violence had been committed...the stigma cast upon this community by the calling of the militia was caused by the incapacity of the sheriff in the execution of his duties. 12

This pronouncement was criticized by the Chief Justice, but, unfortunately, a lack of records prevents a definite and accurate conclusion being drawn as to the justification of asking for military support.

The militia was not again called upon by the Civil Power until the summer of 1888 when the outbreak of an Indian war in the Skeena district seemed imminent. The instigating incident was the murder of a doctor at Hazelton. A posse of special provincial police was despatched to arrest the accused Indian, and killed him when he seemed to be escaping. The facts later showed that the suspect was deliberately shot in the back when he tried to surrender, and that the constable who did the killing was a deserter from the United States Army.¹³ The Indian population became incensed and threatened to burn the dwellings of the white inhabitants. The Indians then constructed barricades and, at the insistence of the more aggressive women in the tribe, demanded \$1000 compensation and the surrender to them of the constable who had done the shooting. The last white man to leave the area reported that the remaining whites were in severe danger.

12. Correspondence...., British Columbia, op.cit., pp.532-533.

13. Canadian Military Gazette, vol. III, 19 July, 1888, p. 434, also 2 August, 1888, p. 450.

In a hasty meeting, the Executive Council of the Provincial government in July, 1868 requisitioned the militia to proceed to the Skeena district to protect the life and property of the white settlers there. On Monday, 16 July, "C" Battery, numbering seven officers and 88 other ranks,¹⁴ boarded the H.M.S. Caroline with ceremony which included picture-taking and an inspection by the Lieutenant-Governor, Hugh Nelson. The men were equipped with stores for a two month campaign, and were reportedly as anxious to see action despite the perils of the area in which they were to fight. On 19 July, the battery arrived at the mouth of the Skeena River. There they set up camp at St. Haul, near Fort Essington, 110 miles from Hazelton and awaited results of a peace parlay with the Indians. While they were at St.

Haul they cleared a camp area and spent their time learning to live in the bush country. It was soon realized that the disturbance was greatly exaggerated and that the presence of the gunners and the Caroline had quelled any desire on the part of the Indians to take drastic action. And so, on 25 August, the battery left their self-constructed camp for Victoria, where they were royally welcomed by the citizens and thanks by members of the provincial government.

The report of Major-General Frederick D. Middleton, General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia, made it quite clear that he was far from pleased with the apparent

¹⁴. F.V. Longstaff, Esquimalt Naval Base, Victoria, Victoria Book and Stationery Office, 1941, p. 47.

ease with which "C" Battery had been called out in aid of the Civil Power at Hazelton. He commented;

Though calling out these troops was perhaps within the law, I submit it was not in accordance with the spirit of it, as I pray it was never anticipated that troops should be sent eight hundred miles to assist the civil law, nor was it anticipated that three magistrates should have the power to consider beginning what might have turned out to be an Indian war. 15

This was a pointed reference to the fact that three members of the provincial cabinet had acted as Justices of the Peace in order to call out the militia.¹⁶ The Department of Indian Affairs stated that a militia force was not needed as the Indians were peaceable.¹⁷

Two years later, during August, 1890, a strike once again broke out among the miners employed by Dunsmuir and Sons, in this case, over the right of the men to organize. The strike was only a few days old when, on 5 August, the Deputy Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Holmes, received a requisition from three Justices of the Peace asking that the militia be called out to aid the Civil Power along with a note that a train would be available to transport the troops to the strike zone.¹⁸ The previous

15. Ibid., p. 48.

16. Mr. Justice Clyne informed the author that this action on the part of the Cabinet was illegal, Lecture, given by Mr. Justice Clyne, 25 March, 1955, University of British Columbia. The expedition's one accomplishment was acquainting the people in eastern Canada with northern British Columbia.

17. Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 16, 1889, p. LXXXI.

18. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 10234, H. Harris, G. Morrison, R. Ward, to Holmes, 5 August, 1890, also ibid., Holmes to Powell, 5 August, 1890.

day Holmes had received a note from James Dunsmuir¹⁹ declaring that if the militia were sent to Wellington, "We (the Company) shall be responsible to you for all reasonable expenses in connection with the same."²⁰

Holmes telegraphed the Adjutant-General the same day that he received the requisition for use of the militia to maintain law and order to the effect that he was taking one officer and twenty-five men from "C" Battery and twenty-five volunteer militia from the British Columbia Brigade of Garrison Artillery.²¹

The matter became a political issue when the News Advertiser stated that the province had been astounded by the sudden despatch of troops to Wellington, as there had been no reports of a disturbance. It was hinted that the troops had been called out by the provincial government to overcome the miners and prevent them from organizing.²²

D. W. Gordon (M.P. Nanaimo District) telegraphed to the Adjutant-General, asking on whose orders "C" Battery was sent to Wellington, as there was no report of a riot, and the despatching of the militia was certain to cause trouble.²³ The provincial government was quick to deny any connection

19. Who later became premier of B.C. in 1900, and Lt./Gov. in 1906.

20. Ibid., R. Dunsmuir and Sons to Holmes, 4 August, 1890.

21. Ibid., Holmes to Powell, 5 August, 1890.

22. The Daily News Advertiser, 6 August, 1890.

23. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 10234, D.W. Gordon to Caron, 7 August, 1890.

with this matter, and a spokesman of the government was quoted as saying that;

It was a very serious mistake; the troops should not have been sent, but upon the highest authority we can state that the administration had absolutely nothing whatever to do with this matter. 24

The provincial government again denied any responsibility, when, on 15 August, a letter from some prominent citizens of Nanaimo demanded that "C" Battery be removed as their presence might give rise to some trouble.²⁵ Actually, there was little to fear in the way of a fight breaking out between the troops and the miners as it was reported that they were on extremely friendly terms, the troops acting as though this were a pleasure excursion rather than a military endeavour.²⁶

Colonel Holmes, in reporting on what had happened, pointed out that on 2 August, three days before the militia was called out, the Attorney-General of British Columbia Theodore Davie, asked him what he would do if the militia were to be called out.²⁷ The Deputy Adjutant-General also observed, in reference to the requisition for militia that;

Feeling that it was not the intention of the Militia Act to permit magistrates residing miles away - and having no local knowledge of affairs, to call out troops to a locality where I know there were not any resident magistrates...I asked

24. Ibid., Caron to Holmes, 7 August, 1890.

25. Quoted in Daily News Advertiser, 7 August, 1890.

26. Daily News Advertiser, 7 May, 1890.

27. P.A.C., op. cit., Holmes to Powell, 15 September, 1890.

the Attorney-General for his opinion as to the legality of the requisition and he said that it was perfectly legal and I was compelled to act upon it. 28

Colonel Holmes had then obtained one officer and twenty-six other ranks from "C" Battery and one officer and twenty-five other ranks from the British Columbia Brigade of Garrison Artillery, and left Victoria for Wellington at 1:30 p.m. The force arrived three hours later at Wellington. When they arrived they were met by a procession of one hundred strikers, but there was no disturbance, and Colonel Holmes found that the magistrate who was supposed to meet and direct the troops was not available. The men were dismissed and quartered in the railroad cars, and received their meals at the Wellington Hotel. On 18 August the men of the Brigade were allowed to leave as it was not required. The same day Colonel Holmes telegraphed to the magistrates asking for permission to leave the strike zone. This permission was denied. The next day he telegraphed the Minister of Militia and Defence asking what action should now be taken since the troops had been ordered to remain although there was no need for them. On 25 August, Colonel Holmes wrote to the Attorney-General requesting that a magistrate be sent to Wellington. He received a reply stating that one of the magistrates who had signed the requisition would be sent. This man never appeared. Holmes, therefore, reduced his force to one staff sergeant and four gunners of "C" Battery. 29

28. P.A.C., M.R., D.W.P., file A 10234, Holmes to Powell, 15 September, 1890.

29. Ibid.

D. W. Gordon, in a telegram to the Minister of Militia and Defence, declared that, the provincial government having claimed Dominion responsibility in the affair, the Dominion should refuse to pay the cost as such action would be an acknowledgement of her responsibility. He concluded by asking "Is it possible three men could cause all this trouble and usurp the powers of the Dominion and provincial governments?"³⁰

On 26 August, Colonel Holmes, in a telegram to the Adjutant-General, stated that:

Magistrates will not act with me at Wellington, or give orders for the return of men - do not consider it necessary for them to remain - please sanction withdrawal. 31

The Adjutant-General's answer was brief: "Cannot advise you without knowing circumstances or purpose for which militia called out."³²

In a letter to W. A. Lindsay, who demanded that the battery be removed, Davies stated that;

The sending of the forces to Wellington was not done at the instigation of the Government, but by duly qualified justices of the peace, in whom is reposed the duty of directing the movements of the troops when occasion requires it... 33

This was a deceptive answer, as it is very obvious

30. P.A.C., M.R., D.M.P., file A 10234, Gordon to Caron, 25 August, 1890.

31. Ibid., Holmes to Powell, 27 August, 1890.

32. Ibid., Powell to Holmes, 27 August, 1890.


33. British Columbia, op cit., 1891, p. 312, Attorney-General, T. Davie, of British Columbia to W.A. Lindsay.

that the provincial government knew undeniably that the troops were to be called out, and the Attorney-General had affirmed the legality of the requisition for calling them out. It seems obvious that, by professing ignorance of what had occurred, the provincial administration was trying to avoid any connection with what was developing into a scandal. The Attorney-General, moreover, had denied in the Legislative Assembly, that he had been consulted prior to the despatch of the force to Wellington.

Finally, the force was ordered to withdraw, not by the three magistrates, but by the Minister of Militia and Defence, through the Attorney-General, and on 1 December, 1890, after a period just short of five months, the troops were removed from Wellington. In Parliament, the following July, it was explained that all expenses incurred - the room and board, transportation and pay of the men - had been paid by Dunsmuir and Sons.³⁴

The use of the troops had been illegal. The responsibility for the entire incident rested neither with the Dominion Government nor with Colonel Holmes, but with the provincial government, who had known beforehand that the militia was to be called out and had sanctioned its use at Wellington when Colonel Holmes questioned the legality of the requisition. It is difficult to ascertain the effect of the incident upon the population, but it is

³⁴. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 13 July, 1891, pp. 2146-2147.



6th Regiment, "The Duke of Cornwall's Own Rifles" in camp at Steveston, 24 to 30 July 1900 during the "Fisherman's Strike". It arose over a dispute between the canneries and the white fishermen as to the price to be paid for salmon which price was acceptable to the Japanese. The white fishermen retaliated by molesting the Japanese, the troops were "called out" as rioting was feared. The volunteer soldiers of Vancouver and New Westminster, the only military unit on the lower mainland, both organized by boat. Granville St. was then a mere silt in the forest. The uniform is that of the old 2nd Battalion, 5th Regiment, Canadian Garrison Artillery as the new rifle uniforms have not arrived. Cheap straw hats were bought at the local store to give protection from the sun, which the uniform cap, did not do. "A" & "B" Co's, New Westminster. Capt. Alexander Hensler, 9c, is leading. C. D. E. and F. Companies, Vancouver, follow. Major C.A. Worsnop is in command. All are citizen soldiers who voluntarily left their vocations when the bugle sounded. Photo presented, 1939, by Major P.M. Ferris. City Archives #57b

believed that it was detrimental; a great number of the labouring class became hostile towards the militia. The populace considered the militia to be strikebreakers only.

This antagonism was in no way lessened when, on 10 July, 1900, the militia was again called out in aid of the Civil Power.³⁵ The cause was a fisherman's strike at Steveston. The Deputy Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Peters, ordered 200 men of the 6th Rifle Battalion at Vancouver, and established a camp in the area for seven days, until, as he stated, all trouble had ended.³⁶ Once again there was confusion in ascertaining the reasons for calling upon military assistance. Examination of documents relating to the strike reveals several facts of interest. The first is that the General Officer Commanding, Major-General E.T.H. Hutton, was somewhat doubtful of the necessity of military assistance, as he requested the Minister of Justice, David Mills, to give an opinion of the legality of the requisition for calling upon the militia.³⁷ Secondly, a communication from Mills to the Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia, H. J. Lotbiniere, was not answered in time to prevent the militia from proceeding to the strike zone.³⁸

35. The members of the militia were called to arms by a bugler who rode around the city of Vancouver blowing assembly from a trolley car. J.S. Matthews, Major 6th D.C.O.R.s who was part of the militia called out, told the author, 16 March, 1955.

36. P.A.C., M.R., A.G.O., file 19019, OGrady-Haley to Colonel F. Pinault, 24 July, 1900.

37. Later the Government denied that it was aware that the militia had been called out at that time, and that the authority rested with the Deputy Adjutant-General, Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, op.cit. 25 Feb. 1901, p. 327.

38. Paper respecting the strike among fishermen on the Fraser River, British Columbia, op. cit. 1900, p. 1010.

Further light is thrown on the incident by the correspondence between W.A. Duncan, president of the Fraser River Cannery Association, the Attorney-General of British Columbia, and R.D. Lister, Chief Special Constable. The strike was called to obtain better wages for the fishermen and union recognition. When the Japanese who were employed by the canneries refused to take part in the strike, the white and Indian fishermen established a boat patrol to prevent them from engaging in fishing, and it appears that this patrol was successful. The only known instance of violence did not concern the Japanese. While Chief Constable Lister was sending periodic wires to the Attorney-General, D. McE. Eberts, saying that things were quiet, the members of the Cannery Association wrote that "the militia is urgently required or great loss of life and property will result."³⁹ The Vancouver Board of Trade also became involved by requesting that Premier James Dunsmuir, who himself not unfamiliar with the use of the militia in strikes, take full measures for the protection of life and property, as the numbers of special police, in their estimation, were inadequate to prevent an outbreak of violence.⁴⁰ On 21 July, Lister sent two communications to the Attorney-General, the first stating that he might require some help as a result of the actions of American agitators.⁴¹ The second, almost

39. Loc. cit.

40. Loc. cit.

41. Loc. cit.

contradicting the spirit of the first, stated that special police protection had been requested only twice by the cannery owners.⁴² The following day the secretary of the Canneries Association wrote to the Attorney-General saying that the Japanese were planning to continue fishing in spite of the strikers' patrols and that the militia was, therefore, urgently required.⁴³ On 23 July, Lister wired the Attorney-General, advising that all was quiet.⁴⁴ However, on the morning of the 24th, the militia entered the strike zone.

A select committee was later established to enquire into the reasons for calling the militia out. It found that the Justices of the Peace who signed the requisition sanctioning the use of the military, were all directly connected with the canneries.⁴⁵ Furthermore, it had been previously decided at a meeting of the cannery owners and officials of the canneries that all measures should be taken to have the militia called out. At this same meeting, two of the Justices signed the requisition which had been previously drawn up and delivered from Vancouver by a Pinkerton agent.⁴⁶ The third Justice who was at North Arm and who admitted to the Committee that he had not witnessed any

42. Loc. cit.

43. Papers respecting..., British Columbia, op.cit. p.1012.

44. Ibid., p. 1013.

45. Report of the Select Committee re: the calling out of the militia at Steveston, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, vol.29, 27 August, 1900, pp. CXLII, CXLIV, CXLIX.

46. Ibid., p.CXLV.

acts of violence, signed the requisition when it was sent to him. He was himself a cannery owner. When he was giving evidence to the Committee he was asked:

Q. You didn't consider it necessary to take any action to arrest these men (who had been intimidating non-striking fishermen) and yet you considered that the condition of things on the North Arm was sufficient to sign a requisition to call out the militia at Steveston?

A. Yes, and I still consider it was necessary.⁴⁷

The explanation most often offered by the Justices of the Peace and other witnesses as to why the militia was called out was that they feared a clash would occur between the Japanese fishermen and the white and Indian striking fishermen. Another excuse was that there were rumours that the coal miners were supposed to come to Steveston to render aid to the strikers, and therefore the special constables on duty would be unable to cope with the situation.⁴⁸

The Commander of the militia force at Steveston stated that when he arrived with his troops, it was to find that no active help was needed and that the Justices of the Peace did not ask for any such assistance.⁴⁹ W.A. Munro, manager of the Phoenix and Britannia canneries, and one of the Justices of the Peace, when asked whether he had seen any acts of intimidation or heard of any inflammatory language being used by labour officials at a union meeting held at

⁴⁷. Ibid., p. CXLIV, answer by M.B. Wilkenson, Justice of the Peace.

⁴⁸. Ibid., p. CLI, statement by R. Whiteside, Justice of the Peace.

⁴⁹. Ibid., p. CLII, Statement by Colonel Worstthrop.

Steveston, admitted that he had not.⁵⁰ Lister disclaimed any responsibility for the calling out of the militia, and also pointed out that the troops could not have rendered much help, as there were no boats available for them to maintain order among the fishermen.⁵¹ It was also stated by witnesses that the striking fishermen had already conceded defeat in the strike when the Japanese had decided to go out.⁵² All the witnesses questioned - which included representatives of both sides: labour leaders, fishermen, cannery officials special police - agreed that no acts of violence had been committed, with the exception of one minor instance at the commencement of the strike.

[As labour unrest became so increasingly widespread in British Columbia the Dominion appointed a Royal Commission in 1903,⁵³ after a series of strikes took place in the mines in the Kootenays, to enquire into industrial disturbances. Labour leaders, in giving evidence indicated what their attitude was towards the militia. When Charles Wilson, K.C., who was representing labour before the Commission, was asked, "Could you tell us the view held by the majority of the executive (of the Western Federation of Mines) about the right of members to join the militia?" he replied, "I could

50. Ibid., pp. CLIV, CLVI.

51. Ibid., p. CLXV.

52. Ibid., p. CLXXVIII, Statement H. Campbell, cannery owner.

* 53. The chairman of this Commission was William Lyon McKenzie King, who later became Prime Minister of Canada. *no secretary*

not give the idea of the majority. My own opinion is that the majority of the executive disfavours it and are opposed to it. They do not look upon it with favour."⁵⁴

The following evidence was given by T.H. Twigg, labour representative:

Q. So far as you know, in these unions, is there any objection to the members being members of the militia?

A. Not in any of the unions in this city (Victoria).

Q. There are, as a matter of fact, a great many men in the militia?

A. The musicians union comprises the 5th Regiment band, and that band is militia.

Q. There are no restrictions, as far as you know, against the militia?

A. I believe that there are some unions who have restrictions, but not in this city. ⁵⁵

George Dales, another labour representative, was examined:

Q. What is the view of the socialist toward the militia? Is it a proper thing for a socialist to be a member of the militia?

A. Seeing that the militia is used so largely to repress riots and to put down all endeavours of the working class, the militia has gained no favour with the working men generally...

Q. Then you think that riots should not be put down?

A. No, but I think they are deliberately put down, in effect, sometimes, to further the interests of the capital class.

Q. When they do occur, it is necessary that they be put down, shouldn't they?

⁵⁴. Evidence taken before the Royal Commission to Enquire into Industrial Disputes in the Province of British Columbia, Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 36a, 1909, p. 29.

⁵⁵. Ibid., p. 133.

A. The manner of putting them down is provocative of greater trouble. If the policy used more effectigely...

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. I think that the militia have been called out prematurely. 56

David Halliday, labour representative of the Western Federation of Miners, was examined as follows:

Q. He means can you be a good Canadian and belong to the Western Federation of Miners?

A. Certainly.

Q. No restrictions upon his service in the militia?

A. You mean if...?

Q. If he is a member of the Western Federation.

A. Not as an individual; he would be left to his individuality; no restrictions connected with that.

Q. The idea of any member joining the militia either in the States or Canada, is disapproved of by the Federation of Miners, is it not?

A. I don't know. 57

It is apparent that labour leaders were beginning to regard the militia as strike breakers rather than as defenders of British Columbia.⁵⁸ Unfortunately there is

56. Ibid., p. 667.

57. Ibid., p. 417.

58. The Vancouver Trades and Labour Council endorsed a resolution from the Shaftsbury Assembly, Knights of Labour, which "most strongly and emphatically" objected to the establishment or enlargement of any armed forces in Canada. This was aimed at the newly formed 6th Battalion Rifles at Vancouver. Vancouver Trades and Labour Council Minutes, 8 September, 1892, quoted in R. Loosmore, The British Columbia Labour Movement and Political Action, 1879-1906, University of British Columbia, 1954, fn. p. 112. Mr. Loosmore informed the author that this was the only reference he could find in labour documents to the militia.

dearth of labour documents to illuminate the attitude of labour generally towards the militia. This much is known, however - no great number of the labouring class were in the militia, its composition being largely of middle class persons.

The militia was called out once more to render aid to the Civil Power in 1913. At Nanaimo a strike had been called by the American Federation of Miners against McKenzie and Mann who had bought control of the Dunsmuir interests. The strike grew in intensity and bitterness when the Japanese and Chinese miners continued to work. Street fighting broke out and violence became common. The British Columbia press became alarmed at the prevalence of radical doctrines among the striking miners. The introduction of such doctrines was blamed on American agitators and on immigrant miners of Belgium and Polish nationalities who were unfamiliar with British traditions of law and justice.

When the mining company resorted to using imported strike-breakers, the union protested. Then, to prevent the working of the collieries, the strikers took matters into their own hands. The situation was not improved when the Minister of Labour, T.W. Crothers, in June, 1913, appointed a Royal Commission, consisting of one man, Samuel Price, who happened to be his former law partner. The Minister himself proceeded to the United Kingdom "to study labour conditions." He returned to Ottawa on 13 August, 1913, the day that the

militia was called out at Nanaimo.⁵⁹ The Royal Commission managed to submit its report the same day. It casually mentioned that military assistance had been required to retain law and order.⁶⁰ It was also stated that, at the time of the strike, McKenzie-Mann had obtained \$17,000,000 from the Dominion Government for the purposes of constructing the Canadian Northern Railway, and that the Canadian Government had made no attempt to use this influence to persuade the company to settle the strike.⁶¹

When the British Columbia Government resorted to calling out the militia, it had three alternatives: it could call upon the Royal Northwest Mounted Police, call out the militia, or employ special police. It was never understood why the Royal Northwest Mounted Police were not called upon, but one of the reasons given was that the Dominion Government would not allow them to perform their duties under the direct control of provincial authorities. It was also felt that their employment would lower the prestige of the province, as it would imply that British Columbia did not have the means to enforce law and order within its own boundaries. To employ the provincial police would leave large areas of the province without sufficient protection. Initially, the provincial government utilized special police at wages of

59. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates, 6 February, 1914, p. 526, also pp. 523-566.

60. Ibid., 23 March, 1914, pp. 1295-1299.

61. Report of the Deputy Minister of Labour, 1913, "Labour Gazette," Canada, Sessional Papers, no. 36, 1914, pp. 8-9.

\$2.50 a day, and since there was widespread unemployment, many men applied for this special duty. These men were soon driven out of the strike zone and law and order broke down. It was shortly after this that the riots of 13 August took place, forcing the government to use militia. As Colonel Hall stated:

I understand that, except as an honorary colonel, no members of the executive had ever so felt the call of duty of the citizen to equip himself for the service of the state as to ever have worn the uniform of the militia. As to the legal aspects of the employment of the militia in aid of the Civil Power, I do not think anything so filled those officers when duty brought them into touch with the manner in which those gentlemen disguised their acquaintance with the provisions of the Militia Act. My opinion is that so little had the executive thought that the militia could be effective, they had not taken the trouble to inform themselves what legal formalities were involved. 62

Press despatches on 13 August indicated that a very serious situation was developing in the strike area. Consequently, Colonel A.J. Hall, commanding officer of the 88th Victoria Fusiliers, paraded his battalion at 9 p.m. Colonel Arthur Currie, commanding officer of the 5th British Columbia Regiment of Garrison Artillery, did the same. At 10 p.m. the Deputy Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Roy, informed Colonel Hall that he was to take the units then on parade and proceed on the orders of the Attorney-General to the strike zone, and that further help of fifty men from the permanent garrison should be sent with two machine guns to his support.

62. Unofficial report by Colonel H.J. Hall, Commanding Officer Civil Aid Force, City Archives of Vancouver, M.R., Military District No. 11.

Colonel Hall had made arrangements privately with the Nanaimo and Esquimalt Railway for a train to be prepared to leave at one hour's notice, and had arranged that news of his action should become public with just sufficient semblance of secrecy to make it appear genuine. In the meantime, he had arranged, with the utmost secrecy, with Captain Troup, supervisor of the British Columbia Steamship Service of the Canadian Pacific Railway, for the conveyance of the troops in a Vancouver boat due to leave at half past eleven at night. This arrangement was kept secret, and when the order to leave was given, telegraph and telephone communications with Nanaimo were cut by the provincial police. Colonel Hall chose the steamship route as it had been reported that the strikers would attempt to destroy the train carrying the militia. The troops, 1000 all ranks, left Victoria at 2 a.m., 13 August, and landed without opposition at Brechin Mine. This development was announced by Attorney-General Bowser, who stated that:

When dawn broke this morning there were nearly one thousand men wearing the uniform of His Majesty and prepared to quell the disturbances. This is my answer to the proposition by the strikers that they will preserve the peace if they are left unmolested by the police. If the men will not obey the police, they will have the military and know that we are in the field, we intend to stay to the bitter end. 63

The armed force of militia proceeded with the Mayor of Nanaimo and the chiefs of the municipal police to Nanaimo,

63. Quoted in "The Vancouver Island Coal Strike," J. C. Hopkins, ed., Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, 1914, p. 681.

where, at bayonet point, a meal was obtained for the men at the hotels. The landing of the troops was a complete surprise and no resistance was met, although it was reported that 1500 armed miners were blocking the road to Extension. However, when a detachment of troops approached Extension, they experienced no opposition, but there was evidence of destruction to mine property and the families of non-striking miners had been forced to flee to the surrounding woods. The troops carried out a rescue operation to collect and succour these unfortunate persons. When more disturbances were reported at Nanaimo, the troops returned there about 9:30 p.m., where their meals were once more obtained by a demonstration of force. They then bedded down in railway freight-cars, without blankets, after twenty-four hours of continuous duty. Colonel Hall held conferences with the mayor, the chief of the Nanaimo police, ^A Sheppard, M.P. for Nanaimo, and ^B Shoebottom, representative for the Attorney-General. He found that information from these conferences was being conveyed to the strikers, and he was forced to discontinue them. A permanent camp was set up at the railroad station and near the wharf, and a scheme was drawn up to place troops who were continually arriving from other parts of the province. By 16 August, the troops were stationed as follows: 64

64. Colonel A.J. Hall, Copy of Official Report of the Operations of the Civil Aid Force in the Strike Area Nanaimo District, 14 August, to 29 August, 1913, p. 3, Army Headquarters, Historical Section, Ottawa.

Railroad station camp, Nanaimo	Wharf camp, Nanaimo
Corps of Guides	72nd Seaforth Highlanders
Royal Canadian Artillery (permanent force)	of Canada, less 50 men and three officers
6th Field Company Canadian Engineers	Detachment of 6th Field Company Canadian Engineers
6th Regiment D.C.O.R.s	
88th Victoria Fusiliers	
19th Canadian Army Service Corps	
Canadian Army Ordnance Corps	
18th Field Ambulance	
Ladysmith	Extension
5th Regiment Canadian Garrison Artillery, less 60 men	30 men, 5th Regiment Canadian Garrison Artillery
South Wellington	Cumberland and Union Bay
30 men, 5th Regiment Canadian Garrison Artillery	50 men, 72nd Seaforth Highlanders Detachment 6th Field Company Canadian Engineers Detachment 19th Company Canadian Army Service Corps Detachment, 18th Field Ambulance

The troops were consistantly being moved from place to place as the situation demanded, guarding mine property, res-cuing refugees, and performing other duties as required.

It became known that the Government telegraph service was not safe for the transmission of confidential messages or orders to the troops. Colonel Hall was forced to take possession of the offices at Nanaimo and censor despatches. When this was accomplished he received permission from Ottawa to curtail service as he saw fit. Similarly, repeated deliberate delays in telephone connections, culminating in the refusal of an operator to give Colonel Hall an important

connection, forced him to seize the central telephone office and to place his own men as operators. When he found that the wires were being tapped, he had two men of the 72nd Seaforth Highlanders transmit orders in Gaelic.

On Saturday, 17 August, Colonel Hall learned that a meeting was to be held in the Athletic Hall of Nanaimo the following Monday, and was to be attended by a large number of men whom the police desired to arrest. The building was examined as much as possible in the daytime without attracting attention, and more thoroughly on Sunday night. A church parade was called for Sunday morning in front of the Court House. This coincided with the arrival of the boat from Vancouver early in the afternoon, and the first arrests were made by the police the same day. "This was the first indication," reported Colonel Hall, "of the restoration of civil control in the strike area."⁶⁵ The police were offered protection by a considerable number of armed troops and were able to effect the arrest and removal of the prisoners without molestation.

The necessity of the reassertion of civil authority was very apparent to Colonel Hall, and as this, in his opinion, had to take the form of arrests, he made the following plans: at 3 a.m. Tuesday, simultaneously in Ladysmith, South Wellington, and Extension, sufficient escort should be afforded the police in order that they might carry out

65. Hall, Official Report..., p. 4.

required arrests; and all telephone communications between these places should cease, except by authorities, from the time the arrests commenced until the work was completed. Similar arrangements were made for Nanaimo.

No person outside of Colonel Hall's staff and the chief of police had any idea of these plans. For operations in Nanaimo during the time when the arrests were being made, it was decided, in reference to the meeting in the Athletic Hall, that the troops would surround the building without attracting undue attention. As soon as possible, after the building was surrounded, motor cars were to be driven to positions where their lights could be played upon the exits, so that men leaving the building would be in the glare of the lights and unable to see.

As planned, the troops surrounded the building and when the first man came out of the meeting Colonel Hall was able to report "it is impossible to describe the look of blank amazement which he exhibited."⁶⁶ Colonel Hall ordered this man to summon the chairman of the meeting to come outside. The chairman came out, was shown the position of the troops and told to inform the men inside of the situation and that attempts to leave the building would not be permitted.⁶⁷ At about 11 p.m. men were permitted to leave and

66. Ibid., p. 5.

67. Ibid., p. 6, Colonel Hall admits in his official report that some doubts arose as to the exact words he used in talking to the chairman. It was reported that he told the chairman, "I require you to walk out in single file to the Court House and anyone attempting to run away will be bayoneted or shot." Colonel Hall, quoted in Canada, Parliament House of Commons, 6 February, 1914, p. 543.

were marched in groups of ten between lines of troops with fixed bayonets to the Court House where they were handed over to the police. Those who were not arrested were confined in the hall until two-thirty a.m. to prevent their communicating with their fellow strikers at South Wellington, Ladysmith and Extension. Colonel Hall stated that:

The type of striker here is very prone to find encouragement and satisfaction in numbers and the little walk in small parties for about one hundred yards inside a double row of fixed bayonets with the unknown something to face at the end of the little walk caused a marked change in attitude. 68

As the bulk of the troops had to leave home on very short notice, arrangements had to be made for the men to go on short leave in order to arrange their business affairs and obtain a change of clothing. The strike clearly showed that the militia lacked the necessary organization to be self-sustaining, and that problems of feeding, clothing, and housing of the troops had to be solved by improvisation. On Thursday, 29 August, Colonel Hall received the following telegram from Colonel A. Roy, District Officer Commanding:

On the strength of written request from Attorney-General and Acting Premier of British Columbia give necessary orders for the troops to return home without delay with exception of the following details to remain on duty as follows: 100 men Nanaimo, 50 men Ladysmith, 50 men Cumberland, 20 Extension, 20 Wellington. Above details include permanent corps. Number of officers remaining should be as low as possible. 69

Upon receipt of this telegram, Colonel Hall distributed

68. Hall, Official Report, p. 6.

69. Colonel A. Roy to Colonel A.J. Hall, 29 August, 1913, in Hall, Official Report, p. 13.

his remaining force as follows: 70

Nanaimo

5 staff officers
50 men, 3 officers, 72nd Seaforth
Highlanders
50 men, 3 officers, 6th D.C.O.R.s
Small detachment of Corps of Guides
Small detachment 19th Company Army
Service Corps

Cumberland

45 men, 3 officers, Royal
Canadian Artillery (P.F.)

Ladysmith

50 men, 3 officers, 5th Regiment
Canadian Artillery

Extension

25 men, 2 officers, 88th
Victoria Fusiliers

South Wellington

25 men, one officer, 88th Victoria Fusiliers

The army now settled down to a campaign of routine patrolling and guarding of property. On 11 May, 1913, Colonel Hall reported that, while large scale violence was halted, street fighting and small acts of violence were still being committed, and that non-striking miners required a military escort to and from the mines. He pointed out that, in view of the fact that both the Department of Labour at Ottawa and the provincial Department of Mines agreed that compromise in the strike was improbable, the militia would have to continue on duty in the strike area. The militia remained on duty up until the outbreak of World War I, when, as Colonel Hall stated in his final report;

The troops were finally released by the magistrates on August 15th, 1914, and this closed a duty unique in the history of the Canadian militia for its long duration, its avoidance of forcible action, and the

fact that it was handled, for the most part by the active militia. 71

While this strike was in progress, the militia in the city of Vancouver was called out in what is now known as the "Komgata Maru incident." On board the Komgata Maru were four hundred passengers, natives of India who were would-be immigrants. When the Indians found their entry barred by Dominion regulations, they seized the ship, and refused to allow the captain to order his ship to leave Vancouver harbour, preferring to stay on, though their food supplies were soon exhausted. On 18 July, 1914, 175 local police and immigration officials tried to remove the immigrants by force and to place them on board the Empress of India for passage to Hong Kong. The attempt was met by a storm of missiles and the police, who did not resort to the use of their firearms, gave up their efforts. Four hundred of the 11th Irish Fusiliers and the 6th Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles were standing by to make another attempt to board the ship. Fortunately H.H. Stevens (M.P. Vancouver) recalled that H.M.C.S. Rainbow was present at Esquimalt and might be able to intervene in the matter. He contacted the Prime Minister, Robert Laird Borden, and arranged for the Rainbow to come to the aid of

71. Hall to Roy, 8 September, 1914, Hall Official Report, Accounts of this aid to the Civil Power also used were: Major T.V. Sudmore, "Aid to the Civil Power," Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol. 9, (January, 1932), pp. 253-260, W. Bennett, Builders of B.C., Vancouver, 1937, pp. 41-43, J. Kananogh, The Vancouver Island Coal Strike, Vancouver, British Columbia Miners' Liberation League, 1914, Newspapers accounts: Nanaimo Free Press, Vicotira Colonist, British Columbia Federationist.

the Civil Power. The cruiser, reinforced by a complement of fifty men from the East Coast, was ordered to proceed to Vancouver. She left Esquimalt the night of 19 July with a detachment of the 5th Regiment Canadian Artillery on board. The presence of the cruiser had the desired effect on the Indians who consented to allow the ship to leave, and were given a large consignment of food. On 23 July the ship sailed out of Vancouver harbour for Hong Kong.⁷²

The use of the militia in British Columbia to quell strikes was not unique in Canada during this period: The Dominion as a whole was experiencing social unrest as a result of the growth of an industrialized community. The line between labour and capital was being sharply drawn and men began to question the economic and social structure. They also began to organize labour unions. The labouring force hoped that through the unions they might improve working conditions, hours of work, and wages. At first they had to gain recognition of their right to organize, and in this they encountered the bitterest opposition from management. As the unions resorted to strikes and walk-outs, management resorted to imported strike-breakers, blacklisting, and lock-outs. In British Columbia the labour-capital conflict centered in the coalfields of Vancouver Island, where the American Western Federation of Miners and, later, United

72. R.L. Reid, "The Inside Story of the Kongata Maru," British Columbia Historical Association Quarterly, vol. 5, (January, 1941), pp. 10-20, also E.W. Morse, "Some Aspects of the Kongata Maru Affair, 1914," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1936, pp. 100-108, also Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, vol. 2, p. 149.

Mineworkers of America, sought to gain union recognition. Against them were arrayed the interests of Dunsmuir and Sons and McKenzie and Mann. The struggle in British Columbia was made more bitter by the fact that the province experienced the formation of a capitalist society even before Confederation. The labour force in the province was thus more militant and more socialistically conscious than were their counterparts in Eastern Canada.⁷³ If nothing else, the Royal Commission of 1903 brought out the fact that the labour leaders of the miners were men interested not only in higher wages and union recognition but in the realization of a socialistic society.⁷⁴ This was an anathema to the mine owners and they responded accordingly. The militia became one of the means by which they sought to subdue a militant labour force. The mine owners, by employing Oriental labour, by the use of special police, by importing strike-breakers, forced the union men into a position where violence became the only means to achieve their ends. The riots of 1913⁷⁵ demonstrated this point decisively. Labour's answer to the strikebreakers employed by the mine owners was violence, and the only answer to violence was military force.

73. See J.T. Saywell, "Labour and Socialism in British Columbia: a Survey of Historical Development before 1903," British Columbia Historical Quarterly, vol. 15, (October, 1950), pp.129-150.

74. Report, Royal Commission..., p. 69.

75. The United Mineworkers of America were also engaged in a bitter strike in Colorado at the same time as that at Nanaimo. The use of the militia in Colorado resulted in a state of almost open warfare, in which over 100 men, women, and children were killed. McKenzie King was employed by the Rockefeller interests against whom the strike was directed, as a public relations officer and labour relations expert, to help deal with the rising tide of public opinion against the company and the stubbornness of the miners. See Ferns and Ostry, The Age of McKenzie King, pp.185-216

CONCLUSION

The early history of the militia in British Columbia is a history of adversity. Of frustration on the part of those few earnest individuals who, through a sense of duty or patriotism, or through a practical fear of invasion, sincerely desired to be part of the defence of the western province. Of incompetence bred of ignorance and disinterest on the part of the authorities concerned in Ottawa and Victoria. Of mismanagement, indiscretion, and often blatant stupidity. And, therefore, it is also the story of determination and often selfless effort on the part of those men who kept the militia alive through years of government non-support.

Throughout the period covered the Government attitude towards the Canadian Militia as a whole was one of apathy. To the majority in Parliament defence was no concern for Canada; the good genius of British might intruded comfortably into any considerations of Canadian defence. The departure of the Imperial garrisons caused no anxiety to these assured gentlemen; it was inconceivable that Britain would risk the safety of such a morsel as the Dominion of Canada.

British Columbia in particular suffered from this complacency. Her isolation for fifteen years after Confederation relegated her to the position of an offspring not neces-

sarily unwanted but certainly inconvenient. The Dominion itself looked to the Atlantic rather than the Pacific; economic and financial power rested in Quebec and Ontario and British Columbia involved only expense. She had difficulty in obtaining funds even for interests other than the militia. Her entry into Confederation brought with it no sense of responsibility on the part of the Dominion Government to provide for the defence of that province. The Federal Government was quite content to consider the Canadian Pacific Railway as its contribution to the defence of the West Coast and to allow the Royal Navy to carry the major burden of the protection of her Western seaboard.

The Imperial Government had always been interested in the defence of British Columbia, but only insofar as it concerned Esquimalt. Its first concern was to insure that the naval station of the North Pacific Squadron was secure from attack over sea, and it believed that the railway terminus at Vancouver could best be protected by the Island naval base, controlling the entire coastal area. Since the British Columbia coast does not lend itself to favourable military operations, this strategy was not unfeasible. This Imperial policy continued until 1900, when the rising threat of German sea power made it necessary for the Royal Navy to concentrate the fleet in home waters and thus abandon Esquimalt as a naval base.

Unfortunately, even during the period of Imperial interest in the defence of Vancouver Island, the concerned au-

thorities in Britain were choked with bureaucratic confusion. The gentlemen of the Admiralty, presumably those most involved, took no active interest in the development of militia forces to defend the station, while the War and Colonial Offices, on the other hand, were persistently urging the Canadian Government to increase the militia forces at Victoria. The resulting military progress was considerably short of rapid. An excellent example of this confusion was the instance of the Admiralty's refusal, in the face of its colleagues' anxiety, to transport, free of charge, pensioners who were being recruited to provide the permanent garrison at Esquimalt. Earlier, the Admiralty had been equally unwilling to relinquish to the Dominion heavy guns stored at the dockyard at Esquimalt. Any scheme proposed or agreed to by the Canadian and Imperial Governments always specified that the militia force of the province should be increased for the purpose of defending the naval base only and not the province as a whole.

Agitation for the general growth of the militia in British Columbia usually came from the Imperial General Officers Commanding the Canadian Militia and the Governors General of the Dominion. Their interest extended beyond Canada's making provision for the defence of Esquimalt to the development of militia forces throughout the province. Any improvements implemented here by the Dominion were made generally in deference to the Imperial Government:

A review of the management of the militia by successive administrations during the past twenty years, almost warrants the conclusion that our rulers disbelieved

in the necessity of a force at all, but maintained one out of deference, perchance, to the old world prejudice of the British Government. ¶

The Government of British Columbia, except in moments of crisis, put no pressure on the Dominion Government to promote or establish militia units within the province. Its primary concern was that the Dominion should use its influence to have the Royal Navy permanently stationed at Esquimalt. When interest was shown in the militia it was usually in connection with its being used in aid of the Civil Power, or as a result of a city such as Vancouver having become important enough politically to exert some influence on the Members of the Legislative Assembly to demand of the Dominion Government the establishment of a militia force in their locale.

However, even had tangible support been available throughout this formative period, the obstacles hindering the establishment of a militia in the province were many and difficult. The geographical characteristics so ideal for defence made the establishment of a defence system near impossible. The topography of the country was in itself a barrier to any kind of organization. Isolated from the rest of the Dominion by the Rocky Mountains, British Columbia was unable to realize unity from this isolation. Within her own borders, a difficult and often treacherous terrain hindered and sometimes prevented communication

1. Jarvis, *Canadian Monthly*, p. 457. This was also shown by the Imperial insistence that Canada spend a minimum of \$1,000,000 annually on her militia. See Chapter II pp.39

amongst a widely scattered population. This was especially a problem in the interior where communication was most difficult and where protection was needed probably more urgently than on the more populous coast. Constant threats of labour violence instigated by American agitators made a military force imperative, but no system of training could overcome the difficulties of geography. It was economically impossible to provide each independent rural unit with a separate drill hall and other facilities, such as instructors. The Dominion Government solved the problem by simply not establishing any units in the interior. Therefore almost half of the population of British Columbia was deprived from 1871 to 1898 of the means of engaging in military activity.

A further and, at times, even greater disadvantage was the temperament of this population. Until the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1885, it remained sparse and transitory. The occupational groups of the province were largely employed in the staple industries, such as forestry, fishing and mining, so that the very nature of their occupation prevented them from being able to come together for purposes of training during the summer season. To the people of British Columbia particularly, discipline was offensive, seemed out of place in a frontier civilization. Many of the immigrants settling in the province had left Europe expressly to avoid military service.² The idea of a professional army was an alien conception which had departed

2. Ibid., p. 452.

Canada with the British garrisons. Even to the militia's supporters, soldiering was a pastime, much like fox-hunting or quadrilles. Wages for labour in the West were high and the pay of the volunteer militia, inadequate at best. The vast discrepancy between the military pittance and the highest cost of living in the Dominion limited the selection of recruits to that economic class which could afford to devote time to training and to spend money for such supplies as clothing and equipment. Both time and money were virtual donations. What little funds came from Government sources were not to be thrown away on anything so trifling as adequate ^{ap}py for the men. Units needed rifle ranges and drill halls, weapons and ammunition. The men often drilled without remuneration, supplied their own personal equipment and too often contributed directly towards the cost of constructions and the pay of instructors.

Under the Militia system of Canada, there was no compulsion on the part of physically able men to offer their services. Duty was left up to the individual, and largely the individual was found lacking. However, in British Columbia, Imperialist loyalty provoked duty more insistently than in the rest of Canada.³ Aside from the Imperial garrison at Esquimalt, many former British officers, having taken up residence in the most populated areas of Victoria, the interior, and Lower Mainland, constituted an important impetus to a military tradition in British Columbia.⁴ And, in addition

3. "An Impressionist View of Canada," Blackwoods Magazine, vol. 193, (November, 1912), p. 723.

4. England, C.H.R., pp. 10-11.

to this Imperial officer class, the Royal Navy establishment at Esquimalt provided further instigation in the way of social prestige as only the Royal Navy can. The great majority of volunteers for the militia were men with military experience obtained either in the United Kingdom or in Eastern Canada. It was a matter of esteem to join and help maintain a militia unit. These officers were chosen by election based on their family background and social position rather than on their ability to lead men. "This was found necessary to keep out men who might be objectionable to the present officers...so when recommending anyone be sure to get a gentleman whom we all shall be sure to wish to associate with."⁵ This created a situation in which a unit was held together by the commanding officer's popularity and social prestige, and the men's devotion to him.⁶ Fortunately, most of these officers were extremely competent and willing to contribute much of their personal incomes towards their units' maintenance. Despite this, however, the principal drawback remained; the character of each unit was peculiar to its commanding officer and uniformity, consequently, was sacrificed.

5. City Archives of Vancouver, M.R., 5 B.C.R.G.A., C.O. 1st Bn. B.C.R.G.A., Lt/Col. E.G. Prior to C.O. 2nd Bn., Maj. T.O. Townley, 27 February, 1892.

6. 'Miles', "Our Militia," The Canadian Monthly, vol. 5, (March, 1874), p. 186.

Even in the ranks, a man had to be able to afford time to drill and to train on a year-round basis, so that the lower middle class provided the non-commissioned officers and men who were established and permanent residents of the areas in which their units were located. The militia was, and is, largely a social institution,⁷ and much of the inducement to join a militia unit, aside from a sense of duty or patriotism, is social. It too often serves as a meeting-place, a uniquely exclusive club, and a means by which certain individuals can promote their own interests on a professional, business, or political level. Thus, the militia of British Columbia was limited to a particular element in society, not necessarily having as its chief interest the defence of the West Coast.

The principal fault, of course, lay in the larger institution of which the volunteer militia of British Columbia was only a part. The general impression of this period is one of a complete lack of knowledge of matters military. There seemed to be no conception, in either Ottawa, or Victoria, of what a militia should be, how it should be organized, or even that it should exist at all. Of course it cannot be denied that the military in British Columbia was lacking more than just support, but "the fact was that, considering the little help we got from Ottawa, the whole militia of British Columbia was worthy of nothing else but praise."⁸

7. Hamilton, Queen's Quarterly, vol. 10, (October, 1902), p. 198.

8. Flick, A Short History of the 31st British Columbia Horse, p. 16.

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Brown, A.S., Boan, H.J., ed., British Columbia: Its History, People, Industries, and Resources, London, Dells, 1912. ✓

Refers largely to the economic development of British Columbia, but has a short chapter on the militia of that province.

Creighton, Donald, John A. Macdonald, The Old Chief-tan, Toronto, MacMillan, 1955.

While this work contains some information pertaining to Macdonald's attitude towards the militia, it was of great use as a political history of Canada from 1867-1891. The book is extremely well documented and the material is derived mainly from the Macdonald papers at Ottawa.

Ferns, H.S., Ostry, B., The Age of Mackenzie King, the Rise of the Leader, London, Heinemann, 1955.

An almost bitter attack on Mackenzie King and the methods he used to achieve the leadership of the Liberal Party. However, the work does provide some interesting information concerning Canadian politics from 1896-1919.

Gosnell, R.E., Sixty Years of Progress in British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia Historical Association, 1913.

One of the better histories of British Columbia. Was useful for information on Dunsmuir and Colonel C.F. Houghton. ✓

Hamilton, J.H., The Industries of British Columbia, Vancouver, Progress, ?.

Serves to underline the fact that British Columbia was a capitalist society almost from the start of its history. ✓

Hopkins, J.C., ed., The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, Toronto, Annual Review, 1901-1914.

A particularly useful annual report, as it provides Canadian press opinion on Dominion affairs and outstanding events. Was extremely useful for British Columbia press commentary concerning the taking over of Esquimalt in 1905, and the aid to the Civil Power in 1913.

General Works, Other Works (cont'd.)

Howay, F.W., British Columbia from the Earliest Times to the Present, Vancouver, Clarke, 1914, 4 vols.

The best available history on British Columbia. The last two volumes are biographical sketches of prominent men who contributed in some way to the development of British Columbia.

Kavanagh, J., The Vancouver Island Coal Strike, Vancouver, British Columbia Miners' Liberation League, 1914. ✓

Presents the side of labour during the critical strike on Vancouver Island in 1913-1914.

Kerr, J.B., ed., Biographical Dictionary of Well-Known British Columbians, Vancouver, Kerr, Begg, 1890.

A rather poor series of biographical sketches of British Columbians who paid to have their names inserted in the work.

Smith-Goldwyn, Canada and the Canadian Question, Toronto, Hunter, Rose, 1891.

Questions the feasibility of Canada's retaining the British tie and of resisting union with the United States.

IV. SPECIAL WORKS(1) Statistical Studies

Manual of Provincial Information, Victoria, Provincial Bureau, 1930.

Contains statistical information on British Columbia population and economic development.

Research Department, Economic Council of British Columbia, Statistics of Industry in British Columbia, 1871-1934, Victoria, Government Printing Office, 1935. ✓

Especially useful for population distribution in the province for the years 1871-1914.

(2) Naval and Military Histories

Colonel Flick, C.L., A Short History of the 31st British Columbia Horse, Victoria, Reliable, 1922,

A good, though sometimes inaccurate, history of this regiment.

Special Works, Naval and Military Histories (cont'd.)

Longstaff, F.W., Esquimalt Naval Base, Victoria, Victoria Book and Stationery Company, 1941.

An ill-organized, poorly written history of the naval station at Esquimalt.

Lyons, H.H., 6th Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles, Vancouver, Lyons, 1907.

A reasonable history of this regiment from its inception to 1907.

MacEvoy, B., Finlay, A.H., The 72nd Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, Vancouver, Cowan, Brookhouse, 1920.

Though primarily a history of this regiment in the First Great War, this book has an excellent chapter on the origins of the regiment.

McTavish, F.C., History of the 18th Field Ambulance from May 20, 1908, to May 19, 1914, (MS), ? ?

A history of the unit by the man responsible for its formation.

Souvenir of the 231st Overseas Bn. C.E.F. 3rd Bn. 72nd Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, Vancouver, 1917.

Contains a brief account of the history of the 72nd Seaforth Highlanders prior to 1914.

Souvenir Number the Reville, the Duke of Connaught's Own, the 158th (Overseas) Bn., Vancouver, Beck, 1916.

Same style as the preceeding work, containing a few items of information on the history of the regiment,

History of the Royal Canadian Artillery, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1951.

History of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1951.

Very brief, but very good, histories of the development of the corps. The history of the Royal Canadian Artillery was particularly as it contained information on "C" Battery.

(3) Manuscripts

Loosmore, T.R., The British Columbia Labour Movement, and Political Action, 1879-1906, unpublished thesis (M.A.), University of British Columbia, 1954.

Special Works, Manuscripts (cont'd.)

(Loosmore) A very good examination of the political and economic philosophy and aspirations of the labour movement in British Columbia.

V. PERIODICAL MATERIAL

(1) British Defence Policy

Aston, G., "Empire Defence," Edinburgh Review (hereafter known as E.R.), vol. 232, (April, 1924), pp. 241-260.

A brief survey of the necessity for some form of Empire defence. Provides some information concerning the origin of Empire defence.

Baden-Powell, George, "Imperial Defence in Our Time," Royal Colonial Institute Proceedings (hereafter known as R.C.I.P.), vol. 13, (June, 1882), pp. 341-434.

A leading Imperialist here expounds his views on the necessity for an Empire defence scheme. Also an explanation of the importance of the Canadian Pacific Railway and Esquimalt in Imperial defence.

Boulger, D.G., "An Eastern Navy," Contemporary Review, (Hereafter known as C.R.), vol. 80, (October, 1891), pp. 538-546.

A demand for a larger Royal Navy in the Far East. Refutes the idea of an alliance between Great Britain and any other power.

Brassey, T.A., "Can We Hold Our Own at Sea?," Fortnightly Review (hereafter known as F.R.), vol. 64, (July, 1898), pp. 141-147.

A plea for a larger British navy by the editor of the Naval Annual.

Major Breton, H. d'Arch, "Thoughts on Imperial Defence," Blackwoods Magazine (hereafter known as B.M.), vol. 157, (May, 1885), pp. 665-668.

An exposition of the military aspects of Imperial defence, including a resume of the Canadian Militia.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Clarke, G.S., "Other Thoughts on Imperial Defence," B.M., vol. 157, (June, 1895), pp. 962-969.

A survey of the value of colonial contributions to the military defence of the Empire.

Periodical Material, British Defence Policy, (cont'd.)

Captain Colomb, J.C.R., (R.N.), "Our Naval Arrangements in the Other Hemisphere," F.R., vol. 68, (July, 1900), pp. 262-267.

One of the leading navalists of England presents reasons for increasing the Royal Navy in the Far East, to counteract the rising power of Japan and the expansion of Russia.

Captain Colomb, J.C.R., (R.N.), Colonel Dickie, C.M., "Imperial Defence," E.R., vol. 169, (April, 1889), pp. 552-591.

A military and naval review of the necessity of Imperial defence and an evaluation of what the colonies could contribute to such defence.

Captain Colomb, J.C.R., (R.N.), "Imperial Defence," R.C.I.P., vol. 17, (June, 1886), pp. 390-410.

A further discussion of the naval aspects of Imperial defence and an outline of the importance of the various coaling stations of the Royal Navy, including Esquimalt.

Captain Colomb, J.C.R., (R.N.), "British Defence," R.C.I.P., vol. 31, (April, 1900), pp. 207-245.

A discourse on the shortcomings of the British defence resources at the time of the Boer War, and possible remedies for the situation.

Major Cooper, C.A., "The Canadian Pacific Railway and Its Strategic Value to England," The Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine, vol. 5, (December, 1886), pp. 393-398. ✓

Demonstrates the value of this railway as a link in a worldwide communications.

Sir Cooper, C.A., Key, A.C., "Naval Defence of the Colonies," Nineteenth Century and After (hereafter known as 19th C.A.), vol. 20, (August, 1886), pp. 284-294.

Suggestions to promote the naval defence of the Empire and the various stations of the Royal Navy, including Esquimalt.

Captain Fitzgerald, C.P., (R.N.), "Are We Worthy of Our Empire?", National Review, vol. 9, (August, 1887), pp. 781-792.

Periodical Material, British Defence Policy (cont'd.)

(Fitzgerald) A demand by a naval officer for increased naval armaments.

Fuller, J.F.C., "Imperial Defence," 19th D.A., vol. 67, (February, 1935), pp. 129-140.

Though concerned mainly with the post Great War period, does provide some historical background of the concept of Imperial defence.

Sir Howarth, H., "Some Plain Words About the Tsar's New Gospel of Peace," 19th C.A., vol. 45, (January, 1889), pp. 202-216.

A bitter attack on the Hague Conference to limit naval armaments, serves to underline the growing naval race during this period.

Hurd, A.S., "The Navy and the Engineering Dispute," 19th C.A., vol. 43, (March, 1898), pp. 366-371, also vol. 45, (March, 1899), pp. 474-486.

Concerns the various opinions on naval architecture and the resulting arguments between engineers and designers which resulted in a curtailment in British naval construction during this period.

Colonel Hutton, E.T.H., "A Co-operative System for the Defence of the Empire," R.C.I.P., vol. 29, (April, 1898), pp. 223-258.

A treatise by an officer who became the General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia in June, 1898, on the necessity of military co-operation for defence within the Empire.

General Hewson, M.B., "The Canadian Pacific Railway," Canadian Monthly, vol. 3, (September, 1879), pp. 559-569. ✓

A further exposition on the value of the C.P.R. in Imperial defence.

"Imperial Defence," E.R., vol. 159, (April, 1889), pp. 552-591.

A plea for some sort of defence scheme embracing colonial contributions to the defence of the Empire.

Jenkins, E., "Imperial Federation," C.R., vol. 16, (January, 1871), pp. 165-188.

One of the first articles promoting the value of closer Imperial-colonial ties.

Periodical Material, British Defence Policy (cont'd.)

Knaplund, Paul, "Intra-Imperial Aspects of Britain's Defence Questions 1870-1900," Canadian Historical Review (hereafter known as C.H.R.), vol. 3, (June, 1922), pp. 120-142.

An excellent, well documented article on the military naval, economic, and political factors which influenced the development of Imperial defence.

Lilly, W.S., "The Burden of Empire," F.R., vol. 68, (October, 1900), pp. 533-543.

Concerns the reasons for colonial contribution to the defence of the Empire and their dependency on England for all forms of military supplies, advice, etc.

'Looker-on', "The Imperative Policy of Armament," B.M., vol. 163, (June, 1898), pp. 861-864.

A strong plea for a greater Royal Navy.

'Looker-on', "The Yellow Peril," B.M., vol. 163, (June, 1898), pp. 877-890. ✓

Underlines the growing naval power of Japan and its possible threat to England in the Far East.

Marquis of Lorne, "The Unity of the Empire," 19th C.A., vol. 17, (March, 1885), pp. 397-404.

A former Governor-General of Canada expounds his views on the feasibility of greater Empire unity ofr defence and trade.

Low, Sidney, "The Hypocrisies of the Peace Conference," 19th C.A., vol. 45, (May, 1899), pp. 689-699.

Another condemnation of the Hague peace conference and any proposals for naval limitations.

"National Life or National Death," B.M., vol. 187, (April, 1910), pp. 443-457/

An urgent demand for a larger navy to counteract the growing naval might of Germany.

Northcote, H.S., "Canada's Highway to the Pacific," 19th C.A., vol. 11, (January, 1882), pp. 102-109.

A further discussion of the value of the Canadian Pacific Railway to Imperial defence. Contains no valuable new information. ✓

Periodical Material, Imperial Defence Policy (cont'd.)

Schuyler, R.L., "The Recall of the Legions, A Phase of the Decentralization of the British Empire," American Historical Review, vol. 26, (October, 1920), pp. 18-36.

An examination of the reasons behind the recall of the British garrisons during the period of "laissez-faire" in British imperial relations.

Sichel, W., "Disraeli and the Colonies," B.M., vol. 167, (April, 1910), pp. 492-496.

? A biased examination in favour of Disraeli's concept of Empire.

Torkow-Namani, Israel, "Abandonment of 'Splendid Isolation' by Great Britain," C.H.R., vol. 27, (March, 1946), pp. 163-188. ✓

An excellent evaluation and study of the events leading to the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902.

"Why Have We No Proper Armament?," B.M., vol. 137, (May, 1885), pp. 569-594.

A demand for the fortification of Royal Navy coaling stations, including Esquimalt.

(2) Canadian-Imperial Defence Relations

Lieutenant-Colonel Denison, G.T., "Canada and the Imperial Conference," 19th C.A., vol. 51, (June, 1905), pp. 900-908.

Explains Canadian policy towards Imperial defence, from the viewpoint of a Canadian Militia officer.

Gundy, H.P., "Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Lord Minto," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1952, pp. 28-36.

An excellent study of the relations between the Governor-General and the Prime Minister in reference to Laurier's attitude towards Canadian participation in the Boer War.

McPhillips, A.E., "Canada's Place in the Empire," Canadian Magazine, vol. 28, (January, 1907), pp. 235-236.

An extremely brief demand for Canadian participation in Imperial naval defence.

Periodical Relations, Canadian-Imperial Defence Relations
(cont'd.)

Penlington, N., "General Hutton and the Problem of Military Imperialism in Canada," C.H.R., vol. 24, (June, 1923), pp. 156-171.

An examination of the factors which led to the elimination of the Imperial Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia. Also concerns Hutton's part in gaining Canadian participation in the Boer War.

Stacey, C.P., "British Military Policy in Canada in the Era of Federation," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1934, pp. 20-29.

Stacey, C.P., "Britain's Withdrawal from North America, 1864-1871," C.H.R., vol. 36, (September, 1955), pp. 185-198.

Two articles on the causes and effects of the withdrawal of British military garrisons from Canada at the time of Confederation. The latter supplies new additional information to that in the first. Both extremely good in their examination of British Imperial military policy during this period.

Stacey, C.P., "Canadian Voyageurs in the Sudan," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 5, (October, 1951), pp. 61-73, (November, 1951), pp. 58-68, (December, 1951), pp. 16-25.

Stacey, C.P., "Canada and the Nile Expedition, 1884-1885," C.H.R., vol. 33, (December, 1952), pp. 319-340.

The former of these two works on Canadian participation in the Nile campaign deals chiefly with the activities of the force during the campaign, the latter with the background of the recruiting of the force in Canada, the attitude of Sir John A. Macdonald towards Canadian participation in the campaign.

Stewart, A.R., "Sir John A. Macdonald and the Imperial Defence Commission, 1879," C.H.R., vol. 35, (June, 1954), pp. 119-139.

A study of Sir John A. Macdonald's attitude towards Canadian participation in any scheme of Imperial defence.

Sir Tupper, Charles, "The Naval Question in the Colonies," Canadian Magazine, vol. 6, (February, 1896), pp. 307-313.

Serves to point out the Conservative Government's at-

Periodical Material, Canadian-Imperial Defence Relations
(cont'd.)

titude towards Imperial naval defence, reiterates the arguments that Canada did her share by the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway.

(3) Canadian Defence Policy and the Canadian Militia

Colonel Brown, J.S., "Military Policy of Canada, 1904-1924, and Suggestions for the Future," Canadian Defence Quarterly, (hereafter known as C.D.Q.) vol. 1, (July, 1924), pp. 18-33.

A critical examination of Canadian governmental attitude towards the militia, its effects, and how the situation might be improved.

Captain Colomb, J.C.R., (R.N.), "The Militia System of Canada," Canadian Monthly, vol. 4, (March, 1880), pp. 293-301.

A brief outline on the organization of the Canadian Militia.

Cummins, J.F., "Colonel D.T. Irwin, a Distinguished Artillery Officer," C.D.Q., vol. 5, (July, 1928), pp. 137-141.

A biography of Colonel Irwin and his influences on the development of the Canadian Artillery, as well as information concerning Irwin's tour of duty during the construction of fortifications at Esquimalt.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham, A.B., "The Canadian Militia," Queen's Quarterly, vol. 19, (April, 1912), pp. 375-382.

An examination of the Canadian Militia as it existed in 1912 and various suggestions to promote its development.

England, R., "Disbanded Soldiers in Canada, Prior to 1914," C.H.R., vol. 27, (March, 1946), pp. 1-18.

The influence and effect of demobilized Imperial officers and men who settled in Canada on the development of the Canadian Militia. Contains some information concerning disbanded soldiers in British Columbia.

Hamilton, C.F., "The Canadian Militia," Queen's Quarterly, vol. 10, (October, 1902), pp. 197-213.

Periodical Material, Canadian Defence...(cont'd.)

(Hamilton) An excellent summary and examination of the weaknesses in the Canadian Militia and the characteristics of the Canadian as a soldier.

Hamilton, C.F., "The Canadian Militia : The Dead Period," C.D.Q., vol. 7, (October, 1929), pp. 78-89.

Hamilton, C.F., "The Canadian Militia ; The Beginning of Reform," C.D.Q., vol. 7, (April, 1930), pp. 383-389.

Hamilton, C.F., "The Canadian Militia : The Change in Organization," C.D.Q., vol. 8, (October, 1930), pp. 94-106.

An excellent history of the growth and development of the Canadian Militia by the author of "Canadian Defence, 1812-1912, in Canada and the Provinces." Very little reference to the defence of British Columbia.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jervis, S.M., "Imperial Federation and Canadian Defence," Canadian Monthly, vol. 4, (May, 1880), pp. 400-410.

An attack on the Government's attitude towards the Canadian Militia.

Lieutenant-Colonel Merritt, W.H., "Practical Military Training," Canadian Magazine, vol. 28, (January, 1907), pp. 257-264.

A description by a militia officer of the training of the Canadian Volunteer Militia.

'Miles', "Our Militia," Canadian Monthly, vol. 5, (March, 1874), pp. 185-191.

A critique of the Canadian Militia in the immediate post-Confederation period and suggestions for its improvement.

Colonel Parkes, G.R., "The Evolution of the Control of His Majesty's Canadian Forces," C.D.Q., vol. 5, (July, 1933), pp. 465-480.

The history of events leading to the establishment of Canadian control of the Militia force of the Dominion.

Lieutenant-General Owen, J.F., "The Military Forces of Our Colonies," F.R., vol. 297, (March, 1900), pp. 477-493.

Periodical Material, Canadian Defence...(cont'd.)

(Owen) An examination of the various military forces of the Empire, including Canada's. Has high praise for the Canadian as a soldier.

Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien, "Our Militia," Canadian Magazine, vol. 12, (December, 1894), pp. 101-106.

A brief summary of the organization of the Canadian Militia in 1894.

Sage, W.N., "The Historical Peculiarities of Canada in Regard to Hemisphere Defence," Pacific Historical Review, vol. 10, (March, 1941), pp. 15-27.

A Summary of the historical factors which influenced Canadian policy in defence matters concerning North America. Though it deals largely with the post Great War era, contains some historical information on the pre-1914 period.

Stacey, C.P., "The Development of the Canadian Army, Part 2," Canadian Army Journal, fol. 6, (November, 1951), pp. 1-11.

A history of the Canadian Army between Confederation and the First Great War. Brief, but extremely useful and well-written.

Sulte, B., "The Canadian Militia Before the Great War," C.H.R., vol. 4, (June, 1923), pp. 98-104.

A bitter attack on Canadian governmental policy towards the militia prior to the First Great War. How that policy thwarted the expansion and training of the militia.

Stacey, C.P., "The Military Aspects of the Winning of the West," C.H.R., vol. 21, (March, 1940), pp. 1-24/

A history of military operations in the Canadian West. Deals chiefly with the Riel Rebellions of 1870, 1885.

Wood, W., "In Case of War," The Canadian Magazine, vol. 2, (May, 1898), pp. 93-101.

Deals with the inadequacy of the Canadian Militia in the event of its being called upon to fight.

Periodicals Material, (cont'd.)

(4) British Columbia Defence and Militia

Gosnell, E.R., "British Columbia and British International Relations," Johnson, E.R., ed., Canadian National Problems, American Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 45, (January, 1913), pp. 1-19.

Refers largely to Canada's contributing to the maintenance of the Royal Navy and the attitude of British Columbia which was favourable to such a scheme.

Ireland, W.E., "Pre-Confederation Defence Problems of the Pacific Coast," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report 1941, pp. 41-53.

An excellent, well documented history of the unpaid, partially unrecognized militia units in the colonies of Vancouver and British Columbia.

Kawakomi, K.K., "White Canada," Canadian Magazine, vol. 42, (May, 1914), pp. 193-198.

Offers an entirely[?] concept as to why the people of British Columbia were anxious to have either the Royal Navy or the Royal Canadian Navy stationed on the coast of that province. ✓

Lieutenant-Colonel Kinloch, D.F.B., "History of the Okanagan Regiment," 12th Report of the Okanagan Historical Society, 1948, pp. 151-159.

A fairly good history of the origins and development of the 30th British Columbia Horse. However, does contain some inaccuracies.

Major-General Laurie, J.W., "The Protection of Our Naval Base in the North Pacific," Proceedings of the Royal Naval Institute, (6 April, 1883), London, Queen's Printer, 1883, pp. 1-15.

A very good discussion of the measures that are absolutely necessary to provide for the defence of Esquimalt. Laurie was an Imperial Artillery officer who had been sent to British Columbia to study the defence problems of the naval station. This commentary is an almost complete reiteration of his original official report.

Periodical Material (cont'd.)

British Columbia Defence and Militia

Major Matthews, J.S., "The Vancouver Militia," British Columbia Magazine, vol. 7, (June, 1911), pp. 551-567.

A brief but very adequate history of the various militia groups in Vancouver. Deals largely with the 6th Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles, of which the author was a member.

Morse, E.W., "Some Aspects of the Komgata Maru Affair, 1914," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1936, pp. 100-108. ✓

Throws some new light on the incident concerning the attempted entry into Canada by a group of East Indians at Vancouver and the part played by H.M.S. Rainbow and the volunteer militia.

Major Ormsby-Johnson, C., "Marine Guns for Naval Bases," F.R., vol. 359, (January, 1897), pp. 98-103.

A demand that the Admiralty turn guns in storage at various colonial naval stations over to local volunteer militia to defend these stations, Esquimalt included.

Pullen, H.F., "An Evacuated Naval Station," Canadian Magazine, vol. 30, (November, 1907), pp. 30-32.

A description of the fortifications at Esquimalt after the Canadian Government had taken it over in 1905.

Reid, R.L., "The Inside Story of the Komgata Maru Affair," British Columbia Historical Quarterly, vol. 5, (January, 1941), pp. 19-24. ✓

Adds additional information to the subject dealt with by Morse. Also refers to the part played by H.M.S. Rainbow and the militia.

Colonel Robertson, F.A., "The 5th British Columbia Regiment Garrison Artillery," The Kahki Call, vol. 10, (November, 1929), p. 3.

A very good history by an authority an former member of this regiment.

Roy, R.H., "...in Aid of a Civil Power, 1877," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 7, (October, 1953), pp. 61-70. ✓

Periodical Material, British Columbia...(cont'd.)

(Roy) The history of the operations of the volunteer militia during the miners' strike, 1877, at Nanaimo, drawn from official sources.

Roy, R.H., "The Colonel Goes West," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 8, (April, 1954), pp. 76-81.

A description of Colonel P. Robertson-Ross' inspection tour across Canada to Victoria, British Columbia, drawn from official sources. Presents a fascinating story of over 1000 miles of travel by horseback through Canada.

Major Scudmore, T.V., "Aid to the Civil Power," C.D.Q., vol. 9, (January, 1932), pp. 253-260.

A personal narrative of the author's participation as a member of the volunteer militia during the miners' strike at Nanaimo, 1913-1914. ✓

Vrooman, F.B., "The Imperial Idea from the Point of View of Vancouver," 19th C.A., vol. 73, (March, 1913), pp. 500-516.

A long, disjointed tirade advocating Canadian contribution to the Royal Navy. Refers to the "yellow peril;" the threat of Japan to British Columbia. ✓

(5) Others

"An Impressionist View of Canada," B.M., vol. 193, (November, 1912), pp. 716-727.

A summary of economic and political conditions within Canada at the beginning of the century, with some reference to the situation in British Columbia. ✓

Arnold, H.O., "The Liberal Idea and the Colonies," 19th C.A., vol. 14, (September, 1883), pp. 385-401.

Demonstrates the changed attitude of the British Liberal Party from 1871-1883, towards Imperial expansion and relations with existing colonies.

Saywell, J.T., "Labour and Socialism in British Columbia, a Survey of Historical Development Before 1903," British Columbia Historical Quarterly, vol. 15, (October, 1950), pp. 129-150.

An excellent article which points out the radicalism of organized labour in British Columbia. ✓

VI. NEWSPAPERSThe British Columbia Federationist, 1900-1914.

This newspaper was used for the opinion of labour concerning the militia as well as for a description by a labour paper of the strike at Steveston in 1900, and also that at Nanaimo, 1913-1914. It should be noted that this paper was extremely anti-military and socialistically inclined. ✓

The British Columbian, 1863-1871.

One of the earliest papers in British Columbia. Used for information on pre-Confederation militia units in the province.

The Canadian Military Gazette, 1885-1895.

The first publication in Canada to cater purely to military tastes. A weekly gazette, only in existence for ten years. But paved the way for future Canadian military publications. Extremely helpful in gaining information on all aspects of military affairs in Canada. Contained several reports on the defences of British Columbia as well as a history of the 5th British Columbia Regiment Garrison Artillery.

The Nanaimo Free Press, 1877-1914.

Utilized to obtain material on military affairs in British Columbia, as well as specific information concerning strikes at Nanaimo, 1877, 1890, 1913-14. ✓

Vancouver Daily Province, 1900-1914.

Useful in obtaining information on militia units in Vancouver, and public opinion concerning military affairs, and the question of Imperial defence.

Vancouver News Advertiser, 1900-1914.

Serves the same purpose as the Vancouver Daily Province. Useful as it tended to be more Canadian in outlook towards the question of Imperial defence.

Victoria Colonist, 1871-1914.

A source of information on all aspects of military affairs in British Columbia. The most useful of all newspapers consulted, primarily due to fact that Victoria was, for a long period of time, the centre of military activity in the province.

VII. INTERVIEWS

Captain Finleyson, W., 2nd Battalion Canadian Highland Regiment, 20 February, 1955.

Major J.S. Matthews, late of 6th Duke of Connaught's Own Rifles, presently City of Vancouver Archivist, 23, 24, 25 March, 1955.

Major-General Odium, Victor, late Canadian Army, 27 March, 1955.

Roy, R.H., presently on staff Provincial Archives, British Columbia, 24-28 June, 1955, Ottawa.

Colonel Stacey, C.P., Commanding Officer Canadian Army Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Ottawa, 24-28 June, 1955.

These interviews were especially valuable in gaining background information, of both a specific and general nature, concerning individual militia units and the Volunteer Militia of British Columbia in general. Captain Finleyson provided the author with facts concerning the origin of militia units which are perpetuated in the present Canadian Active Militia. Major Matthews not only provided the author with a wealth of information on various militia units in Vancouver but gave a personal account faced by these units in maintaining their establishments. He was also extremely helpful in suggesting sources of information of use to this thesis. Major-General Odium, who had been connected with the British Columbia Militia in 1900, provided a wealth of information on the factors which influenced the growth of the militia in the province. Mr. R.H. Roy, who has done a great deal of research into the history of the militia in British Columbia, was more than helpful in donating to the author material of use to this thesis, as well as indicating where other such material was available in the Public Archives of Canada. Colonel C.P. Stacey also provided the author with information and suggestions as to where material could be found.

Expenditures by the Dominion Government on the Militia of British Columbia

Year	Allowance B.C.	Allowance Canada	Drill B.C.	Drill Canada	Grand Total Canada
1873-74	961.60 ¹	Unknown	844.00	315,557.26	1,013,943.84 ²
1874-75	332.00 ²	40,281.42 ³	659.75	315,557.26	1,013,943.84 ⁴
1875-76	120.00	39,999.79 ⁵	500.92	392,986.68	978,530.41 ⁶
1876-77	nll	39,774.96 ⁷	293.50	124,267.95	550,451.87 ⁸
1877-78	160.00	39,951.19 ⁹	617.75	154,005.24	618,136.58 ¹⁰
1878-79	590.00	39,789.40 ¹¹	990.25	154,284.34	777,698.90 ¹²
1879-80		Unknown		172,924.59 ¹³	690,018.93 ¹⁴
1880-81	360.00	39,974.55 ¹⁵	2,182.00	157,125.51	667,000.51 ¹⁶
1881-82	760.00	38,471.90 ¹⁷	1,213.25	264,969.19 ¹⁸	772,811.79 ¹⁹
1882-83	480.00	37,406.33 ²⁰	1,100.00	162,915.68 ²¹	734,354.25 ²²
1883-84	873.00	38,382.63 ²³	1,555.48	314,473.56 ²⁴	989,478.22 ²⁵
1884-85	100.00	37,166.75 ²⁶	2,198.32	230,151.19 ²⁷	1,009,906.45 ²⁸
1885-86	400.00	35,955.00 ²⁹	1,763.00 ³⁰	241,207.91 ³¹	1,164,871.55 ³²
1886-87	300.00	35,860.00 ³³	1,489.11	257,385.67 ³⁴	1,193,692.77 ³⁵
1887-88	300.00	37,025.00 ³⁶	1,849.26	281,733.83 ³⁷	1,273,178.59 ³⁸
1888-89	500.00	36,884.00 ³⁹	1,530.32	286,637.41 ⁴⁰	1,323,551.56

APPENDIX I (2)

Year	Allowance B.C.	Allowance Canada	Drill B.C.	Drill Canada	Grand Total Canada
1889-90	460.00	36,287.50	1,747.55	265,330.54 ⁴²	1,287,013.49 ⁴³
1890-91	427.50	35,996.50	1,338.93	272,098.37 ⁴⁴	1,279,513.65 ⁴⁵
1891-92	495.00	36,314.15 ⁴⁶	1,786.16	251,125.70 ⁴⁷	1,266,308.05 ⁴⁸
1892-93	25.00	34,407.09	1,550.12	278,311.67 ⁴⁹	1,419,745.89 ⁵⁰
1893-94	657.50	35,536.41 ⁵¹	2,484.12 ⁵²	211,613.56 ⁵³	1,284,517.17 ⁵⁴
1894-95	120.00	31,127.49	2,626.48 ⁵⁵	243,753.99 ⁵⁶	1,574,013.76 ⁵⁷
1895-96	260.00 ⁵⁸	35,480.78 ⁵⁹	3,552.19	388,666.21 ⁶⁰	2,136,713.54 ⁶¹
1896-97	325.00 ⁶²	62,983.99 ⁶³	3,870.17 ⁶⁴	430,165.39	2,478,179.00 ⁶⁵
1897-98	1,560.39 ⁶⁶	77,672.08 ⁶⁷	4,261.80 ⁶⁸	299,627.60	1,746,730.60 ⁶⁹
1898-99	866.41 ⁷⁰	74,460.07 ⁷¹	5,519.01 ⁷²	422,552.53	2,561,056.17 ⁷³
1899-00	1,129.24	97,015.90 ⁷⁴	3,805.43 ⁷⁵	424,990.64	2,154,935.65 ⁷⁶
1900-01	899.68 ⁷⁷	72,713.15 ⁷⁸	5,538.68 ⁷⁹	454,357.20	2,411,544.82 ⁸⁰
1901-02	1,347.66	65,785.10 ⁸²	5,215.62 ⁸³	314,761.23	2,308,720.16 ⁸⁴
1902-03	1,755.81 ⁸⁵	99,761.03 ⁸⁶	7,280.60 ⁸⁷	616,871.97	2,044,265.65 ⁸⁸
1903-04	1,149.94 ⁸⁹	116,862.13 ⁹⁰	10,957.49 ⁹¹	749,985.17	2,245,212.31 ⁹²
1904-05	1,361.25 ⁹³	32,293.91 ⁹⁴	8,393.22 ⁹⁵	699,724.43 ⁹⁶	2,649,878.47 ⁹⁷

APPENDIX I (3)

Year	Allowance B.C.	Allowance Canada	Drill B.C.	Drill Canada	Grand Total Canada
1905-06	801.27 ⁹⁸	74,352.82 ⁹⁹	14,633.03 ¹⁰⁰	809,924.47	4,294,124.62 ¹⁰¹
1906-07	1,575.10 ¹⁰²	29,394.25 ¹⁰³	13,905.49 ¹⁰⁴	724,377.98	3,377,037.87 ¹⁰⁵
1907-08	1,215.57 ¹⁰⁶	70,911.70 ¹⁰⁷	13,181.85 ¹⁰⁸	1,084,499.45	5,498,183.60 ¹⁰⁹
1908-09	1,937.50 ¹¹⁰	112,507.43 ¹¹¹	14,229.40 ¹¹²	7,304,795.92	5,221,664.79 ¹¹³
1909-10	2,070.81 ¹¹⁴	67,674.60 ¹¹⁵	29,886.01 ¹¹⁶	796,608.45	4,679,956.24 ¹¹⁷
1910-11	461.00	79,980.37 ¹¹⁸	19,875.91 ¹¹⁹	1,089,693.56	6,868,651.29 ¹²⁰
1911-12	20 78.49 ¹²¹	83,857.50 ¹²²	36,936.05 ¹²³	1,169,107.07	7,580,600.29 ¹²⁴
1912-13	3,004.12	85,473.88 ¹²⁵	42,981.97 ¹²⁶	1,719,257.19	9,112,474.90 ¹²⁷
1913-14	2,634.83 ¹²⁸	101,904.53 ¹²⁹	73,537.86 ¹³⁰	1,805,413.97	11,151,398.63 ¹³¹
1914-15	6,922.77 ¹³²	66,512.87 ¹³³	99,458.42 ¹³⁴	1,875,944.36	10,060,617.74 ¹³⁵

Allowance B.C. and Canada: money allotted for Drill instruction, other instruction, and for anything that directly effects the training of the troops.

Drill B.C. and Canada: money paid for annual training period pay to men, camp training and training at local Headquarters.

Grand Total: total money expended by the Government of Canada on the militia force of the Dominion of Canada.

APPENDIX I

Footnotes

1. Public Accounts of the Dominion of Canada, 1874, Sessional Papers, vol. 1, 1875, p. 144.
2. Public Accounts of the Dominion of Canada (Hereafter known as P.A.D.C.), 1875, Canada, Sessional Papers, (Hereafter known as Can., S.P.), no. 1, 1876, p. 167.
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21. P.A.D.C., 1883, Can., S.P., no. 1, 1884, p. 169.
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 37. Ibid., pt. C. 197.
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71. Ibid., pp. L. 12-16.
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APPENDIX NUMBER II

Year	Authorized Strength		No. Trained British Columbia	No. Trained Dominion of Canada	Years Summer Camp Held in B.C.
	Officers	Other Ranks			
1874-75	4	180	200 ¹	30,000 ²	yes
1875-76	12	190 ³	unknown	28,842 ⁴	nil
1876-77	12	190 ⁵	unknown	23,000 ⁶	nil
1877-78	17	260 ⁷	unknown	20,000 ⁸	nil
1878-79	19	279	12-197 ⁹	21,000 ¹⁰	nil
1879-80	15	275	21-250 ¹¹	19,780 ¹²	nil
1880-81	21	335	10-220 ¹³	21,250 ¹⁴	nil
1881-82	20	283 ¹⁵	unknown	15,173 ¹⁶	yes
1882-83	322	all ranks	163 all ranks ¹⁷	16,101 ¹⁸	yes
1883-84	277	all ranks	210 all ranks ¹⁹	22,367 ²⁰	nil
1884-85	278	all ranks	210 all ranks ²¹	17,203 ²²	nil
1885-86	278	all ranks ²³	261 all ranks ²⁴	18,070 ²⁵	yes
1886-87	278	all ranks ²⁶	224 all ranks ²⁷	20,225 ²⁸	yes

APPENDIX NUMBER II (cont.)

Year	Authorized Strength British Columbia Officers	Other Ranks	No. Trained British Columbia	No. Trained Dominion of Canada	Years Summer Camp Held in B.C.
1887-88	24	254 ²⁹	246 all ranks ³⁰	20,255 ³¹	nil
1888-89	21	210	205 all ranks ³²	20,689 ³³	nil
1889-90	223	all ranks ³⁴	16-226 ³⁵	19,225 ³⁶	nil
1890-91	21	210	15-152 ³⁷	19,856 ³⁸	nil
1891-92	21	210 ³⁹	15-165 ⁴⁰	18,081 ⁴¹	nil
1892-93	21	214 ⁴²	9-194 ⁴³	18,557 ⁴⁴	nil
1893-94	21	210 ⁴⁵	15-252 ⁴⁶	16,574 ⁴⁷	nil
1894-95	30	494 ⁴⁶	21-355 ⁴⁹	19,337 ⁵⁰	nil
1895-96	36	587 ⁵¹	26-432 ⁵²	21,602 ⁵³	nil
1896-97	38	592 ⁵⁴	32-502 ⁵⁵	17,893 ⁵⁶	nil
1897-98	38	616 ⁵⁷	32-574 ⁵⁸	27,474 ⁵⁹	nil
1898-99	37	825 ⁶⁰	39-602 ⁶¹	25,296 ⁶²	nil
1899-1900	64	870	45-733 ⁶³	29,999 ⁶⁴	nil

APPENDIX NUMBER IX (cont.)

Year	Authorized Strength British Columbia		No. Trained British Columbia	No. Trained Dominion of Canada	Years Summer Camp Held in B.C.
	Officers	Other Ranks			
1900-01	64	870	43-698 ⁶⁵	27,575 ⁶⁶	nll
1901-02	73	912	53-639 ⁶⁷	30,262 ⁶⁸	nll
1902-03	106	896	57-722 ⁶⁹	20,219 ⁷⁰	nll
1903-04	123	1051	71-779 ⁷¹	25,990 ⁷²	nll
1904-05	77	975	69-746 ⁷³	35,674 ⁷⁴	yes
1905-06	78	964	61-672 ⁷⁵	39,492 ⁷⁶	yes
1906-07	78	995	69-757 ⁷⁷	40,800 ⁷⁸	yes
1907-08	111	1160	94-884 ⁷⁹	43,042 ⁸⁰	yes
1908-09	119	1254	109-1065 ⁸¹	36,224 ⁸²	yes
1909-10	289	2037	143-1551 ⁸³	41,375 ⁸⁴	yes
1910-11	199	2393	158-1644	41,720 ⁸⁵	yes
1911-12	289	3793	208-2222	44,171 ⁸⁶	yes
1912-13	451	5086	323-4011	45,098 ⁸⁷	yes

APPENDIX II

Footnotes

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71. A.R.S.M., 1904, Can., S.P., no. 35, 1905, Appendix B, p. 15.
72. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, op. cit., p. 9354.
73. A.R.S.M., 1905, Can., S.P., no. 35, 1906, 1907, p. 9.
74. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, op. cit., p. 9354.
75. A.R.S.M., 1906, Can., S.P., no. 35, 1907, Appendix E, p. 63.
76. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, op. cit., p. 9354.
77. A.R.S.M., 1907, Can., S.P., no. 35, 1908, p. 26.
78. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, op. cit., p. 9354.
79. A.R.S.M., 1908, Can., S.P., no. 35, 1909, Appendix E, p. 63.
80. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, op. cit., p. 9354.

81. A.R.S.M., 1909, Can., S.P., no. 35, 1910, pp. 13-15.
82. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, op. cit., p. 9354.
83. A.R.S.M., 1910, Can., S.P., no. 35, 1911, Appendix B, p. 76.
84. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, op. cit., p. 9354.
85. A.R.S.M., 1911, Can., S.P., no. 35, 1912, Appendix E, p. 93.
86. A.R.S.M., 1912, Can., S.P., no. 35, 1913, Statement no. 3, p. 43.
87. A.R.S.M., 1913, Can., S.P., no. 35, 1914, Appendix B., p. 41.
88. Loc. cit.

APPENDIX NUMBER III

	% of Total Troops Trained	% of Total Allowances	% of Total Pay to B.C.
1874-75	.0066%	.0100%	.0220%
1878-79	.0095%	.0160%	.0054%
1879-80	.0150%	unknown	
1880-81	.0094%	.0100%	.0180%
1881-82	unknown	.0200%	.0040%
1882-83	.0120%	.0130%	.0064%
1883-84	.0090%	.0240%	.0092%
1884-85	.0110%	.0027%	.0096%
1885-86	.0170%	.0110%	.0083%
1886-87	.0090%	.0084%	.0077%
1887-88	.0090%	.0081%	.0079%
1888-89	.0090%	.0130%	.0066%
1889-90	.0100%	.0140%	.0075%
1890-91	.0100%	.0110%	.0036%
1891-92	.0110%	.0130%	.0079%
1892-93	.0100%	.0008%	.0077%
1893-94	.0200%	.0190%	.0140%
1894-95	.0200%	.0030%	.0120%
1895-96	.0230%	.0086%	.0100%
1896-97	.0280%	.0047%	.0093%
1897-98	.0210%	.0250%	.0130%
1898-99	.0230%	.0120%	.0140%
1899-1900	.0260%	.0100%	.0094%

APPENDIX NO. III (cont.)

	% of Total Troops Trained	% of Total Allowances	% of Total Pay to B.C.
1900-01	.0250%	.0120%	.0110%
1902-03	.0390%	.0210%	.0110%
1903-04	.0300%	.0086%	.0130%
1904-05	.0220%	.0310%	.0110%
1905-06	.0170%	.0100%	.0180%
1906-07	.0190%	.0680%	.0170%
1907-08	.0200%	.0140%	.0090%
1908-09	.0300%	.0170%	.0070%
1909-10	.0390%	.0280%	.0250%
1910-11	.0400%	.0062%	.0180%
1911-12	.0500%	.0240%	.0340%
1912-13	.0950%	.0350%	.0230%

APPENDIX IV

Money Expended by the Dominion of Canada on the
Defence of the West Coast.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Expenditure</u>	
1884-85	3,231.37 ¹	payments to "C" Bty.
1885-86	5,171.95 ²	" " " "
1886-87	12,662.70 ³	" " " "
1887-88	27,880.92 ⁴	" " " "
1888-89	38,081.12 ⁵	" " " "
1889-90	38,724.30 ⁶	" " " "
1890-91	39,396.57 ⁷	" " " "
1891-92	39,462.77 ⁸	" " " "
1892-93	45,415.18 ⁹	" " " "
1893-94	78,394.43 ¹⁰	Payments to Imperial Garrison
1894-95	127,500.00 ¹¹	at Esquimalt.
1895-96	121,891.00 ¹²	
1896-97	45,119.21 ¹³	
1897-98	44,894.47 ¹⁴	
1898-99	44,669.80 ¹⁵	
1899-1900	12,989.13 ¹⁶	
1900-01	128,140.00 ¹⁷	
1901-02	114,058.27 ¹⁸	
1902-03	111,943.47 ¹⁹	
1903-04	109,986.65 ²⁰	
1904-05	109,906.67 ²¹	
1905-06	179,255.55 ²²	

Appendix 1V(cont'd.)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Expenditure</u>	
1906-07	38,040.77 ²³	Canada takes own Garrison at Esquimalt.
1907-08	63,841.35 ²⁴	
1908-09	71,142.93 ²⁵	
1909-10	66,800.75 ²⁶	
1910-11	188,983.10 ²⁷	Defence of Esquimalt and Victoria.
1911-12	94,050.90 ²⁸	
1912-13	130,135.08 ²⁹	
1913-14	115,639.07 ³⁰	
1914-15	160,705.74 ³¹	

Footnotes for Appendix 1V

- 1 Annual Report of the Auditor General of the Dominion of Canada, (hereafter known as ARAGDC) 1886, Canada, Sessional Papers, (hereafter known as CAN, S.P.), No. 1, 1887, p. 214.
- 2 ARAGDC, 1887, CAN, S.P., 1888, p. 190.
- 3 ARAGDC, 1888, CAN, S.P., No. 3, 1889, pt C, p C 212.
- 4 ARAGDC, 1890, CAN, S.P., No. 5, 1891, pt D, p D 84
- 5 ARAGDC, 1891, CAN, S.P., No. 2, 1892, pt 13, p B 254.
- 6 ARAGDC, 1892, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1893, pt C, p C 27.
- 7 ARAGDC, 1893, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1894, pt C, p C 20.
- 8 ARAGDC, 1894, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1895, pt C, p C 38.
- 9 ARAGDC, 1895, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1896, pt K, p K 3.
- 10 ARAGDC, 1896, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1897, pt K, p K 3.
- 11 ARAGDC, 1897, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1898, pt L, p L 41.
- 12 ARAGDC, 1898, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1899, pt L, p L 2.
- 13 ARAGDC, 1899, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1900, pt L, p L 2.
- 14 ARAGDC, 1900, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1901, pt Q, p Q 2.
- 15 ARAGDC, 1901, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1902, pt Q, p Q 2.
- 16 ARAGDC, 1902, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1903, pt Q, p Q 2.
- 17 ARAGDC, 1903, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1904, pt. Q, p Q 2.
- 18 ARAGDC, 1904, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1905, pt. Q, p Q 2.
- 19 ARAGDC, 1905, CaN, S.P., No. 1, 1906, pt. Q, p Q 2.
- 20 ARAGDC, 1906-07, CAN, S.P., 1906-07, pt. Q, p Q 2.
- 21 ARAGDC, 1907-08, CAN, S.P., 1907-08, pt. Q, p Q 20.
- 22 ARAGDC, 1908, CaN, S.P., No. 1, 1909, p t. P, p P 22.
- 23 ARAGDC, 1909, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1910, pt. P, p P 31.
- 24 ARAGDC, 1910, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1911, pt. P, p P 46.

- 25 ARAGDC, 1911, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1912, pt. O, p. O 32.
- 26 ARAGDC, 1912, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1913, pt. O, p. O
30-32.
- 27 ARAGDC, 1913, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1914, pt. O, p. O 33.
- 28 ARAGDC, 1914, CAN, S.P., No. 1, 1915, pt. P, p. P 28.
- 29 ARAGDC, 1915, Can, S.P., No. 1, 1916, pt. P, p P 31.

APPENDIX V


POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA¹

<u>District</u> (as on map)	<u>1881</u>	<u>1891</u>	<u>1901</u>	<u>1911</u>
1)	863	1,220	8,446	22,466
2)		2,185	23,516	28,373
3)	817	3,360	12,085	28,066
4)	7,939	41,507	53,641	183,108
5)	17,292	35,744	50,886	81,241
6)	6,753	8,191	11,563	19,031
7)	2,208	2,475	3,743	3,545
8)	4,825	2,003	4,523	8,411
9)	2,762	548	9,270	16,595
10)	1,000	940	984	1,644

Total population of British Columbia²

	<u>1871</u>	<u>1881</u>	<u>1891</u>	<u>1901</u>	<u>1911</u>
	39,247	49,459	98,173	178,657	392,480
Farm pop.		2,743	8,451	88,478 (Rural)	88,796 (Rural)

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1. Research Department, Economic Council of B. C., Statistics of Industry in B. C., 1871-1934, Victoria, 1935, pp. 3-8.
 2. Ibid., p. 7.
 3. Ibid., p. 8.



SCALE

0 80 160 MI.

BASE MAP BY
GEOGRAPHY DEPT. U.B.C.

APPENDIX VI

The 5th British Columbia Regiment Garrison Artillery

No. 1 Coy of Rifles,
Victoria, GO 3/74
13 Feb. 1874

No. 2 Coy of Rifles
Victoria, GO 8/74
13 Feb. 1874

Seymour Bty of G.A.
New Westminster,
GO 17/74, 10 July, 1874

Victoria Bty of G.A.
Victoria, GO 17/78
19 July 1878


B.C. Provisional Regiment of G.A.
Victoria, GO 22/83, 12 Oct. 1883
No. 1 Bty New Westminster
No. 2 Bty Victoria
No. 3 Bty Victoria
No. 4 Bty Victoria

Victoria Rifle Coy
Victoria, GO 22/83
12 Oct. 1883

Name Changed to British
Columbia Brigade of Garrison
Artillery, GO 9/86,
7 May, 1886

No B.C. Battalion of G.A.
Btys now called Coys, March, 1893
no GO. Coys renumbered, GO 51/93
25 Aug. 1893
No. 1 Coy Victoria
No. 2 Coy Victoria
No. 3 Coy Victoria
No. 4 Coy New Westminster
No. 5 Coy Vancouver (When organized)

Name changed to the 5th B.C. Regiment
Canadian Artillery, increased to 6 Coys,
GO 58/95, 28 Dec. 1895



Independent Rifle Coys Authorized at,

A Nelson,
 B Kamloops
 C Kaslo
 D Revelstoke
 1 July, 1898

Rossland Rifle Coy

↓ ↙
 Independent Coys to be known as the Rocky Mountain Rangers,

A Nelson
 B Kamloops
 C Rossland
 D Revelstoke
 E Kaslo
 1 Dec., 1900

↓
 Two Indept Coys of Inf, with the Coys of R.M.R.s at Kaslo,
 Nelson and Rossland to form a four Coy Regt., to be
 known as the 102 Regt. 1, April, 1908

R.H.Q. Nelson
 A Rossland
 B Nelson
 C Kaslo
 D Nelson

↓
 Two Independent Coys at Kamloops and Revelstoke
 to be joined with 102 Regt., now
 called 102 R.M.R.s 1, June, 1909

↓
 R.H.Q. Nelson
 A Rossland
 B Nelson
 C Kaslo
 D Nelson
 E Kamloops
 F Revelstoke

Armstrong Coy of Inf
 Authorized, 1, June, 1908

↘ ↙
 Independent Coy Inf Armstrong
 absorbed by the 102 R.M.R.s 1, Mar., 1912

102 R.M.R.s Reorganized, 1, May, 1912
 A Rossland
 B Nelson
 C Nelson
 D Kaslo
 E Revelstoke
 F Armstrong

102 R.M.R.s Reorganized, 26, Oct., 1912

A Kamloops
 B Kamloops
 C Armstrong
 D Revelstoke



G Coy authorized at Vernon, 102, R.M.R.s
 15, Sept., 1913



E Coy authorized at Kelowna, 102 R.M.R.s
 15, Nov., 1913



F Coy authorized at Salmon Arm, 102,
 R.M.R.s 16, Mar., 1914



A Kamloops
 B Kamloops
 C Armstrong
 D Revelstoke
 E Kelowna
 F Salmon Arm
 G Vernon

30th and 31st British Columbia Horse

Independent Mted Troop Vernon
authorized, 1 July, 1898



Independent Mted Troop Vernon
disbanded, 1 August, 1899



Independent Sqdn Mted Rifles
authorized at Okanagan,
1 April, 1908 (unofficially known
as the Okanagan Mted Rifles)

OMR HQ - A Kamloops
B Vernon



Independent Sqdn now known as
the Canadian Mted Rifles,
20 May, 1909
A Sqdn Kamloops
B Sqdn Vernon



Canadian Mted Rifles, two
additional sqdns authorized,
1 April, 1910
A Sqdn Kamloops
B Sqdn Vernon
C Sqdn Coldstream
D Sqdn Lower Nicola



Canadian Mted Rifles now called the
British Columbia Horse, 1 April, 1910



B.C.H. Increased by four sqdns to form
two four sqdn regiments, 1 April, 1911 -
1st and 2nd B.C.H. GO 197

2nd B.C.H. composed of
B and C Sqdns of the 1st
B.C.H., 1 Dec, 1911



1st B.C.H. composed of
as of 1 Dec., 1911
HQ. Sqdn Vernon
A Sqdn Lumby
B Sqdn Vernon
C Sqdn Armstrong
D Sqdn Kelowna




2nd B.C.H. now composed, as
 of 1 March, 1912, of
 HQ. Sqdn Merritt
 A Sqdn Kamloops
 B Sqdn Salmon Arm
 C Sqdn Walkachin
 D Sqdn Merritt

1st B.C.H.
 HQ. Sqdn Vernon
 A Sqdn Lumbeys
 B Sqdn Vernon
 C Sqdn Armstrong
 D Sqdn Kelowna

Victoria Independent
 Sqdn authorized,
 15 July, 1914

Victoria Independent Sqdn
 absorbed into the 1st, (Now
 30 B.C.H.) 6 Nov., 1914

25 July 1713 GO 138
 HQ Vernon
 A Lumbeys
 B Vernon
 C Enderby
 D Kelowna



APPENDIX VII

GOVERNORS-GENERAL OF CANADA 1871-1914

Lord Lisgar	-22 May, 1872
Earl of Dufferin	25 June, 1872
Marquis of Lorne	25 May, 1878
Marquis of Lansdowne	23 October, 1883
Lord Stanley of Preston	11 June, 1888
Earl of Aberdeen	18 September, 1893
Lord Minto	12 November, 1898
Earl Grey	10 December, 1904
Duke of Connaught	13 October, 1911

APPENDIX VIII

GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING THE CANADIAN MILITIA
1871-1914

Colonel Patrick Robertson-Ross	5 May, 1869
Major-General Edward Selby-Smyth	1 October, 1874
Major-General R.G. Amherst Luard	5 August, 1880
Major-General Frederick D. Middleton	12 July, 1884
Major-General Ivor Caradoc Herbert	20 November, 1890
Major-General W.J. Cascoigne	19 September, 1895
Major-General E.T.H. Hutton	30 June, 1898
Major-General R.H. O'Grady-Haley	19 July, 1900
Major-General Lord Dundonald	28 July, 1902
Brigadier-General Sir P.H.N. Lake Chief of the General Staff	17 November, 1904
Major-General B.H. Vidal Chief of the General Staff	March, 1908
Major-General Sir P.H.N. Lake Inspector General (Chief Military Adviser)	1 April, 1909
Major-General W.D. Otter Inspector General	1 April, 1911
Major-General W.H. Cotton Inspector General	1 December, 1913

APPENDIX IX

SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR COLONIES
(IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT)

Earl of Kimberely	6 July, 1870-21 February, 1874
Earl of Carnarvon	21 February, 1874-4 February, 1878
Sir Michael E. Hicks-Beach	4 February, 1874-28 April, 1880
Earl of Kimberley	28 April, 1880-16 December, 1882
Earl of Derby	16 December, 1882-24 June, 1885
Colonel F.A. Stanley (later Earl of Derby)	24 June, 1885-6 February, 1886
Earl Granville	6 February, 1886-3 August, 1886
Edward Stanhope	3 August, 1886-14 January, 1887
Sir Henry Thurston (later Viscount Knutsford)	14 January, 1887-17 August, 1892
Marquis of Ripon	17 August, 1892-28 June, 1895
Sir Joseph Chamberlain	28 June, 1895-9 October, 1903
Alfred Lyttleton	9 October, 1903-11 December, 1905
Earl of Elgin	11 December, 1905-16 April, 1908
Earl of Crewe	16 April, 1908-7 November, 1910
Lewis Harcourt	7 November, 1910- 1915

APPENDIX X

MINISTERS OF MILITIA AND DEFENCE
1871-1914

Prime Minister: Sir John A. Macdonald (Conservative)

Sir George E. Cartier	1 July, 1867
Hugh McDonald	1 July, 1873

Prime Minister: Sir Alexander Mackenzie (Liberal)

William Ross	7 November, 1873
William B. Vail	30 September, 1874
A.G. Jones	21 January, 1878

Prime Minister: Sir John A. Macdonald (Conservative)

C.F.R. Masson	19 October, 1878
Mackenzie Bowell	19 October, 1878
Sir Alexander Campbell	16 January, 1880
Sir Adolph Caron	8 November, 1880

Prime Minister: Sir J.J.C. Abbott (Conservative)

Sir Adolph Caron	8 November, 1880
Mackenzie Bowell,	25 January, 1892

Prime Minister: Sir John Thompson (Conservative)

J.C. Patterson	5 December, 1892
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Prime Minister: Sir Mackenzie Bowell (Conservative)

J.C. Patterson	5 December, 1892
A.R. Dickey	26 March, 1895
A. Desjardins	15 January, 1896

Prime Minister: Sir Charles Tupper (Conservative)

A. Desjardins	15 January, 1896
D. Tisdale	27 April, 1896

Prime Minister: Sir Wilfrid Laurier (Liberal)

Sir Frederick Borden	13 July, 1896
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Prime Minister: Sir Robert Borden (Conservative)

Sir Sam Hughes	10 October, 1911
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APPENDIX XI

DEPUTY ADJUTANTS-GENERAL MILITARY DISTRICT NO. 11
1871-1914

Lieutenant-Colonel C.F. Houghton	1871 - 1 November, 1880
Colonel J.W. Laurie	1880 - 1881
Captain C.T. Dupont	1881 - 1882
Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Holmes	1883 - 1894
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Peters	1895 - 1901
Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Holmes	1901 - 1910
Colonel J. Peters	1910 - 1911
Lieutenant-Colonel R.L. Wadmore	1911 - 1913
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Roy	1913 -